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Abstract
In this thesis I develop a syntactic representation of control that is PRO-free. I 
implement a mechanism of theta-role assignment that uses theta-role percolation 
(Neeleman and Van de Koot (2002)), which enables the apparent subject properties of 
controlled infinitives to be reinterpreted as properties associated with an external 
theta-role, rather than a subject. I first analyse Obligatory Control using a de- 
compositional analysis of theta-roles (independently motivated in Samek-Lodovici 
2003), according to which theta-roles are divided into two selectional requirements, 
one that formally licenses arguments and another that regulates interpretation. It is the 
latter one that regulates Obligatory Control, by being copied to the controller in the 
super-ordinate clause. The resulting theory makes the same predictions as one based 
on PRO, yet avoids dependence on this ill-defined element inherited from the GB era. 
I then offer an account of the case-agreement properties of predicates in Icelandic 
infinitival clauses; this data shows not only that PRO is unnecessary but that it cannot 
actually fulfill the task for which it was proposed. An extra-syntactic analysis is 
developed for Non-Obligatory Control, since this relation is not syntactically 
constrained in the way that Obligatory Control is. I claim that in non-obligatory 
control structures the external theta-role is not saturated syntactically. This 
unassigned role is subject to an LF-interpretative rule that attributes it with a 
[+human] specification. This rule suffices for cases in which the interpreted subject is 
understood generically, but in long-distance control structures, this [+human] 
specification is further supplemented by a discourse rule that links the theta-role to a 
highly accessible antecedent, as developed in Ariel (1996). An attempt is made to 
generalise the rules operative in non-obligatory control structures, to the null-objects
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in Rizzi (1986), the consequence of which is that no null-element would be projected 
in these constructions either and the object properties would be reinterpreted in terms 
of the internal theta-role complex. In the final chapter, I offer an analysis of partial 
control (Landau 2000). On the basis of the ambiguous properties pervading this 
relation, which belong to both obligatory- and non-obligatory control, I analyse 
partial control as obligatory control + non-obligatory control.
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Chapter 1
The PRO Problem
1.1 In tro d u c tio n
The topic of this thesis is the syntactic representation of control and in particular 
whether such a representation requires a null-argument to be projected in the subject 
position of infinitivals. I will focus on examples like (l)a) and b), as well as examples 
like (2)a) and b).
(1) a. Bilh hoped PROi to win
b. Bill ordered Beni PROi to dance
(2) a. PRO To finish off one sentence in peace would be nice
b. Beni said to Betty that PROi to get there on time will be very difficult
At a purely descriptive level, control constructions involve an infinitival clause with 
an understood subject, which may or may not gain its reference from a structurally 
represented antecedent. The sentences in (1) are prototypical examples of Obligatory 
Control. In these cases, the infinitival is the complement of a matrix verb and the 
understood subject in this infinitival must refer to a designated argument in the super­
ordinate clause. This may be the subject, as in (a), or the object, as in (b). The 
argument that determines the reference of the understood subject is the controller and 
the understood subject the controllee. In contrast the sentences in (2) are examples of 
Non-Obligatory Control. In these constructions, the infinitival’s inferred subject is
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either uncontrolled, in that it has no structurally represented antecedent at all, as in
(a), or its controller is arbitrarily far away, as in (b). That the controller can indeed 
skip more than one argument in examples such as (b) can be made apparent by a 
simple this-is-the-house-that-Jack-built-type example, wherein the understood subject 
can be equated with the argument in the super-ordinate clause, in the face of one, as 
in (3)a), or even two, as in (3)b), intervening arguments:
(3) a. Beni complained that Betty had said that PROi to get there on time 
would be very difficult because hei lived only two stops away.
b. Beni complained that Betty had said that Binty agreed that PROi to 
get there on time would be very difficult, because hei only lived two 
stops away.
In both control relations, obligatory and non-obligatory control, the understood 
subject is standardly represented as PRO (see Chomsky (1981), Chomsky and Lasnik 
(1993), Martin (1996) and Landau (2000)). But a question pervading both of these 
constructions is whether it is necessary or indeed desirable to utilise PRO. Most 
analyses do assume PRO at the syntactic level, so before rejecting it prematurely, it is 
worth reviewing what use it has served.
One use is that of maintaining a uniform analysis of syntactically regulated elements 
across both finite and infinitival clauses. Locality, for example, is a property of 
reflexives; they adhere strictly to Principle A, which demands they be bound locally, 
within their binding domain. But their occurrence in infinitival clauses, as in (4), 
means that without recourse to a null-subject to retain their locality property, 
Principle A must be complicated. For the matrix object to be the reflexive’s 
antecedent the whole clause must constitute the binding domain of the reflexive, but
13
this does not explain why it must be the matrix object, rather than the subject, which 
is the antecedent.
(4) a. [Bill persuaded Ben [to enjoy himself]]
With PRO’s inclusion Principle A is upheld, since the binding domain is the 
infinitival clause, and the accessible subject that binds the reflexive is PRO. In this 
way, the semantic antecedent can be restricted to the matrix object, since whatever 
controls PRO is also interpretatively linked to the reflexive, the latter being bound by 
PRO:
b. [Bill persuaded Ben [PRO to enjoy himself]]
A similar argument provides a solution for secondary predicates in infinitivals. The 
depictive is predicated of whatever controls PRO, again in this case, the matrix 
object:
(5) Ben persuaded Bill [PRO to dance naked]
Lastly, use of PRO also avoids a revision of locality that might otherwise be needed 
to cover floating quantifiers in infinitivals. If they are bound by a controlled PRO 
within their clause, the obligatory requirement that all refer to the pupils, and not the 
teachers in (6) is gained for free, since again it is the matrix object which controls 
PRO:
(6) The teachers urged the pupils [PRO to all learn their lines]
There is then an advantage in introducing this category, since it keeps existing
theories about the behaviour of other syntactic phenomena intact, ridding us of the
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need to complicate the principles that govern them. But this comes at a cost. What is 
PRO? It isn’t an A-bar trace, since unlike an A-bar trace, PRO exhibits anaphoric 
properties, as in (7)a), cannot (arguably) receive case, as illustrated in (b), nor does it 
reconstruct, as evidenced by (c). If someone in (c) could reconstruct, it would 
reconstruct into the subject position of ‘to impress’, in which case quantifier raising 
of everyone should be possible across it. But the sentence is unambiguous indicating 
that reconstruction into PRO is not an option:
(7) a *Beni said that Bill hoped PROi to win the race
a’) Which book did Ben say that Bill told Betty to buy twhich book
b) *PROnom won the race
b’) Which race did he win twhich race(Acc)
c) Someonei left in order PROi to impress everyone
= There exists a person, such that that person left in order to impress 
everyone
4- For each person there is someone who left in order to impress them
c’) Which picture of Ben does Bill like t
= which x, does Bill like [x picture of Ben ]
Its anaphoric properties guard against PRO being analysed as small pro, which shows 
exclusively pronominal behaviour, in needing no overt argument as a referential 
source at all, as in (8)a), and when pro does have an antecedent, that antecedent need 
not be local, as in example (b), where pro is bound by an antecedent across a finite 
clause:
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(8) a. pro vamos a la playa
pro go(lpl) to the beach 
‘Let’s go to the beach’
(Spanish)
b. Juani dijo queproi es muy bajo
‘Juan said that he is(3sg) very short’
But if PRO is an anaphor (see Manzini (1983) and Koster (1987)), it is a very unusual 
one, since unlike overt anaphors it is usually taken to be restricted to the subject 
position of infinitivals, as in (9)a) and gerunds, as in (b):
(9) a. *Bill said that himself to behave will prove rather difficult
a’. PRO to behave himself will prove rather difficult
b. *Bill said that himself talking out loud in the library is forbidden
b’) PRO talking to myself out loud in the library is forbidden
It does not behave as an NP-trace either, which forms a chain between a theta- and a 
case-position, an issue to which I return later:
(10) a) Billi seems f  to like Ben
b) *Bill tried t* to like Ben
So PRO, not falling clearly under any category, remains ad hoc. To remedy this, one 
could continue to develop a theory of PRO itself, trying to reconcile its ambiguous 
properties within the typology of empty categories. But the alternative pursued here is 
to do without it altogether. In fact, this aim will become the foremost desideratum for 
the theory of control to be developed within:
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(11) I Our theory of control should not rely on an ad hoc category such as
PRO
Meeting the first of our desiderata should not, however, cause us to lose an account 
for the subject properties of controlled infinitivals, which we saw in examples (4), (5) 
and (6). The second of our desiderata can therefore be stated as below:
(12) II Our theory should account for the subject properties of the infinitival
Dispensing with PRO is not a unique innovation of this particular thesis, in fact there 
is a steady line of analyses that have had this aim in mind (see Bresnan 1978, 1982 
and Brame 1977 and Evers 1988). The reduction of obligatory control to another 
syntactic relation also follows a familiar trend (see Williams 1980, in which control is 
reduced to predication, Manzini 1983, where control is reduced to binding, Homstein 
2000, in which it is analysed as movement and Landau 2000, which adopts an 
agreement-based approach).1 However, as will become clear in the next section, the 
properties of obligatory control do not reflect any one of these relations in particular, 
rather it is the case that all syntactically regulated relations exhibit a set of shared 
properties, so in the main they provide general fuel for a syntactic account of control, 
rather then a particular direction within the syntax.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 lays out the key properties 
of control, starting with Obligatory Control and going on to look at the sub-categories 
within this relation, namely the Exhaustive and Partial Control of Landau (2000). I 
then outline the way in which the properties of Non-Obligatory Control differ from 
the syntactically regulated relation of obligatory control. In this same section, I 
illustrate why it is important to keep non-obligatory and obligatory control separate; a
1 For an early semantic/categorial account, which derives the interpretation of obligatory control 
constructions from the arguments of the higher predicate, see especially Bach (1979).
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brief look at Bhatt and Izvorski (1998) will demonstrate what is lost if we obscure the 
line between these two, rather different, relations. The section ends with a review of 
two conditions for obligatory control retained in this thesis, yet rejected in Landau 
(2000), namely c-command and split antecedents. A closer inspection of the examples 
used to dismiss these conditions will lead us to reinstate them to their original place 
as core criteria to which obligatory control must adhere. In section 1.3, I examine 
several theories that have sought to reduce control to other relations, starting with the 
most recent reduction of Landau (2000) in which control is reduced to Agree. 
Landau’s peculiar instantiation of Agree is examined and questions are raised as to its 
motivation. And of particular interest for the purposes of the present thesis is the way 
in which the anaphoric nature of the controlled infinitival clause is represented 
without any direct contribution from PRO, making the additional attribution of PRO 
as an anaphor in this work superfluous. Having looked at a reduction which retains 
PRO, I move on in section 1.3.2, to one that does without it altogether, namely 
Homstein (2000) in which control is reduced to Move. It will be argued that 
reduction in this direction leads to empirical problems that an optimal theory of 
control should seek to avoid. The modifications to Theta-theory in particular, result in 
empirical set-backs which weigh heavily against the purported benefits of this 
enterprise. In section 1.3.3,1 turn to a third way of reducing control, namely that of 
binding. I return to the properties that syntactic dependencies share generally, before 
singling out two that set binding and control apart from movement. Koster (1987) and 
Manzini (1983) provide precedents for reduction in this direction and a brief look at 
Manzini (1983) will demonstrate that the empirical terrain a reduction of control to 
binding can cover is extensive. The spirit of the present thesis gains much from these 
earlier binding-based analyses, only it is of a more contemporary bent. In particular 
notions of government, which stem from the GB era are left behind. There are 
important differences, however, between the binding of lexical anaphors and the 
binding relation between the antecedent and the dependent in obligatory control, as 
illustrated in Lasnik (1992). I will look at some of these concerns with a view to
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demonstrating later that the theory of control developed within expects the 
differences noted in this work and can avoid the problems raised. In particular, we 
will see that the differences observed concern the elements themselves, namely 
lexical anaphors and PRO, rather than the relation between these elements. That an 
anaphoric relation can be maintained, without recourse to an anaphoric empty 
category is made clear by the next work I turn to, namely Borer (1989). In this work, 
the anaphoric relation between the controlled infinitival clause and a designated 
argument in the super-ordinate clause is established without any contribution from 
PRO. In its place, Borer (1989) inserts pro as the subject of controlled clauses. The 
present account will seek to maintain this dislocation between the anaphoric relation 
and an anaphoric element that Borer (1989) achieves, but will do so without any null 
element posited at all. The aim of looking at these existing attempts at reduction of 
control has been to finish with a set of desiderata for the present work. Thus the 
chapter concludes with section 1.4, by setting out what an optimal theory of control 
must do: the problems it must avoid, the generalisations it should not lose and the 
questions it must address.
1.2 Properties of Control
1.2.1 Properties of Obligatory Control
The understood subject of obligatorily controlled clauses requires a theta-marked 
argument as its antecedent and this antecedent must be local, c-commanding and 
unique:2
2 To begin with, for ease of exposition only, I represent the null-argument as PRO.
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(13) a. Billi tried [PRO* to organise himself]
b. *Iti was tried [PRO* to organise himself]
c. *Billi thinks it was tried [PROi to organise himself]
d. *BilFsi aunt tried [PRO* to organise himself]
e. *Billi asked Benj [PROi&j to kiss Bobby behind the bike shed]
Example (13)b) shows that an argument bearing no theta-role cannot be an 
antecedent, whilst (c) demonstrates that the empty subject is subject to a locality 
constraint. The example in (d) establishes that the empty subject must be c- 
commanded by its antecedent and (e) shows that it cannot host split antecedents.3 To 
this list of constraints, Homstein (2000) adds the obligatorily sloppy reading of PRO 
under ellipsis and the forced de se interpretation of PRO ((g) to (i) from Homstein 
2000):
f. Billi wanted PROi to escape and Ben did too (=Ben wanted Ben to 
escape)
g. The unfortunate expects that he will get a medal
h. The unfortunate expect that getting a medal will be boring
i. The unfortunate! expects [PROi to get a medal] (= false under OC)
(F) is self-explanatory, but (g) requires one to imagine the unfortunate as an amnesic 
war veteran watching himself, without recognising himself, in a medal ceremony on 
TV. Under these circumstances, although (g) and (h) can be said to represent the 
unfortunate’s beliefs, (i) cannot. But if locality is operative in both of the examples in
3 More recently (see Landau 2000), the inclusion of condition (d) and (e) have been rejected as criteria 
for obligatory control. In the next sub-section, I take issue with this rejection.
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(g) and (h), we expect both the obligatory sloppy in (g) and the de se reading in (h); 
allowing us to restrict our attention to the properties in (a -  e) in what follows.
In Homstein (2000), it is claimed as an advantage of the movement-based theory of 
control that the ‘de se’ reading can be derived; two theta-roles are assigned to one 
expression, the semantic repercussions of which are that a compound monadic 
predicate is formed:
(14) John Xx [x hopes x leave] (Homstein 2000, (his 39))
But we will see later that the derivation of the ‘de se interpretation’ is not a 
peculiarity of a movement-based analysis of control, which means that these 
examples do not provide support for the control-as-movement enterprise.
1.2.2 Exhaustive Control versus Partial Control
The obligatory control category has recently been revised in Landau (2000), which 
provides data showing that there are instances of obligatory control which conform to 
core obligatory control properties, but depart from them in one respect, in that a strict 
identity between the matrix controller and the controllee is not required. In cases of 
partial control, the reference of PRO need only include the controller but need not be 
exhausted by it; it could also include additional individuals:4
(15) a. Beni managed [PROi to eat all the pies] Exhaustive Control 
b. *Benj managed [PROi+ to eat all the pies]
4 The speakers of English that I have asked either find partial control very marked or completely out 
(myself included). We will return to this issue in chapter five. But see Landau (2001) for extensive 
evidence of this phenomenon being productive cross-linguistically.
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(16) a. Beni refused [PROi+to meet at 6] Partial Control
b. *Benirefused [PROg* to meet at 6]
This phenomenon, first noted in Williams (1980), is found in control cases which 
have a collective predicate in the embedded clause. Importantly, if these predicates 
are syntactically plural, partial control is not an option:
(17) a. * Bill told Ben he preferred to meet each other at 6
b. *Bill told Ben he regretted having talked about themselves
The key difference then between exhaustive control and partial control is that in 
partial control a syntactically singular subject can control a semantically plural PRO, 
an option unavailable in exhaustive control constructions. In all other respects, partial 
and exhaustive control share the same properties and behave in unison with regard to 
the aforementioned diagnostics in (13).
Aside from (13)b), the constraints to which obligatory control conforms are all 
structural ones, making a syntactic account for this relation more obvious then a 
purely semantic one such as in Culicover and Jackendoff (2001), where this structural 
pattern remains incidental. But it does not argue for any particular account within the 
syntax, since the same properties have been used to reduce control to predication 
(Williams 1980), to binding (Manzini 1983) and more recently, to movement 
(Homstein 2000).
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1.2.3 Properties o f Non-Obligatory Control
The criteria that we have just seen to be operative in obligatory control do not seem to 
regulate non-obligatory control. Williams (1980) noted that although non-obligatory 
control relations may conform to some obligatory control criteria, they do not exhibit 
all and in some instances lack them entirely. In sum, these restrictions amounted to a 
need for a unique, local, c-commanding antecedent. These criteria alone, give us the 
following candidates for non-obligatory control: infinitival subject clauses, as in (18), 
controlled interrogative complements, shown in (19), verbal gerunds as in (20), 
control with implicit arguments, displayed in (21) and lastly, long-distance control, in 
example (22):
(18) [To go to the lecture drunk] wasn’t one of your best ideas
(19) [Peter knows [cphow [to fix the head gasket]]]
(20) [Walking back home yesterday], a brick fell on my head
(21) a. [It is fun [to dance]]
(It is fun for x, for x to dance)
b. [[To finish off one sentence in peace] would be nice] (for x)
(22) Peter said that to get there on time would be very difficult
Infinitival subjects, verbal gerunds and implicit control constructions have no 
structurally represented antecedent at all. The interrogative complement, illustrated in 
example (19), does have a non-local argument in the super-ordinate clause, but this is
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not the antecedent for the understood subject in the infinitival, which carries a generic 
interpretation. The long-distance control case, as its name suggests, breaks the 
locality condition, and it also tolerates split antecedents, separating it further from 
obligatory control, which does not:
(23) Peter said to Paul that to get there on time would be very difficult for them
In fact, the properties that obligatory control shares with other syntactic relations, 
which we have just seen to be absent in non-obligatory control should be reflected in 
an optimal theory of control. With that in mind, the third of our desiderata for control 
can be stated:
(24) III. Our theory of control should provide an account for why obligatory
control is subject to four conditions, which non-obligatory control is 
not: there is an obligatory antecedent, which must be unique, be local 
and must c-command its understood subject.
In contrast to the absence of restrictions that characterise non-obligatory control, this 
relation is subject to a semantic restriction which obligatory control is not. As noted 
in Manzini (1983), in all examples of non-obligatory control, the understood subject 
must be interpreted as human. To see the contrast between the two relations, consider 
the examples below. In obligatory control, in both subject- and object-control cases, it 
is possible to have non-human subjects acting as antecedents of the infinitivals:
(25) a. This booki promises PRO* to be a great read
b. The filnii tries PRO* to convey a humane side to Pol Pot.
c. The farmer needed the cropi PROi to exceed last year’s quota
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Non-obligatory control, however, does not have this option; its understood subjects 
must always be human. To see this, look at (26)a) below. In this example, no verb has 
been used that forces a human interpretation of the infinitival subject, yet human it 
must be. Despite the inclusion of a potential antecedent, namely the book and the fact 
that no human is mentioned, the book cannot act as antecedent for the infinitival, 
which is interpreted as a ‘generic human’ (to be better defined as we proceed), where 
its most accurate paraphrase is provided in (b) and not (c):
(26) a. This book is a great example of how to entertain children.
b. This book is a great example of how one can entertain children
c. This book is a great example of how books can entertain children
With the delineation between obligatory and non-obligatory control in place, we are 
ready to state the fourth of the desiderata that should fall out from the theory of 
control to be developed within:
(27) IV Our theory should account for why the understood subject in non-
obligatory control must be human.
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1.2.4 Blurring the distinction between Obligatory and N on-
Obligatory Control
One of the principal claims in Bhatt and Izvorski (1998) is that there is no difference 
between the PRO-subject in arbitrary control constructions and the PRO-subject in 
obligatory control constructions. In each instance, the same element is operative, 
namely a dependent one that always requires an antecedent for its interpretation. The 
difference that these PROs exude in their interpretation is due to their respective 
controllers and not to any intrinsic distinction within the empty category itself. To 
motivate a uniform analysis of PRO, the authors claim that controlled PRO can occur 
in all the environments in which PROaib can and the examples below are offered as 
evidence (Bhatt and Izvorski’s 3 and 4):
(28) a. Matti knows how PRO* to behave himself
b. Matt knows how PROarb to behave oneself5
(29) a. It’s fun PROi to indulge ourselvesi
b. It’s fun PROi to indulge oneself
However, none of these examples qualify on present criteria as instance of obligatory 
control. Both interrogative complements and control by implicit arguments are 
aligned under non-obligatory control within the current analysis, making the 
parallelism between the two entirely expected from this perspective. This is not 
purely terminological because under the present account, placing interrogatives under 
obligatory control makes a prediction, namely that the semantic restriction, which 
demands that understood subject in non-obligatory controlled clauses be minimally
3 This sentence is unavailable to me and to a number of other native speakers of standard English with
whom I conferred.
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interpreted as human, is suspended -  a fact not borne out by the data. I repeat the 
relevant example below, which shows that despite providing a potential antecedent 
and not using a verb which requires a human agent, the understood subject of the 
infinitival must be human:
(30) This book is a great example of how to entertain children
So making a different cut is not without repercussions, because that cut will make 
different predictions about what sentences can mean. If we take a couple of examples 
whose obligatory control status is uncontroversial, the distributional evidence in fact 
favours a demarcation between the two relations rather than their assimilation:
(31) a. Peter tried/promised/hoped to control himself
a’. *Peter tried/promised/hoped to control oneself
b. Peter persuaded/ordered Pauli to behave himselfi
b ’. *Peter persuaded/ordered Paul to behave oneself
I return in the next section to two criteria for obligatory control leaned on in this
thesis, yet rejected in Landau (2000), namely c-command and the ban on split
antecedents. I will demonstrate that contra Landau (2000), both are very much
operative in the obligatory control relation, thereby re-establishing their status as
criteria to which obligatory control relations must adhere.
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1.2.5 A note on the c-command- and the split-antecedent-restriction 
on obligatory control.
Landau (2000) has questioned whether both the c-command restriction and the ban on 
split antecedents on obligatory control actually hold, citing the following as counter 
examples:6
(32) a. %Yesterday, it spoiled Marysis’ mood PROi/*arb to listen to the news
b. PROi/BilPs2/hisi/*2 making that comment was very rude of John
(33) a. %Johni promised his soni PROi&j to go to the movies together
b. %Johni persuaded Maryj PROi&j to kiss in the library
(Landau’s 10 a & b and 11 a & b)
(32)a) shows apparent control of PRO by a DP embedded within the matrix object, 
thereby breaking c-command and (33) is intended to illustrate that PRO in 
obligatorily controlled clauses can tolerate split antecedents. This is so in both typical 
subject- (a) and object-controlled constructions (b).
The observation that syntactic relations adhere to c-command has become firmly 
established since its introduction in Reinhart (1976); naturally this does not render the 
c-command condition exempt from questioning, but it does mean that the justification 
for its suspension must be very strong. Before addressing Landau’s particular
6 The ‘%’ mark is my own addition and based on my own judgements and those of six other native 
speakers with whom I conferred. It represents the fact that these constructions are considered marked 
or ungrammatical by over half of my informants.
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example, it is worth noting the extent to which this restriction bears on grammatical 
dependencies generally. Properties that hold of what are arguably syntactic 
dependencies have been clearly distinguished from those that hold of non-syntactic 
operations, as demonstrated in Koster (1986). Five properties that are manifest in the 
binding of anaphors, of negative polarity items, in movement and in predication yet 
absent in extra-syntactic affairs, are illustrated. These properties are listed below:
(34) a. obligatory presence of an antecedent
b. c-command by that antecedent
c. uniqueness of that antecedent (i.e. no split antecedents)
d. permission of antecedent to take multiple dependents of the same type
e. locality restriction between antecedent and its dependent(s)
For present purposes it suffices to concentrate on (b) and (c), namely c-command and 
the ban on split antecedents. Antecedents must conform to these conditions in regard 
to their dependents in operations of movement, as in (35), in binding (both negative 
polarity items and reflexives), as in example (36) and secondary predicates, as shown 
in (37) (see especially Neeleman and van de Koot 2002).
(35) a. * Which book] did you wonder which CD2 Ben bought ti&2
(*split antecedents) 
b. *Ben said to twho that Bill wondered who Betty bought pyjamas
(* c-command)
(36) a. *Beni showed Bill2 h im self^  (*split antecedents)
b. *Beni’s mother looked at himselfi (*c-command)
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(37) a. ♦Beni met Bilk drunki&2
b. *Bensi’s brother met Bill drunki
(♦split antecedents)7 
(♦c-command)
Let us concentrate on c-command first. Given the rather robust nature of this 
condition and extent of its grammatical applicability, the evidence for its disposal 
must be pretty bullet proof. Rejecting c-command on the basis of the two counter­
examples in (32) is perhaps not sufficient justification at a conceptual level, but that 
aside, empirically, one is treading rather thin ground, since lone examples are quite 
vulnerable to being explained away, and with that one’s original argumentation. The 
example in (32)a) falls short because it is not an indisputable example of obligatory 
control and for c-command to be rejected as a restriction on this relation, it must be 
tested on examples whose obligatory control status is not in doubt. Such examples are 
conspicuously absent:
(38) a. ♦Billi ’s brother persuaded Ben PROi to dance
b. ♦Beni’s teacher tried PROi to detain Bill
c. ♦ [The cousin of [Beni ]] hoped PROi to win the title
The example in (32) in fact meets one of Landau’s diagnostics for non-obligatory 
control, namely permission of long-distance antecedents:
(39) Every boyi said that it spoilt the party PROi to listen to his father playing the 
tuba.
7 Note that this sentence is compatible with a situation in which Ben happened to be drunk when he 
met Bill, who was also drunk, but syntactically speaking, this is incidental; the depictive can be 
predicated of only one of these arguments.
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Given the availability of long-distance relations, Landau’s example cannot be 
classified as obligatory control with confidence and its validity as a counter to c- 
command is less solid. The example in (32)b) is similarly problematic because it also
cannot be categorised as obligatory control with confidence. The availability of the
pronoun, for example, would suggest that it be classified as non-obligatory control. 
The obligatory co-reference between the understood subject of the gerund and John 
stems from the fact that pragmatically, it is very odd to say that it is rude of John for 
Bill to say something. Support for this comes from an example that does not involve 
control, but the semantic anomaly remains:
(40) #That Bill made that comment was very rude of John
So much for the rejection of c-command, but let us return to the issue of split 
antecedents and those particular examples which were the motivation for renunciation 
of this condition:
(41) a. %Johni promised his soni PROi&j to go to the movies together
b. %Johni persuaded Maryj PROi&j to kiss in the library
Turning to the example in (41)a) first, note the category of the verb in the super­
ordinate clause, which under Landau’s analysis (see Landau 2000, p38, (29f)) is a so- 
called ‘desiderative’ verb and thus falls within the class of partial control verbs. This 
means that it will license a reading in which the reference of the understood subject of 
its controlled clause can exceed that provided by the controller. That is, we expect 
those speakers who accept partial control constructions to be able to get a reading that 
includes both the subject (i.e. the controller) and additional individuals. These 
additional individuals may, but need not, be represented structurally, so the sentence 
should be compatible with a reading in which the matrix object is included in the 
reference of PRO. This possibility, therefore, does not support an argument for split
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syntactic antecedents. One prediction which falls out from this argument is that only 
those speakers who accept partial control constructions will accept (41)a) and, 
although wider corroboration is needed to make this result worth its salt, the 
speakers I have asked so far do conform to this expectation: the same four speakers 
that reject partial control constructions absolutely, also reject the purported split 
antecedent effect in the promise example, whereas Landau’s informants accept both.
The object-control example in (41)b) is also problematic as evidence against the split 
syntactic antecedent restriction for the very same reason, namely the type of verb 
used in the embedded clause. Persuade is omitted from the categorisation of partial 
and exhaustive control verbs in Landau (2000), on page 38, leaving us unclear as to 
its classification. If it is an exhaustive control verb, then the fact that some speakers 
accept (41)b) is potentially problematic. At first glance, the one type of verb class in 
the exhaustive control category with which it might pattern is the implicative class; 
force and compel, for example, are categorised as such (see Landau 2000, page 38). A 
prime example of an implicative verb is manage, a verb which the reader will recall 
from a repetition of (15) below, does not license a partial control reading:
(15) a. Beni managed [PROi to eat all the pies] 
b. *Beni managed [PROi+ to eat all the pies]
One of the decisive tests used in Landau (2000) to determine whether or not a verb is 
implicative is to look at its complement. The complement of an implicative verb 
should lack tense and hence be unable to bear a tense at odds with that of the matrix 
verb:
(42) *Yesterday, John managed to solve the problem tomorrow
But persuade does not pattern with manage in this respect:
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(43) Yesterday, John persuaded Peter to take his aunt to the pictures on Friday
Indeed, force, which is categorised as implicative and hence an exhaustive control 
verb in Landau (2000), also exhibits this anomaly:
(44) Yesterday, John forced Peter to take his aunt to the pictures on 
Friday.
Landau (2000) develops an argument such that the crucial factor distinguishing 
partial from exhaustive control verbs is (semantic) tense. Unlike partial control 
complements, exhaustive control complements have no independent tense and hence 
they must be interpreted as simultaneous with the matrix event:
(45) PC-complements are tensed; EC-complements are untensed
The failure of both force and persuade to pass this test, implies either that implicative 
verbs straddle the partial- and exhaustive control class, or that they are not 
implicative verbs. Which ever it is, the original example’s credibility as proof of split- 
control being licensed is somewhat undermined. To test reliably whether speakers 
can truly accept split syntactic antecedents it is perhaps better to choose verbs that do 
not carry this complication. Once we do so, the availability of split antecedents for 
the understood subject disappears:
(46) a. *Johni told Mary2 PRO1&2 to put a whoopee cushion on a chair in the
library.
b. *Johni asked Mary2 PRO1&2 to eat their lunch in the playground
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Having then provided reasons against Landau’s rejection of both c-command and 
toleration of split antecedents by dependents, I suggest that both these conditions be 
re-instated as conditions which obligatory control constructions must meet. With 
these criteria in place, I turn in the next section to attempts at reducing control to 
other syntactic relations.
1.3 Reducing Control to O ther Syntactic Relations
In this section, I go on to two proposals which seek to reduce control to two entirely 
separate fields. Homstein (2000) is a movement-based theory of control, where as 
Landau (2001) is agreement-based, but despite their differing directions, these 
theories share some similar ideas and problems. In particular, given that in Chomsky 
(1998), Agree is the only way in which a grammatical dependency can be established, 
movement must also be an instantiation of Agree. I start with Landau (2000).
1.3.1 Obligatory Control as Agree
In this section, I look at a reduction of obligatory control to Agree. The workings of 
this proposal are quite intricate and in what follows I will not take issue with 
particular detail of this proposal; problems are raised at a more general level and I 
will focus on three in particular:
(47) a. In this theory, PRO is retained and multiple lexical entries for PRO
must be assumed,
b. The relation between the controller and PRO is indirect
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c. Agree obscures the contrasts which distinguish control, binding and 
movement.
But in order to be clear that the above are indeed issues that remain unresolved in 
Landau (2000) and why they are problematic, the reader will benefit from a an outline 
of how the mechanism works.
On this account, three Agree relations are posited, which collectively comprise the 
control relation(s). The key players in these Agree relations are a functional head in 
the matrix clause, the matrix DP ‘controller’, PRO and Agr. In short, it is proposed 
that agreement is triggered by an uninterpretable feature on the functional head in the 
matrix clause, and this head enters into a complex of agree relations including both 
the DP-controller and PRO in exhaustive control, but the DP-controller and Agr in 
partial control:
(48) a. Exhaustive Control: [.. F .. DP .. [Cp [tp  PRO T-Agr [ vptpRo ]]]]
I I I I______ I
Agree 2 Agree 1
Agree 3
b. Partial Control: [..F .. DP .. [CPT-Agr [tp PRO tT-Agr [ vptPRO ]]]]
Agree 2 I Agree 1
____________  J
Agree 3
We can look at a derivation of an exhaustive control sentence first, in which PRO is 
involved. This will help to clarify the triggers for each Agree relation and the 
motivation behind them. Manage is an implicative verb, which as we will see in 
chapter five, is not a verb that licenses partial control. In this example then, the 
reference of PRO is identical to that of its controller:
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(49) Beni managed PROi to eat all the pies
The tree in (50) sets out the derivation: In Agree 1, the phi-features of T-Agr and the 
semantically singular PRO [-SP] are matched. The second Agree relation targets the 
matrix functional head, T and the semantically singular [-SP] DP-controller. In virtue 
of this Agree relation, T inherits semantic singularity from the DP. Now in Agree 3, T 
enters into an additional Agree relation with PRO, through which both T and PRO are 
matched for semantic number:
T (0SP-+-SP)
DP(-SP) V’
pr o (-sp) r
T-Agr (0SP) VP
*PRO(-SP)
Agree 1
Notice the absence of any direct link between the matrix ‘controller’ and PRO, which 
enter into no relation with each other. Notice also, that the matrix functional head 
enters into two Agree relations, both times for the same feature, namely semantic 
number. But we will suspend comment until we have looked at a derivation for 
partial control, which will result in a completer picture of Landau’s theory of control.
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For partial control, it is Agr in the infinitival which has a key role to play. Recall that 
in partial control, a semantically singular DP controls a semantically plural PRO:
(51) The chairi decided PROi+to gather early.
We saw in (48)b) that Agr raises from T to C. This movement is argued to be the 
consequence of the tense feature in C in the infinitivals that follow partial control 
verbs. Evidence for partial control complements carrying their own tense is made 
apparent by inserting a time adverbial in the embedded clause in conflict with one in 
the matrix clause. As we can see in example (52), such conflicts are tolerated in 
partial-, but not exhaustive control, indicating that the former houses an independent 
tense feature in its infinitival:
(52) a. Exhaustive Control:
* Yesterday, John managed to eat all the pies tomorrow
b. Partial Control:
Yesterday, the chair decided to gather early tomorrow
The derivation for the partial control sentence in (51) is illustrated in the tree in (53) 
and proceeds as follows: In Agree 1, Agr is checked by a semantically plural PRO, 
[+SP], but remains unspecified for semantic number itself, [0SP]. Through Agree 2, 
the functional head, T, in the matrix clause acquires semantic singularity [-SP] from 
the DP-controller. T, now specified as [-SP], then enters into Agree 3 with the raised 
Agr, itself unspecified for semantic number, namely [0SP]. Despite the [-SP] 
specification on T, Agree 3 incurs no mismatch between T and Agr in semantic 
number since [0SP] and [-SP] are indistinguishable on functional heads:
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--------------- T-Agr (0SP) C PRO T’
Agree 3 tAgr(0 SP) VP
 tpRQ(+SP)
Agree 1
Notice again, the lack of any direct link between the controller in the matrix clause 
and PRO. Indeed, on this occasion even the functional head enters into no relation 
with PRO, it targeting Agr in C instead, leaving PRO quite irrelevant to the control 
relation.
With this outline of how the system of Agree in Landau’s theory of control works, we 
can now return to the issues raised in (47), the first of which is the retaining of PRO. 
In Landau (2000) two lexical entries for anaphoric PRO are assumed (see Landau 
2000 p8), one which is semantically singular and one that is semantically plural. Non- 
obligatory control in this work is also analysed using PRO, but in this relation PRO is 
taken to be a logophor. This theory does then remain dependent on an ambiguous 
element with conflicting properties, for which no overt counterpart exists. In 
Landau’s derivation of partial control, PRO has no real function, since the one Agree 
relation it does enter into, namely that with Agr, does not result in feature matching, 
Agr remaining unspecified for semantic number. Building on Borer (1989), which we
will see in more detail later, the anaphoric nature of the infinitival clause is pinned to 
Agr, despite PRO’s classification as an anaphor. The control relation, traditionally 
understood as being between a controlling DP and PRO, has been secured without 
any contribution from PRO, since it is the double probing that gives us obligatory 
control. Given that PRO is in a sense accidental to the control theory as developed in 
Landau, one might ask whether it would be judicial to go a step further and dispense 
with PRO entirely. Of course, evidence for PRO, as we saw in section 1.1 is 
extensive, but later we will see that these subject properties of infinitivals can be 
accounted for without recourse to PRO.
The absence of any contribution from PRO in partial control constructions brings us 
to the second issue raised in (47), which is the lack of any direct link between PRO 
and the matrix controller, their only connection being indirect via the functional head 
in the super-ordinate clause. A number of points require attention here, the first of 
which is how to account for the structural restriction in English between a DP- 
controller and PRO, namely c-command of the latter by the former, if there is no 
direct relation between them? There seems to be nothing that prevents a derivation in 
which the functional head dominates both the DP-controller and PRO, yet PRO 
occurs higher in the structure than its controller, a structure unattested in English:
Of course Landau (2000) rejects c-command as a defining restriction of obligatory 
control, but we saw in section 1. 2 that the particular example provided as evidence
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could not be relied upon, since it allowed long-distance control, a property which, 
like myself, Landau uses as a diagnostic for non-obligatory control.
A second issue is the probing of two different elements for the same feature by the 
functional head. This has to be made possible in Landau’s theory, since in this way 
one can ensure identity between the DP-controller and PRO. But it is not clear why T 
should enter in two Agree relations, probing two different goals for the same feature 
What is the motivation for the second probing? In Chomsky (1998), Agree is the 
means by which uninterpretable features are checked against their interpretable 
counterparts. Thus the element with the uninterpretable feature is the probe, whereas 
the element with the interpretable feature is the goal. The probe attracts the goal. 
Such is the direction of the dependency. There is no sense in which the goal receives 
its specification from the probe, higher up in the structure. Landau’s rendition of 
Agree is slightly different. Agree is triggered by an uninterpretable feature on the 
probe, T in subject-control structures, and a goal, which is PRO in exhaustive control, 
but Agr in partial control. And what makes PRO/Agr active for Agree is PRO’s/Agr’s 
anaphoric character, not an unchecked case feature. Note the change in the 
dependency relation: PRO and Agr, which are goals, are imposing a requirement on 
their probes. We see two examples of this, firstly in the exhaustive control derivation 
(see (50)): in virtue of Agree 3, where T is the probe and PRO the goal, PRO inherits 
semantic singularity from its probe. Secondly, in the partial control derivation (see
(53)): in Agree 3, where T is the probe but Agr is the goal, Agr may or may not 
inherit semantic plurality from the probe. When it does, this amounts to a functional 
head receiving its specification from something higher up in the structure, which is a 
rather large step away from Agree as was. In Chomsky (2000), when a probe 
encounters two goals in its c-command domain, both with the interpretable 
counterpart of the unvalued feature it has, the probe takes the nearest goal and agrees 
with that, it doesn’t agree with both. So if we transpose this to a derivation of 
exhaustive control a la Landau, the functional head should agree with the DP only:
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(55)
PRO (iF)
It seems that in order to ensure identity between the controller and PRO, Landau must 
introduce this second Agree relation, yet independent motivation for this repetitious 
step remains unclear. Chomsky’s (1999) notion of a phase, in which uninterpretable 
features remain visible until the end of the super-ordinate phase, makes it a technical 
possibility, but this does not constitute any motivation for multiple agree relations in 
this particular instance. And if we were to license superfluous Agree relations 
generally, which are so in virtue of their not being registered until the end of a said 
phase, we are left with the question as to why the computational system would be set 
up to generate multiple redundant Agree operations.
The last question that (47) raises concerns a more general issue in regard to Agree 
lying at the core of movement, binding and control. In reducing control to Agree, and 
by hypothesis binding too, we are left with one operation at the source of a number of 
relations, which despite their shared properties, differ in important respects. So how 
is the contrast between binding and control and also movement and control to be 
reflected in a theory which regulates these relations through the same operation? This 
question can also be asked of the next theory we look at, namely Homstein’s (2000) 
reduction of control to move.
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1.3.2 Obligatory Control as Movement
The reduction programme in Homstein (2000) not only removes the control module 
from the grammar, but also dispenses with PRO. In this theory, the null subject in a 
controlled infinitival clause is an NP-trace, whose distribution reduces to one of A- 
relations and interpretation to that of a foot of a movement chain. In ridding the 
grammar of the control module and dispensing with the uncomfortable null case 
theory of PRO (Chomsky and Lasnik 1993), Homstein’s approach has initial appeal. 
And the fact that collapsing control with movement necessitates a repudiation of the 
Theta-Criterion does not necessarily call for its rejection, since this criterion has been 
shown to simply not hold in a number of constructions (see Williams 1994, Hudson 
2003). It is worth finding out whether the empirical ground such a theory can cover 
outweighs the losses.
In his reduction of control to movement, Homstein takes on the MLC, or Shortest 
Move, as the condition that determines NP-trace’s distribution. A-movement, such as 
in passive and raising constructions is limited to the closest argument position and 
when this position is filled, there can be no movement across this position to a higher 
one. This same condition is said to account for the locality of control. Here, too, the 
closest argument must be the antecedent of PRO:
(56) a. Beni hopes [PROi to leave soon]
b. Bill persuaded Beni [PROi to leave soon]
On the basis of this similarity between the two constructions, the Minimal Distance 
Principle, the interpretative constraint previously applied to control constructions (see
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Rosenbaum (1967), is subsumed by Shortest Move. But for this to be viable, 
Homstein must dispense with the Theta-Criterion. Movement into theta-position, 
such as in (57), results in the chain (Ben, t) having two theta-roles, that of ‘leaver’ 
and ‘hoper’. The conception of theta-roles is reformulated; they are conceived as 
morphological features on predicates that can accrue on a DP as it moves to its 
ultimate position in the matrix clause. Theta-role assignment consists of a checking 
relation between an argument and a predicate bearing a theta-feature:
(57) Beni hoped [ti to leave soon]
(00) (0)
The properties of obligatory control, as set out in (13) in section 1.2 can be derived if 
control is an instance of A-movement: By definition, a trace, as a residue of copy and 
merge operations, must have an antecedent, and being an example of A-movement, 
this antecedent must be local to and c-command its trace. And lastly, a trace cannot 
be associated with two antecedents.
Hornstein notes that it was the Theta-Criterion that necessitated the introduction of 
the control module. Indeed, he argues that a grammar without the Theta-criterion can 
be simplified further, by dispensing with all rules of construal, binding included. The 
distribution of local anaphors is argued to parallel that of obligatory control, making 
them amenable to a theory in which they also are understood as the by-product of 
movement operations:
a. ♦Ben reproached herself
b. ♦Ben’s mother reproached himself
c. ♦Ben thinks that Bill reproached himself
d. ♦Ben told Bill about themselves
e. Ben reproached himself and Bill did too
43
f. The unfortunate remembers himself receiving a medal
g. Only Churchill remembers himself giving the speech
Just like PRO/NP-trace, the reflexive requires an antecedent which is local and in a c- 
commanding position, as demonstrated in (58)a -  c). Split antecedents are not 
tolerated, as in (d) and in (e), only a sloppy reading under ellipsis is possible. A ‘de 
se’ reading is the only interpretation possible in (f) and lastly in (g), Churchill is the 
sole possessor of the relevant memory.
So under this analysis, PRO and anaphors are the same kind of animal, namely NP- 
trace. The reason a reflexive is pronounced, whilst PRO and NP-trace are not, is 
because the verb that selects a reflexive has a case feature whose checking is 
obligatory. This reflexive, like NP-trace, carries a theta-feature, as does its 
antecedent; so again we have an A-chain with two theta-roles:
(59) John liked himself 
{66} {6}
That PRO, NP-trace and lexical anaphors share similarities, all being +anaphoric, is 
evident, but accepting this as a truth does not imply that they are one and the same 
entity. Indeed problems with Homstein’s proposal have been amply documented (see 
especially Brody 1999, 2000, Cormack and Smith 2002 and Landau 2001) and what 
follows is not a comprehensive critique. Again I concentrate on two particular 
problems because they bear relevance to the proposal that will be ultimately adopted 
here. The first concerns Horstein’s argument that the locality restrictions on control
and movement can be subsumed by the MLC, the second, his rejection of the Theta-
Criterion.
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Contrary to there being a perfect parallel between control and movement in terms of 
their locality restrictions, in both control and binding, there are occasions on which 
the closest c-commanding argument can be skipped:
(60) a. Billi told Benj about himselfi/j
b. Beni promised Bill PROi to leave soon
Shortest Move states that the only possible antecedent for a dependent is the closest 
c-commanding argument, incorrectly rendering Ben the only possible antecedent of 
the reflexive in (a) and Bill in (b). For no constructions which uncontroversially 
involve move is Shortest Move broken, which makes it unlikely that it is this absolute 
condition to which binding and control relations must adhere. In their reply to 
Culicover and Jackendoff (2001), Boeckx and Homstein (2003) address the problem 
posed by verbs such as promise, but not entirely convincingly. They retain the 
argument set forth in Homstein (2000), namely that promise is marked, backing this 
up by citing acquisition studies in Carol Chomsky (1969) that have shown a delay in 
the child’s mastering of this construction. The reason the construction is tricky for the 
child to grasp, they claim, is that the object of promise is headed by a null 
preposition, and it is this null preposition which the language learner has difficulty 
detecting. They show how semantically similar verbs behave in parallel fashion, only 
with the preposition being overt (Boeckx and Homstein’s 5):
(61) a. John promised [Pnuii Mary ] [to leave early]
b. John vowed/committed [to Mary] [to leave early]
The example above is likened to examples with raising predicates that have an 
experiencer:
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(62) a. John seemed to Mary t to be tired
b. John struck [Pnun Mary] t as tired
The parallelism between the above examples is questionable, in that promise does not 
allow a PP-complement when it takes an infinitival:
(63) a. I promised someone to leave
b. *1 promised to someone to leave
Furthermore, the introduction of a null element into the syntax carries with it the 
responsibility of providing evidence for that element. With which verbs does this null 
preposition materialise, for example and what is its semantics? Without such 
evidence, the introduction of another null element for one particular problematic 
example seems to be somewhat ad hoc in (61).
The similarities between control and binding do indicate that the two are rather 
similar syntactic relations. But the whole reduction of one relation brings with the 
danger of losing sight of the differences that distinguish these relations (see esp 
Lasnik (1992)) and their further collapsing with a third, namely move, leads to 
serious complications of Theta Theory. Let us return to the example in (10), 
elaborated on below in (64), in which PRO, as a trace of movement, receives a theta- 
role in its base position, and another at its landing site; an operation that violates the 
condition on well formed chains, which holds that thematic relations hold between 
chain roots only (Brody 1995). If these two elements are one and the same, and we 
then analyse examples such as (64)b) and (b’) as NP-movement, the reason for the 
contrast between (64)a) and (a’) is forfeited. As Brody (1999) has pointed out in 
detail, we lose the explanation for why an example like (64)a’) is impossible (a’ = 
Brody’s no 16).
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(64) a. Billi was hit U
a’. *Billihitti
b. Billi seems h to like Ben
b ’. *Bill tried U to like Ben
Homstein (2000) answers for the ungrammaticality of such examples by means of the 
transitive verb’s unchecked Accusative case feature. The derivation in (64)a’) is 
saved by inserting the Acc-carrying morpheme self, which forms a complex with Bill 
in its initial position, as in (65)a). Once Bill has raised to check its case features, the 
Accusative pronoun him, must be inserted to provide morphological support for the 
bound morpheme, self, as in (b).
(65) a. Bill likes tsui-self
b. Bill likes himself
But with neither him nor self forming part of the numeration, it is not clear how 
insertion of self and then him, is less expensive an option than sole insertion of him, 
resulting in the unwanted sentence in (66). His disposal of Binding Theory prevents 
any appeal to Principle B to rule this pronoun insertion out:
(66) *Bilh hit hinii.
But economy aside, there is another reason to suggest that a reduction of binding to
movement is not in the right direction, namely the occurrence of reflexives in
conjuncts, which are not a possible movement configuration:
(67) The boys spoke both to the girls and each other
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The Co-ordinate Structure Constraint (Ross 1967) bars movement out of one 
conjunct, which means that a movement-based derivation of (67) is not available and 
hence the sentence should not be possible, contrary to fact.8
To return to the newly conceived ‘PRO-trace’ in the examples in (64), this trace 
would have non-trivial differences from NP-trace in terms of its thematic and case 
properties (see Brody 2001). Only a chain headed by PRO-trace can have a theta-role 
assigned to its head. In effect we are left with NP-trace 1, and NP-trace 2, setting us 
on a return path towards the two separate elements we began with. Trace 1 occurs 
only in the subject position of infinitivals, whereas Trace 2 occurs in all kinds of 
positions. Despite Hornstein (2000) not relying on PRO, then, the trace that he 
introduces for control is at odds with the first desideratum of the theory to be 
developed here, which I repeat below:
(68) I Our theory of control should not rely on an ad hoc category such as
PRO
To take another problematic example from Brody (1999), if the head of a chain can 
be thematic, we lose an account for the different distribution displayed by control- 
type verbs versus ECM-type verbs in raising and control contexts. They do share 
similarities in that they are both transitive and so must assign accusative case, and 
also both can passivise, but where as attempt can control, believe cannot:
(69) a. John attempted PRO to leave
b. *John was attempted t to leave
c. *John believed PRO to have left
8 Note that the example cannot be explained away by a suggestion that it is biclausal, because of the 
ungrammatical:
(1) *The boys spoke both to the girls and the boys spoke to each other
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d. John was believed t to have left
Previously, the different government requirements on NP-trace and PRO answered 
for the differences in their distribution. NP-trace must be governed and so cannot 
occur in the infinitival clause, where as PRO must remain ungovemed, so sits happily 
in the subject position of an infinitival clause, but not in a complement to an ECM 
verb, from where it would be governed by this verb. Homstein (2000) dispenses with 
government and allows chains to have multiple theta-roles, making it difficult to see 
how Move could distinguish between the distributional differences of these examples.
Other difficulties inherent to a movement-based enterprise have been documented 
and the aim here has not been to list them all. But focusing only on those mentioned, 
it seems that collapsing control with raising carries with it significant empirical set 
backs. Loss of the theta-role and the blurring of distinctions between control and 
movement in particular are two problems that any subsequent theory of control might 
try and avoid. But as Boeckx and Homstein (2003) in their reply to Culicover and 
Jackendoff (2001) say, “ ...control properties largely reflect structural properties of 
the syntax,” and it is this indisputable fact that drives the search for a largely syntactic 
answer for control. In the next section, I look turn to binding based analyses of 
control. What will become apparent from these is the gradual reduction of PRO’s 
importance to this binding relation. Ultimately, the theory to be developed here will 
have most in common with a modified binding theory; it will share with Homstein 
(2000) the view that obligatory control requires a syntactic representation and will 
also cater for the data without PRO. But unlike Homstein (2000), the properties of the 
subject in the infinitival are not lost, but reinterpreted in terms of the infinitival’s 
external theta-role. But I turn to the present account’s precursors first, which reduce 
obligatory control to binding, yet continue to lean on PRO.
49
1.3.3. Obligatory Control as Binding
1.3.3.1 Similarities between obligatory control and binding
A reduction of control to another existing grammatical dependency results in a more 
restrictive theory than one which creates a new category of dependency specifically 
for control. If the latter is assumed, we risk losing explanatory force, since we can 
place any problematic data within this new category, the boundaries of which are not 
closely defined to begin with. The preferred route, therefore, is to stick to the 
narrower hypothesis until we encounter data that forces us towards a wider theory. 
But there remains the issue as to which of the existing grammatical dependencies 
provides the most promising route. Both Manzini (1983) and Koster (1986) argue that 
the structural similarities between binding and obligatory control are sufficiently 
similar to warrant a reduction of the latter to the former. Koster (1986) represents an 
attempt to encapsulate the core structural properties that hold of all syntactic 
dependencies, binding, obligatory control and movement included. The 
configurational matrix comprises this group of structural properties. We have seen 
these already in section 1.2 ., which focused on the properties of obligatory control, 
but I repeat them below:
(70) a. obligatoriness
b. uniqueness of antecedent
c. no split antecedents
d. locality
The four properties comprising this matrix are not construction specific. And we can 
group anaphoric binding and control together on the basis of these properties. Both
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reflexives and obligatorily controlled PRO require local antecedents and these 
antecedents must c-command them:
(71) a. Beni trusted himselfi
b. Beni tried PROi to dance
(72) a. *Billi said that Ben trusted himselfi
b. *Billi said that Ben tried PROi to dance
(73) a. *Billi’s brother trusted himselfi
b. *Billi’s brother tried PROi to dance
But the properties of the configurational matrix, as exemplified in the examples 
above, are not decisive, since they do not distinguish binding and control from the 
trace of movement, for example, which also requires its antecedent to be in a local 
and c-commanding position:
(74) a. The ball* was hit ti
b. *The balli’s owner was hit ti
c. *The balli seemed that it was hit ti
But crucially, in binding both the antecedent and the reflexive are arguments, 
receiving a theta-role. The same is true of obligatory control; the controlling 
argument has a theta-role as does the verb in the infinitival complement:
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(75) a. Ben amused himself
0 0
k Ben hoped to win
e 0
This is not so for A-movement, as traditionally conceived, however, where only the 
foot of the chain is a theta-role recipient:
(76) Ben was admired t^ en
What marks a further distinction between binding and obligatory control on the one
hand and movement on the other, is a distributive difference already noted in the 
previous section. Unlike movement, in both binding and control configurations, it is 
sometimes possible to skip the closest c-commanding antecedent:
(77) a. Billi showed Benj himself^ (in the photograph)
b. Billi promised Ben PROi to dance
So whereas the correct generalisation for A-movement is that only the closest c- 
commanding argument is a possible antecedent, this is too strict for binding and 
control. Their locality restriction must be formulated slightly differently; namely 
reflexives and PRO must be bound by one of the arguments of the next predicate up:
(78) Locality for Binding and Control:
Reflexives and PRO must be bound by an argument of the immediately c- 
commanding predicate. If that predicate has two arguments, one of those 
arguments can be skipped.
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Of course, the flexibility that binding shows in regard to its antecedent choice in
(77)a) is different to that in the control example, where only the non-local argument 
can be PRO’s controller. As argued in Koster (1986), the distinction between binding 
and obligatory control in this respect, must be traced to the properties of the control 
verb. The verb in (77)a) is not a control verb and does not, therefore, designate a 
particular argument as the reflexive’s antecedent. This is the residue of obligatory 
control that is semantic; in all other respects obligatory control patterns with 
grammatical dependencies generally, but the relation it simulates more than others is 
that of binding and we will seek to account for this by stating it as the fifth of our 
desiderata:
(79) V The theory should explain why anaphoric binding shares a substantial
number of properties with obligatory control.
Manzini (1983) provides an excellent example of how Binding Theory can 
accommodate obligatory control. A slight modification of Chomsky’s (1981) binding 
conditions, together with a newly conceived Case filter, covers vast empirical terrain, 
demonstrating the viability of reducing control to Principle A. But, as Manzini herself 
notes, her modification to what constitutes a binding domain means that PRO is 
wrongly predicted to be able to occur in the object position of a subject-less nominal, 
with PRO carrying a reflexive or arbitrary interpretation:
(80) * [Pictures of PRO] please the boys
The former binding conditions, as constructed by Chomsky, correctly rule this 
construction out. PRO is governed by the preposition, and government, presupposes a 
governing category. Since PRO’s defining property is that it must not have a 
governing category, the above example is not predicted to occur. This solution is not
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available to Manzini, however, because her modification of a binding domain has the 
effect such that an element which is governed does not necessarily have a governing 
category. For the detail of this proposal I refer the reader to the text itself, it suffices 
to note for present purposes, that her modification necessitates the claim that 
anaphoric empty categories must lack case. In (80), PRO is assigned case obligatorily 
by the preposition, which correctly rules it out. The obligatory assignment of case 
departs from the Case filter as widely understood, which, in its original guise, states 
only that every overt NP must be assigned case. The extensive empirical coverage of 
this paper, however, reinforces the reduction of control to binding, although it would 
be advantageous if a binding theory could avoid introduction of a new anti-case 
requirement, for the prohibition of PRO in the one example in (80).
I.3.3.2. Differences between obligatory control and the binding of lexical 
anaphors
In contrast with the similarities shared by obligatory control and binding, there are 
some important differences between the distribution of PRO and lexical anaphors that 
a reduction of control in this direction must avoid. In particular, as pointed out in 
Lasnik (1992), the proto-typical position for lexical anaphors is the direct object 
position, as in (81)a), but a controlled PRO in this same position is never possible 
(81)b).
(81) a. John injured himself
b. *John injured PRO
(Lasnik5 s 7 & 8)
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This is essentially a question as to why controlled objects are universally unavailable 
and will form the sixth of our desiderata for the theory of control to be developed:
(82) VI Our theory should rule out controlled objects
Attempts have been made to attribute the distributional difference to case. The 
transitive verb assigns case obligatorily, but PRO can only receive null case. This 
argumentation would explain the contrast between the following examples:
(83) a. John believes himself to be clever
b. *John believes PRO to be clever
The matrix verb in the example above is an ECM verb, so called because it 
exceptionally case marks the subject of its complement. Thus although this allows the 
reflexive in the subject position of the complement in (a), PRO, which cannot receive 
accusative case, is infelicitous in this same position, as illustrated in example (b). But 
this will not do, as the next set of examples attest:
(84) a. *John believes sincerely himself to be clever
b. *John believes sincerely PRO to be clever
(Lasnik’s 11 & 12)
If accusative case were responsible for the barring of PRO in (83)b), then the addition 
of an adverbial between the matrix verb and its complement, an intervention which 
prevents case assignment to the anaphor, as in (84)a), should render PRO possible in
(84)b), contrary to fact. Something more than obligatory case-assignment is required
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for the original problem in example (81) then, a problem which the present account 
will seek to address. In short, the absence of controlled objects will be tied to 
syntactic selection on the part of the control verb, which neither of the verbs in (83)b) 
or (84)b) are. But I will return to this issue in chapter four, where the structural 
restrictions on obligatory control are stated explicitly.
In the next section, I look at a binding based analysis of obligatory control, which 
retains the idea that the infinitival clause has anaphoric properties, but avoids the 
conclusion that the source of this anaphoricity is an anaphoric PRO subject. What 
such a theory demonstrates is that the differences between PRO and lexical anaphors 
(as documented in Lasnik (1992)) do not necessarily translate into differences 
between control and binding; the differences observed between control and binding 
refer to the elements involved in these relations, not the relations themselves.
1.3.3.3 Obligatory control as binding, without an anaphor
Borer (1989) treats control as an anaphoric dependency, but locates the source of this 
anaphoric dependency in Agr, rather than PRO. The binding dependency is one 
between anaphoric Agr and its matrix antecedent. Although Borer does continue to 
posit a null-element in the subject position of infinitivals, this is small pro -  the same 
pro found in the subject position of finite clauses in typical pro-drop languages:
(85) John, tried [icp Infl, [n>prot [infl e] to leave]]
In (85) above, John binds, and thus transmits its index to infinitival Agr in INFL, this 
INFL having moved to C by a process of I-to-C movement.9 INFL, having inherited 
the referential features of its antecedent, John, can now identify its subject, pro. As a
9 Borer takes this I-to-C movement to be optional, a process that has the effect of making the moved I 
the head of CP, thus more accurately labelled IcP.
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consequence there is an identity relation between pro and John, but one that has been 
established indirectly. The anaphoric relation is seen as one between the matrix 
antecedent and the clause within which pro sits. A lexical subject in an infinitival 
clause is ruled out by assuming that anaphoric Agr in English cannot assign case.
Any distinction between pro in non-finite clauses and pro in finite clauses, most 
notably that the former exhibits obligatory referential dependence whilst the latter 
does not, is derived from independent conditions, leaving the definition of pro 
constant throughout. Borer successfully reduces control effects to independently 
motivated conditions (the combination of anaphoric Agr in infinitives/gerunds 
together with the i-identification requirement for empty categories -  see Borer (1989) 
for detail), thereby demonstrating that one can dispense with the anaphoric element, 
PRO. A question, however, that might be raised is whether it is necessary or desirable 
to replace PRO with another element, namely pro. Since the anaphoric dependency 
has been established independently of any null-element, an attempt at a continuation 
of this reduction, by positing nothing at all in this position, seems a more progressive 
option and one that will be built on in what follows. The hypothesis that there is no 
element in the subject position of infinitivals carries with it the advantage that there is 
no longer any need to appeal to the inability of anaphoric Agr in English to assign 
case, as an explanation of PRO’s’ peculiar distribution. This inability to assign case 
seems to be a forerunner of the Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) quasi-solution, namely 
that infinitival I can only assign null case, neither of which really constitute a move 
forward in trying to explain PRO’s distribution.
In the following section, I introduce the aim of the proposal to be developed here, 
namely a binding based analysis of obligatory control, very much in the spirit of 
Borer (1989), but which dispenses with the notion of a structurally represented empty 
subject in controlled infinitivals altogether. The section will end with the list of 
desiderata collected throughout this chapter, which the present theory of control will
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seek to meet. But before these desiderata are stated, I turn briefly to Bresnan (1982), 
which shares with this proposal the idea that control can be represented without PRO. 
But as we will see, this theory depends on the controlled infinitival being a VP, 
which, on the basis o f  evidence to the contrary, is a conclusion that the present 
proposal wishes to avoid.
1.4 A PRO-free Account of Control
Doing without PRO altogether is not an innovation of this particular thesis. Bresnan 
(1978 and 1982) and Brame (1977) are particularly well known PRO-free analyses. 
But these accounts differ from the one to be developed here in that they both analyse 
the controlled clause as a bare VP, which renders the control relation one of 
predication, a conclusion the present account wishes to avoid for reasons outlined in 
Janke 2003. But PRO-free control and bare-VPs need not go hand in hand, as I will 
now demonstrate.
1.4.1 Bare-VP Analyses
A precursor to the present analysis is that of Bresnan’s LFG account, which also 
utilises no PRO. But the PRO-free account to be developed here diverges from 
Bresnan’s account quite sharply, most importantly in the category of the controlled 
complement. A quick detour will illustrate how. At a superficial level, one of the 
differences between finite complements and infinitivals in English is that the former 
have an overt subject, whereas the latter do not:
(86) a. Bill said that [Ben should return later]
b. Bill told Ben [to return later]
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A question that arises from the difference these two complements exude in this 
respect is whether the infinitival complement in (86)b) should be analysed as fully
clausal on par with the finite one in (a), or as a reduced clause. In the former analysis
a null-subject is assumed, which has syntactic properties, but no phonological matrix. 
A recent example of an analysis that falls within this branch would be Landau (2000). 
In the latter, the lack of a phonetically felt subject is taken to reflect its syntactic 
absence and the infinitival is analysed as a bare VP. Such is the line adopted in the 
subject-free account of Brame (1976) and also that of Bresnan (1978 and 1982). In 
the LFG analysis such as Bresnan’s there is no syntactic difference between subjects 
of the infinitival complement in (87)a) and that of (87)b) below.
(87) a. Ben seemed [to dance gracefully] 
b. Ben tried [to dance gracefully]
Both of these relations fall under ‘functional control’; the embedded and matrix verb 
share the same token as their subject, where the two functional slots are connected by 
an arc:
(88)
SUBJ: Ben v
VERB: seemed \
hoped 1
COMP: SUBJ: /
VERB: to dance
But in minimalist accounts these constructions are treated differently from each other 
in important respects. The former is taken to be an example of raising, in which the 
subject of the infinitival is assigned a theta-role by the embedded verb, before raising 
to become the subject of the matrix verb, which lacks theta-assigning capacity. In
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contrast, the second example is analysed as involving control, in which both the 
embedded verb and the verb in the super-ordinate clause assign theta-roles to their 
syntactic subjects, PRO and Ben respectively. The identity relation between PRO and 
Ben is procured separately by another module altogether, namely the control module:
(89) a. Beni seemed [wU to dance gracefully]
b. Benj hoped [ c p  PROi to dance gracefully]
Crucially, in the control case, the infinitival is analysed as a CP, whereas the raising 
complement is a lesser clause, namely a TP. The inability of PRO-subjects to raise 
out of their infinitivals is attributed to this extra CP-layer. In making no syntactic 
distinction between the complements of ‘hope’ and ‘seem’, a bare VP-analysis is 
stumped by the clausal nature of controlled infinitivals, some of which can host 
subjects introduced by complementisers, in contrast to ‘raising’ infinitivals, which 
lack this option:
(90) a. Bill hoped for Ben to win
b. *Bill seemed for him to win
Further support for there being a CP-layer in the infinitival complements of control 
verbs is provided by Dutch. The sentences in (91)a) and (b) are of subject- and 
object- control respectively. As is clear from the parentheses, the complementiser om 
in the infinitival complements is optional:
(91) a. Hij beloofde (om) te blijven (Dutch)
He promised for to stay 
‘He promised to stay’ 
b. Hij haalde haar over (om) te blijven
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He hauled her over for to stay 
‘He persuaded her to stay’
This is not true of the infinitivals following raising verbs:
(92) a. Hij schijnt te blijven
He seemed to stay 
b. *Hij schijnt om te blijven 
He seemed for to stay
As the examples in (92) demonstrate, om is not permitted, which points to a CP-layer 
being absent in these clauses, hence the inability to house the complementiser. The 
evidence from Dutch CPs is replicated in earlier stages of English, such as Middle 
English, where the complementiser is still present:
(93) a. Horn gan for to ride
Horn began for to ride 
‘Horn began to ride’
b. Betere J)e is ffeondscipe to hebben J)ene for to fihten
Better to you is friendship to have than for to fight 
‘It’s better to have friendship than to fight’
(Brunner 1959 p91, attributed to Lajamon)
The CP-status of controlled infinitivals will form the last of the desiderata that the 
current proposal will seek to incorporate:
(94) VII Our theory of control should explain why controlled clauses are CPs
and not VPs or TPs.
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The account to be developed will follow the analyses of Brame (1977) and Bresnan 
(1978), by claiming that there is no PRO in the subject position of obligatorily 
controlled clauses, but unlike Bresnan (1982), I will argue that this is also true of 
non-obligatorily controlled clauses. I will also seek to avoid the conclusion that 
controlled infinitivals are VPs. A precursor to this proposal is that of Evers (1988), in 
which PRO is also dispensed with and the control relation is secured by appealing to 
the external theta-role in the controlled clause. Both obligatory controlled infinitivals 
and their non-obligatorily controlled counterparts are to be analysed as fully clausal 
CPs; in fact their CP-status will fall out from the proposal developed here.
1.4.2 Desiderata for a theory of control
Looking at previous reductions of control has helped to decide on the desiderata for 
the present proposal of control, which will incorporate insights and progress made 
from existing theories. In this respect, I have set the following criteria that the present 
theory of control will aim to meet. The properties of PRO remain elusive. A by­
product of the GB-era, PRO was conceived as an argument that could not receive 
case, could not be governed, was both pronominal and anaphoric and only occurred in 
control structures. It was designed for only one purpose and in this last respect, it 
patterns with today’s functional categories. On the basis of the ad hoc category that 
PRO is, an optimal theory of control should do without it. But leaving PRO out of 
control, should not leave us without an account for the data for which PRO was 
introduced; the subject properties of the infinitival must not be lost. Thirdly, the
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structural properties that obligatory control shares with other grammatical 
dependencies, such as movement and binding, should be incorporated into the system 
to be developed here. And that the understood subject in non-obligatory control must 
be interpreted as human, as opposed to that of obligatory control in which no such 
requirement is present, provides the fourth of the seven desiderata to be met in this 
proposal. The fifth desideratum will seek to provide an account for the similarities 
that the relations of binding and obligatory control share and the sixth requires an 
explanation for the absence of controlled objects. Finally, it would be an advantage if 
the CP-status of controlled infinitivals were a product of this system. Thus, we reach 
the following desiderata:
(95) I Our theory of control should not rely on an ad hoc category such as
PRO
II Our theory should account for the subject properties of the infinitival.
III Our theory should provide an account for why obligatory control is 
subject to four conditions, which non-obligatory control is not: its 
antecedent is obligatory, must be unique, local and must c-command 
its understood subject.
IV Our theory should account for why the understood subject in non- 
obligatory control must be human.
V Our theory should explain why anaphoric binding shares a substantial 
number of properties with obligatory control.
VI Our theory should rule out controlled objects
VII Our theory should explain why controlled clauses are CPs and not VPs 
or TPs.
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Chapter 2
Obligatory Control
2.1 In tro d u c tio n
2.1.1 PRO and Theta Theory
In the previous chapter it was suggested that a representation of obligatory control 
does not need to rely on PRO. We looked at a number of theories in which PRO was
either absent, such as the LFG analysis of Bresnan (1978), or present, but not a
contributor to the control relation, as in Borer (1989) and Landau (2000). In this 
chapter, I develop a syntactic representation of obligatory control that omits reference 
to PRO altogether. We will be concerned with the representation of the first two 
examples of chapter 1, repeated below in (1). The reader will recall that these 
examples contain an understood subject in the infinitival complement of the matrix 
verb. This understood subject shares its reference with a designated argument in the 
super-ordinate clause, either the subject, as in (l)a), or the object, as in (b).
(1) a) Billi hoped PROi to win
b) Bill ordered Beni PROi to dance
The argument to be developed within is such that the sentences above do not have a 
PRO projected in the subject position of the infinitival complements. Crucially, 
however, the infinitival verbs within these complements do introduce an external 
theta-role. As we will see, it is a property of this external theta-role that provides the
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source for the subject properties apparent in these controlled complements, so as a 
first step towards achieving this rather different view of control, we will change the 
notation of the understood subject from that shown in example (1) to that of example 
(2). The Greek ©-symbol signifies the presence of an external theta-role in the syntax. 
The matrix controller now shares its index with this theta-role, thereby anticipating
the referential dependency that exists between these two elements:
(2) a) Billi hoped ©i to win
b) Bill ordered Beni ©i to dance
A representation of control such as this, in which theta-roles are given syntactic 
status, precludes a theory of argument structure along the lines of Hale and Keyser 
(1993), where rigid argument positions make theta-roles obsolete. But theta-roles as 
presupposed in the current work are purely syntactic constructs, in that syntax cannot 
distinguish between their differing interpretations. Thus there is no sense in which a 
semantic notion is having effect within the syntax. The theory of control to be 
developed is based on a theory in which grammatical dependencies are regulated by a 
system of upward copying comparable to that in Neeleman and van de Koot (2002). It 
is worth sketching out how such a system operates, before providing an outline of the 
theory that is to be developed within.
2.1.2 Percolation of selectional requirements
We can think of a grammatically dependent element as one that needs an antecedent 
of some kind. A verb requires a subject for example, a reflexive needs a binder and a 
secondary predicate must be predicated of something. Thus the verb, the reflexive 
and the secondary predicate have a syntactic requirement for an argument of the
65
relevant type, which raises the question as to how this need that the dependent 
element exhibits is to be represented. In mainstream minimalism the mechanism used 
is Agree (see Chomsky 1998, for example). Agree is the means by which 
uninterpretable features are checked against their interpretable counterparts. Thus the 
element with the uninterpretable feature is the probe, whereas the element with the 
interpretable feature is the goal. The probe attracts the goal. In the tree below, an 
uninterpretable feature on the functional head, F, makes F the probe and triggers 
Agree with the DP, a goal, in virtue of it housing the interpretable counterpart of the 
feature that F carries:
(3) uF/iF = (un)interpretable feature
In such a framework we can anticipate quite large trees, in that for every feature 
introduced, so is a functional head in order to house said feature. The alternative 
method adopted here does not rely on this probe and goal mechanism. One of the 
consequences of this method is that trees will be smaller, because the functional 
heads necessary in an approach that regulates syntactic relations via agreement will 
not be required. The trade off will be that the information encoded on each node will 
be more complex. The framework that I will now introduce is that of Neeleman and 
van de Koot (2002) and depends on percolation rather than Agree.
In this framework the need that a dependent element exhibits is represented by the 
dependent element’s introduction of a selectional requirement. In this way the 
requirement that the dependent element has is syntactically encoded by the element 
itself. This selectional requirement introduced into the tree percolates until it finds an 
antecedent with the properties that it requires. Let us say that when it reaches a node 
where it immediately dominates such an antecedent, its requirements have been met
F (uF)
Agree T VP
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and it percolates no further. In the example (5)a) below then, where ‘G’ is the 
dependent element and ‘A’ the antecedent, the selectional requirement (®) that ‘G’ 
introduces percolates to the root node because it is on this node that it is in a relation 
of immediate domination with the element that meets its specified need. Only on this 
node, then, is the selectional requirement satisfied (© ) .  Copying is a recursive 
upward relation, whereas its application (satisfaction) is a one-step downward 
relation, regulated by Accessibility:
(4) Accessibility. Relations between nodes require immediate domination
Note that application of selectional requirements is not based on copying and does 
not therefore include any downward transmission of information onto a node. 
Application obtains when the selectional requirement is in a relation of immediate 
domination -  Accessibility -  with the sought after node, from where it can ascertain 
whether this node matches the property it seeks. Restricting such application to those 
instances in which the selectional requirement immediately dominates its antecedent 
imposes a very strict locality condition on each node; essentially it ensures that the 
properties of every node in a tree can be retraced to the properties of its daughters. 
Thus in (5)b), where again it is ‘G’ that introduces the selectional requirement, but 
this time it is ‘J’ which has the properties that could satisfy this requirement, 
percolation to the root node does not result in its satisfaction, since although the 
selectional requirement on ‘B’ dominates T ,  it does not immediately dominate T .  
With copying being an upward relation only, the selectional requirement is essentially 
stranded without an antecedent:1
1 Note that a feature cannot be copied up without interpreting what is copied as a property of that node. 
See the Neeleman and van de Koot 2002, for further detail.
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Let us now pin these abstract examples to a real syntactic relation, such as that 
between a verb and its arguments. A transitive verb requires two syntactic arguments 
and these selectional requirements of the verb are represented by the verb’s 
introduction of an internal and external theta-role. These theta-roles percolate until 
reaching the mother node of the object- and subject-DP respectively, upon which they 
are satisfied. With the arguments of the verb saturated (indicated now by the #- 
symbol for expository purposes only), the theta-roles percolate no further:
(6) TP 0#
DP
Ben
r e
VP 00#
we e  d p
i i
enjoyed e e  the party
Another example of a grammatical dependency would be that between a local 
anaphor and its antecedent. An anaphor lacks referential properties itself, requiring an 
antecedent (a quantifier or referential category) that allows it to be interpreted. The 
lexical encoding of the variable of the anaphor is represented by the selectional 
requirement, say B for ‘bind me’, and through this mechanism the anaphor links to its
antecedent. B percolates from the anaphor that introduces it to an argument that 
provides the variable with a value:
(7) TP B
T’ B
VP B
likes
DP B
himself B
We can now turn to a concrete example for that in the tree in (5)b), where the 
selectional requirement could not be met because it failed to immediately dominate 
its antecedent. Example (8) demonstrates what this strict imposition achieves. As in 
(7), the reflexive introduces LB \ which represents its need to be bound by an 
antecedent of a particular type and again, it is the DP Ben that meets this requirement. 
But on reaching the root node, ‘B’ cannot be satisfied since the properties it seeks are 
not on a node that it immediately dominates:
(8)
Ben
TP B
T’ B
VP B
DP
sister
DP B
likes himself B
Failure of the selectional requirement to be satisfied is a desirable outcome, since the 
corresponding sentence is ungrammatical:
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(9) *Beni ’s sister likes himselfi
So upward copying, together with the restriction on application to immediate 
domination in (8) has the effect that when reflexives are not in a c-command relation 
with their antecedents, their selectional requirements are not met. (see Neeleman and 
van de Koot (2002) for a complete derivation of c-command within this system for all 
grammatical dependencies).
Note that internal and external dependencies are distinguished in this grammatical 
system via upward copying and satisfaction under immediate domination. The 
copying of categorial features amounts to projection: categorial features cannot be 
copied up without interpreting what is copied as a property of that node. And 
allowing satisfaction of selectional requirements under immediate domination only, 
ensures that internal dependencies remain internal. In contrast, external dependencies 
involve the copying of selectional requirements that are copied separately from 
categorial features, enabling them to pass the maximal projection of the head that 
introduces them. For further detail, I refer the reader to Neeleman and van de Koot,
(2002), page 533.
The encoding of grammatical dependencies that I have introduced above belongs to a 
family of theories which use percolation, such as the HPSG framework of Pollard and 
Sag 1994 and also GPSG (see Gazdar et al, 1985). So there is no sense in which the 
theory of control introduced within is reliant on this particular framework.
But a crucial assumption on which this theory of control does depend is that theta- 
roles are complex objects, consisting of two components, namely A and B. These 
components, which I introduce in the immediate sub-section, but explore fully in 
section 2.2, constitute distinguishable selectional requirements. Each of these 
selectional requirements contribute to the syntactic relation formed between the
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predicate from which their theta-role originates and the argument to which they are 
applied. It is together that these selectional requirements secure this relation.
2.1.3. Theta-role Components
Of the two components that make up a theta-role, component A is the component 
responsible for the formal licensing of arguments. Formal licensing, as we will see in 
this chapter and the next, is achieved via Case- or Subject-Verb-Agreement. 
Component B is a binding component, which regulates interpretation. This binding
component is the very same component introduced for the binding of anaphors
illustrated in example (7):
(10) A: Formal Licensing Component
B: Interpretative Component
Thus, the full representation of a theta-role must comprise both these components, as 
in example (11) below.
(11) ©-role = [qA,B]
In most circumstances, A and B remain and are copied together, so their individual 
properties go unnoticed, but later, we will look at evidence for the independent 
thematic and syntactic status of these components. And under very restricted 
circumstances, even when A and B start out their syntactic lives together, i.e. as a 
theta-role, we will see that A and B operate independently from each other. 
Specifically, when B detaches from A and is copied in isolation beyond the infinitival 
clause to a node on which it immediate dominates an argument in the matrix, 
obligatory control is the result. This is sketched out in the tree in (12) below, which 
marries the percolation of selectional requirements to the theta-role dislocation
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operative in obligatory control. Motivation will follow in the subsequent section; the 
tree below merely introduces the representation. The infinitive verb "win' introduces 
a theta-role, [qA, B], which is copied up. At CP, B detaches from A and continues up 
to the root node, on which it immediate dominates the matrix DP. Application of B to 
the matrix DP results in this DP being the interpreted subject of the infinitival clause:
(12) TP [B#j
VP [B]
CP [ eA B ]
TP [eA B]
T  [eA B ]
T
to
W [ e A B ]
win
In LFG analyses, such as Bresnan (1978, 1982) and in Chierchia’s (1984) seminal 
work on infinitives, there is also no subject in the controlled complement. The 
syntactic representation of control offered here is in line with the semantics for 
control offered in Chierchia (1984). Like Chierchia, but unlike Bresnan, I assume that 
the controlled complement is a CP. Indeed its CP status follows from the theory 
developed below, (see section 2.3).
The chief aim of this chapter is to map out a PRO-less approach to control. It will set 
up a system that can deal with English control cases, but will anticipate an extension 
to Icelandic in chapter 3, which on the surface suggests that ridding the grammar of 
PRO might be premature. The main proposal of a PRO-free representation of
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obligatory control is set out in section 2.2. I start by clarifying what the 
distinguishable properties of the A - and 5-components are and reformulate the Theta- 
Criterion using these components. In the next sub-section I turn to independent 
evidence for the decomposition of theta-roles. Samek-Lodovici (2003) is the focus of 
this section, which illustrates that the formal and the semantic properties of a verb can 
originate from different heads, thereby illustrating that thematic operations target 
different components within theta-roles. In section 2.2.3,1 turn to syntactic evidence 
for an individual representation for these components. With corroboration for A and 
5 ’s individual contribution to both thematic and syntactic operations, I turn in section 
2.2.4, to drawing a parallel between obligatory control and binding, which sets these 
relations apart from predication. The distinction drawn between predication on the 
one hand and obligatory control and binding on the other will anticipate the way in 
which the mechanism adopted here will regulate these relations. Specifically, the 
former relation will be regulated by A and B in unison, whereas the two latter 
relations are the reserve of B. I will then set the PRO-free representation of 
obligatory control adopted here, beside one which utilises PRO, which will make 
clear not only how the current approach differs from a PRO-based one, but also what 
it retains. The similarities this proposal has with a PRO-based account will ensure 
that the approach adopted here does not lose the generalisations for which PRO was 
invented. For regulation of this mechanism, I depend on the Elsewhere Principle 
(Kiparsky 1973), which will prevent the over-generation that would produce 
ungrammatical structures; separation of B from A will be restricted to the subject 
position of infinitival CPs, namely obligatory control environments. Section 2.3 
returns to the evidence for PRO that was documented in chapter 1 and reanalyses this 
data using the PRO-less mechanism.
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2.2 Obligatory Control without PRO
2.2.1 Theta-role decomposition
A main innovation of this thesis is that theta-roles are taken to be complex objects 
introduced by predicates and that the components comprising these complex objects 
have distinguishable properties. But the roles are purely syntactic, in that syntax 
cannot distinguish between their differing interpretations. The specific components 
are an argument-licensing component "A \  which licenses argument positions, and a 
binding component ‘B \  that regulates interpretation. I repeat these components 
below, before examining their properties:
(13) A: Formal Licensing Component
B: Interpretative Component
B is a syntactic representation of the predicate’s argument variable. Through B’s 
application, the argument variable representing the predicate’s semantics receives a 
value. In (14), B is linked to the argument variable x and applied to the DP, with the 
result that the DP is interpreted as the argument of the verb:
(14)
DP T’ [B]
argument
T AP [B]
I t
predicate (x)
It is component A which ensures that the verb’s adicity and the number of DP- 
arguments projected in the structure correspond. Its application to an argument
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morphologically marked as such licenses that argument position; marking is either 
case-marking on the category itself or via agreement with the verb (as will be 
explained later in chapter 3):
(15)
DP T’ [A]
argument
T AP [A]
I
predicate
The examples in (14) and (15) have identified the contribution of each individual 
component to the subject-predicate relation, but it is their collective contribution that 
is required for the relation to be licensed in full. The tree in (16) below represents the 
complete picture, with the components operating in unison, in other words, theta-role 
assignment:
(16)
DP
argument
TP [<A,B] * 
T’
AP [*A,B]
I t
predicate (x)
Perhaps, an immediate question that springs to mind is how the Theta-Criterion fits 
within this de-compositional analysis of theta-roles. In its original guise (see 
Chomsky 1981) the Theta-Criterion consists of two requirements, which say 
something like the following:
(17) ©-Criterion: (a) Every argument must have one theta-role
(b) Every theta-role must be assigned.
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Let us look first at the initial part of the Theta-Criterion, which ensures that all 
arguments have a theta-role. If we were to transpose this part into the current analysis 
of theta-role de-composition, we would do so by using A, since in licensing argument 
positions, A regulates the number of arguments relative to the predicate:
(18) Every projected argument must satisfy one A
The second part of the Theta-Criterion, which demands that all theta-roles be 
discharged, relates to 5, since demanding that all a verb’s theta-roles be discharged is 
a demand on that verb’s semantic arguments to be expressed. If we were to make 
application of this interpretative component obligatory, it would ensure that all the 
argument variables of a predicate become specified:
(19) Every B must be satisfied by an argument
But note that (19) is no more than a restatement of Principle A of the Binding Theory, 
which in its broadest sense states that all anaphoric expressions must be bound 
locally:
(20) Principle A: An anaphor must be locally bound
Given its duplicity, (19) need not be stated separately, leaving the reformulated 
Theta-Criterion as below:
(21) ©-Criterion: Every argument must satisfy one A
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A theta-role decomposition analysis such as has been introduced here makes it 
possible to distinguish two key components that contribute to argument-hood, 
namely interpretation and case. It is the interpretation of the infinitival subject that is 
relevant to the control relation, not its case, and as this chapter unfolds, we will see 
how theta-role decomposition allows us to represent this. The next two sections, 
however, will focus on evidence for such decomposition in the first place. First, I 
look at Samek-Lodovici (2003) from which the idea for theta-role decomposition 
came. Notably, Samek-Lodovici’s evidence for theta-role decomposition comes from 
an entirely different construction from control, namely the Italian light-verb 
construction. This construction will show that A and B are separately targeted in 
thematic operations. In the subsequent section I turn to corroboration for these theta- 
role components’ independence at the syntactic level.
2.2.2 Independent Evidence for Theta-Role De-composition
A non-atomic approach to theta-roles is independently motivated in Samek-Lodovici
(2003), who develops a way of explicitly representing the correspondence between 
elements at Argument Structure and those at Lexical Conceptual Structure. Chiefly, 
what this work illustrates is that the formal and the semantic properties of a verb can 
originate from different heads, the implications of which for present purposes is that 
A and B must exist independently, and that there is a heuristic value in making this 
existence explicit. Given that the theory of control to be developed within depends on 
theta-role decomposition, it is worth spending some time on the construction that 
Samek-Lodovici introduces such theta-role decomposition for. But the reader 
acquainted with the detail of this paper can skip to section 2.2.3, where I focus on 
constructions in English in which A and 5 ’s independent existence at the syntactic 
level can be detected.
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Samek-Lodovici splits theta-roles into two components. I will identify these 
components first and then translate them straight into the language of the current 
framework. The building of the Italian light verb construction that follows will adhere 
in the main to the mechanism used in that of Samek-Lodovici (2003), but it will use 
the terminology of the present proposal in the interests of clarity. Nothing else hinges 
on this though. The theta-role components in Samek-Lodovici are represented by 
variables (x,y) and indices that accompany these variables (xi ,yj). The variables 
express the predicate’s adicity, whilst the subscripts determine that argument’s 
interpretation. At a purely descriptive level, we can see in example (22) that only the 
subscripts are represented at both the level of Argument Structure and at the level of 
Lexical Conceptual Structure. Let us turn straight to an example to illustrate what 
these components correspond with. The example in (22) shows Samek-Lodovici’s 
representation of transitive verb freeze.
(22) a. AS: freeze (xj (yk))
b. LCS: CAUSE (Wj,( BECOME (Zk, ICE)))
(Samek-Lodovici’s (2))
At the level of Argument Structure (22)a), the transitive verb’s two arguments are 
represented by the two variables, x and y, as well as their accompanying subscripts, j 
and k respectively. The variables express the predicate’s adicity, whilst the subscripts 
determine that argument’s interpretation. The same subscripts accompany the Lexical 
Conceptual Structure variables in (22)b), which ensures constancy in thematic 
interpretation between these two levels. If we were to translate the variables and
subscripts of Samek-Lodovici into the language of the present framework, the
variables would correspond to the A-components and the subscripts to the B- 
components:
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(23) (x,y..) and (A, A...) = Formal Licensing Components 
(y ) and (B, B ...) = Interpretative Components
The correspondence between the level of Argument Structure and Lexical Conceptual 
Structure for transitive freeze using A and B would be represented as in example (24).
(24) a. AS: freeze ([qA,B] ( [<&A,B] ) )
b. LCS: CAUSE (W,(BECOME (Z ICE)))
The theta-roles at the level of Argument Structure (24)a) comprise A and B. The As 
correspond to the x and y variables of example (22), and the Bs to the subscripts j and 
k. Thus the As regulate argument number, whilst the Bs govern interpretation. Rather 
than duplicating the Bs at the level of Lexical Conceptual Structure, I posit a link 
between the Bs at the level of Argument Structure and the semantic variables (W and
Z) at the level of Lexical Conceptual Structure. This direct linking is merely an
alternative to duplication, having the same effect, namely of ensuring constancy in 
interpretation between the two levels.2
Support for the independent representations of these theta-role components comes 
from a construction whose make-up indicates that thematic operations single out one 
of the sub-components, namely the Italian light-verb, which is formed from a verb 
and a verb nominal. Essentially, Samek-Lodovici traces the make-up of these verbs to 
different sources: whereas the light-verb’s adicity is determined by the verb from 
which the light-verb is derived, its interpretation comes from the verb-nominal with 
which the verb is combined. An example will clarify. These constructions comprise a 
verb and a verb-nominal, both of which have different interpretations. The resulting
2 This rendition does not represent the linking from LCS to AS in a more economical way than Samek- 
Lodovici, a task not tackled here.
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light-verb takes on the meaning of the verb-nominal, not the verb, whose original 
interpretation is lost. So in the light-verb construction below, the di-transitive verb 
dare (to give) combines with the verb-nominal una lavata (a washing) and the 
resulting light-verb means ‘to wash’ as opposed ‘to give a washing to... ’ as might be 
supposed. That the di-transitive verb does not inherit its meaning from its verbal 
component, namely dare (to give) is evident from the fact that the verb-nominal 
lavata (a washing) cannot be interpreted as the direct object of dare:
(25) Dare una lavata alle camicie 
to.give a washing to.the shirts 
‘To wash the shirts’
(Samek-Lodovici’s 3)
We will now look at the thematic operations necessary to derive the light-verb’s 
meaning. The thematic operations invoked are based largely on Samek-Lodovici 
(2002), with some slight modifications and applied directly to the A- and B- 
components, rather than Samek-Lodovici’s variables and indices.
Let us look first at the verbal component of what will ultimately become the light- 
verb. The verb dare is di-transitive and hence introduces three theta-roles, all of 
which are complexes, comprising^ andB:
(26) dare: {eA,B} {qA,B} {oA,B}
The first thematic operation, call it erasure, targets the B components only, erasing 
them all. But the A components are left in tact, which means that the number of 
arguments introduced by the verb is held constant, that is its adicity is unchanged:
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(27) dare {A,B {A,B {A,B}}} dareught {A{A{A}}}
Now let us turn to the second component of the (ultimate) light-verb, namely the 
verb-nominal. The verb-nominal is transitive, consisting of two theta-roles, again 
each comprising A and B. The same operation {erasure) now targets the formal 
components of the verb-nominal, namely the A components, this time bypassing the 
Bs. By targeting the components that regulate argument number, rather than those 
concerned with interpretation, the operation does not interfere with the verb- 
nominaTs meaning:
(28) lavata {A,B {A,B}} —► lavata {B{B}}
The next operation brings together the verb with the verb-nominal to derive the light- 
verb. This operation, combine, joins the verb’s As, as in example (27) with the verb- 
nominal’s Bs, as in example (28), resulting in the light-verb, which inherits the verb- 
nominal’s meaning. The light-verb’s number of arguments is exactly one less than 
that of the original verb. This is because the final A component of the verb dare is 
applied to the verb nominal, its complement, as the two combine:
(29) dareu^t {A{A{A}}} + lavata {B{B}} —> dare una lavata {A,B{A,B}}
By showing that thematic operations distinguish and target a theta-role’s sub­
components, Samek-Lodovici illustrates that the formal and semantic properties of a 
verb can originate from different heads, the implications of which for present 
purposes is that A and B can exist independently. Details of and further corroboration 
for the original analysis can be found in Samek-Lodovici (2003); the above examples 
serve only to motivate independently a non-atomic approach to theta-roles. But 
having seen this at the thematic level, we now need to look at motivation for their 
individual representations at the syntactic level, since this is the level at which the
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current theory of obligatory control is aimed. I turn in the next section to examples 
that might qualify as such.
2.2.3 Independence of A and B
In the previous section, we saw that the components that make up a theta-role must be 
visible to thematic operations, since they are targeted individually when building 
Italian light-verbs, for example. Granted the possibility of A and B’s dislocation at the 
thematic level, the next question I would like to address is whether A and B can be 
introduced into the syntax separately from one another and if so what kind of lexical 
items might introduce them. In fact, we have already seen B in action on its own, so 
we will attend to B first.
B is an interpretative component, so the type of element that would introduce it is one 
that is syntactically dependent on an antecedent which will provide the variable with 
a value. We saw earlier in example (7) that a reflexive fits this description; it cannot 
be interpreted in the absence of an antecedent, yet it is not a predicate. Dependent as 
the reflexive is, it will play no role in licensing its antecedent, since there is no sense 
in which the antecedent requires anything from the reflexive. As we can see from 
(30)b), without a locally agreeing antecedent, the reflexive is unlicensed, yet its 
antecedent can occur in the structure with or without the reflexive, as (c) 
demonstrates.
(30) a) Beni likes himselfi
b) *Beni said that Betty likes himselfi
c) Ben likes Bill
82
The reflexive can only introduce B, since introduction of A and B together constitutes 
introduction of a theta-role, forcing a predicative usage. Repeating example (7) then, 
binding between the reflexive and its antecedent is established when B is discharged 
from the DP’s mother node:
(31)
VP [5]
himself
Of course there are occasions when reflexives are used predicatively, such as in Bill 
isn't himself today, in which case it will introduce both A and B, namely a complete 
theta-role:
(32)
DP
Bill
TP
is
T’
Neg
n’t
NegP
VP [A,B]»
iBiu
V [A,B] today
DP
himself [A,B]
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Note that when the A- and 5-components do not separate, it is necessarily the case 
that the subject of the predicate is also its binder:
(33) * Billi didn’t consider Ben himselfi today
^ Bill didn’t think that Ben was Bill
This restriction makes sense under the present proposal, which links the binding 
requirement to the theta-role itself (see (13) above).
Having looked at an example of £ ’s independent syntactic effects, we can turn now to 
the .4-component. An example of where A might be introduced alone is by ‘weather’ 
verbs. The expletives of ‘weather’ verbs seem to have different properties from those 
of real expletives; whereas the former are selected by the verb, introduction of the 
latter are triggered by a structural requirement. A look at the German examples below 
will illustrate. German is a V2 language, which requires its first position to be filled. 
Theta-less expletives fulfill this function. In (34)a), the expletive is obligatory, but in 
(34)b), where the structural condition that requires a filled spec-CP has been met by 
the time adverbial, the expletive is no longer possible:
(34) a. Es wurde getanzt a’ *Wurde getanzt
There was danced Was danced
‘There was dancing’
b. *Gestem wurde es getanzt b’ Gestem wurde getanzt
Yesterday was there danced Yesterday was danced
‘There was dancing yesterday’
This is not so for the expletives of weather verbs, which, as the examples in (35)b) 
show, remain obligatory regardless of the adverbial in spec-CP:
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(35) a. Es hat Gestem geregnet 
It had yesterday rained 
‘It rained yesterday’
a’. *Hat Gestem geregnet 
Had yesterday rained
b. Gestem hat es geregnet 
Yesterday had it rained 
‘It had rained yesterday’
b’ * Gestem hat geregnet 
Yesterday had rained
On the basis of such a distinction, weather expletives are described as recipients of a 
pseudo theta-role, devoid of semantic import in Chomsky (1986). This pseudo theta- 
role might actually be an A-component. Their being recipients of an ^-component 
only, makes sense, since despite being formally licensed arguments, weather 
expletives bear no semantic relation to their verb; there is no sense in which ‘it’ can 
literally snow.34
To sum up briefly what the aim of this section has been: Theta-roles have been 
argued to be composite elements, consisting of two selectional requirements, A and B. 
A licenses argument positions whereas B ensures interpretative correspondence 
between the verb and its argument Their independence has been demonstrated using 
anaphoric binding, regulated by B, and the semi-argument status of weather-verb 
expletives receives some account if they only satisfy an A. The next sub-section 
introduces constraints operative on the percolation of theta-role components, with a 
view to drawing a distinction between predication on the one hand and binding and 
obligatory control on the other. The locality constraint on predication will be shown
It has been suggested that these quasi-arguments can control:
1) Itj sometimes rains after PROj snowing (Chomsky 1981, p324)
That this is control is not crystal clear, but if the weather verbs ‘snow’ and ‘rain’ both introduce an A, 
the identification (see section 2.5.1) of these components, and subsequent assignment to the expletive 
would not cause a problem semantically, since ‘it’ cannot snow or rain.
4 Note that it is the feet that A-components are not linked to the semantics that allows them to go 
unsatisfied.
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to be tighter than that on binding and obligatory control, a distinction reflected in this 
system by regulating predication via A and B in unison and the latter two relations by 
B alone.
2. 2. 4 Predication vs. Obligatory Control and Anaphoric 
Binding.
One of the desiderata with which chapter one concluded was that of retaining the 
distinction between obligatory control and other syntactic dependencies, whilst 
incorporating the similarity between obligatory control and anaphoric binding 
(desideratum V). It was argued, for example, that a theory in which all grammatical 
dependencies reduce to Agree masks the distinctions between these dependencies. 
This section keeps this desideratum in mind; it will show that predication is subject to 
stricter locality restraint than that of obligatory control and binding and that by 
appealing to theta-role components we can reflect the differences they show in this 
respect and thus go some way in arriving at this desideratum.
Let us take predication first. The examples in (36) demonstrate that predication 
cannot cross clause boundaries, whether that clause is finite, as in (a) or infinitival, as 
in(b).
(36) a) * I said today [cp that John met Mary nude yesterday]
b) * I persuaded John [cp to meet Mary nude in Trafalgar square]5
This locality constraint might be reflected in the present system of theta-role 
percolation by a ban on complete theta-roles percolating beyond CP:
5 - where it is John and Mary who are meeting in Trafalgar square. All but one of the speakers I 
checked with agreed with this judgement (n=7). Presumably this particular person is able to extra-pose 
PPs from inside the embedded clause to the matrix clause.
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(37) CP blocks theta-role percolation
But let us look at anaphoric relations, too, because this will lead us to reformulate
(37), in that it will become clear that what CP blocks is only one of the components 
that make up a theta-role rather than the whole complex. Unlike predication, 
anaphoric relations can be established across infinitival CPs:
(38) a. I arranged for myself to win
b. John arranged for himself to win
That these are anaphors, rather than logophors, is supported by the following 
examples, which distinguish anaphors from pronouns. The former require a local 
antecedent, as in example (39)a), whereas the latter ban them, as in (b):
(39) a. *John arranged for myself to win
b. *1 arranged for me to win
Logophors pattern with pronouns in their distribution (see Pollard and Sag 1994 and 
Reinhart and Reuland 1993) and, as we can see from (40), can do without an 
antecedent altogether.
(40) a. Everyone enjoyed the talk except myself,
b. Everyone enjoyed the talk except me.
We saw earlier (see (31)), that a reflexive only introduces the binding requirement B. 
In this system of percolation, the cross-CP binding of the reflexives in example (38) 
must mean that B can percolate freely beyond infinitival CP:
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(41) CP does not block percolation of B
But this leaves us with a contradiction, since B constitutes part of a theta-role and the 
ungrammaticality of cross-CP predication as in example (36), was attributed to CP 
acting as a ban on theta-role percolation, as in (37), repeated below:
(37) CP blocks theta-role percolation
But appealing to a theta-role’s sub-components allows us to narrow down the 
problem with the predication examples in (36) to the A component of the theta-role, 
since we have seen in example (38) that B’s can cross CPs. Thus, (37) can be 
reformulated as in (42) below without losing the generalisations for either the 
predication or the binding examples:
(42) CP blocks percolation of A .
Now what of obligatory control? Similar to the reflexives in (38), the obligatory 
control relation also crosses a CP-boundary:
(43) a) John arranged [cp for himself to win] 
b) John arranged [cp to win]
The binding of reflexives and obligatory control share other important properties, as 
was saw in Chapter one, where some of the arguments produced in Koster 1986 and 
Manzini 1983 were documented. And the present proposal follows these authors in 
grouping obligatory control with anaphoric binding. So both (43)a) and (43)b) are 
examples of binding. In (a), the anaphoric link holds between the reflexive in the 
infinitival and the argument in the super-ordinate clause, whereas in (b), the
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anaphoric link is between the external theta-role of the infinitival verb and the 
argument in the super-ordinate clause. The crucial difference between these two 
examples lies with 5 ’s origin. In (a) the reflexive introduces 5, but in (b), the 22- 
component comes from the infinitival verb’s external theta-role. But in both examples 
B percolates beyond the CP boundary to the matrix argument which specifies its 
reference.
Translating a PRO-based approach to obligatory control into the current mechanism 
of percolation makes a direct comparison between these two approaches possible. 
Within this system, PRO would introduce a 5-component in virtue of its anaphoric 
character (see Manzini 1983, Koster 1986 and Landau 2000, in which PRO is 
analysed as an anaphor) and this 5-component would percolate to its controller in the 
matrix clause (44)a). The PRO-free representation will make very similar predictions 
to that of a PRO-based one, since their thematic ’paths’ within TP are the same. In 
both trees in (44), the path of the controlled verb’s external theta-role is identical up 
to T-bar. In (a), the theta-role is satisfied by PRO, the subject of the embedded clause. 
The 5-component that PRO introduces in virtue it being an anaphor is copied to the 
root node, where it immediately dominates the matrix DP, thereby establishing the 
shared reference between these two elements. In this representation, PRO is the 
source of the anaphoric nature of the infinitival clause. Now let us turn to (b). The 
controlled verb’s external theta-role percolates until CP, where it divides and 5  is 
copied in isolation to the matrix TP. 5 ’s application to the matrix DP establishes the 
interpretive link between this DP and the infinitival clause and it is this 
subcomponent, rather than PRO, that provides the source for anaphoric nature of the 
infinitival clause:
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V [A,B] V [A,B]
In both trees, a thematic path is created between the infinitival verb and TP, and in 
both instances, the path between the infinitival clause and the matrix DP is one of 
binding:
Binding
Theta-role percolation
The crucial difference between them is that in (44)b) the subject properties of the 
infinitival clause are reinterpreted in terms of the activity of the verb’s external theta- 
role, as opposed to an empty subject in that clause. And the binding properties of 
obligatory control are an outcome of the separation of B from A, which forges an
interpretative link between B and the referential DP, the characteristic feature of 
anaphoric relations.
We can end this section by noting that an appeal to theta-role components, which has 
been independently motivated in a construction orthogonal to control (Samek- 
Lodovici (2003), has helped us toward three of the desiderata set out in chapter one. 
Reinterpreting PRO in terms of the activity of the external theta-role complex, will 
enable us to retain the subject properties of the infinitival (Desideratum II) without 
depending on the ill-defined category that PRO is (Desideratum I). On the basis of 
the tighter locality restriction that predication exhibits, relative to obligatory control, 
the analysis of theta-role decomposition has enabled us to represent the difference 
between these two relations by regulating the former relation through theta-role 
percolation and assignment and the latter relation by percolation of a theta-role sub­
component, namely the interpretative component, B. Thus, the difference these two 
grammatical relations exhibit in this respect is explicitly incorporated into the 
mechanism adopted here. The similarities obligatory control has shares anaphoric 
binding in respect to locality is represented in this system by regulating the binding 
relation between a lexical anaphor and its antecedent via the interpretative 
component, B, too (Desideratum V) . The copying of this interpretative component of 
a theta-role must of course be restricted, a task we turn to in the next sub-section.
2.2.5 Regulating theta-role decomposition.
The percolation of isolated selectional requirements needs to be regulated, so as to 
restrict separation of B from A to very limited environments. In short, we wish to 
restrict its occurrence to obligatory control environments. To provide this restriction, 
I rely on the Elsewhere Principle (see Kiparsky 1973), a well established principle
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which gives precedence to a more specific rule over a more general one. The context 
for predication is more restricted than that for anaphoric binding, since, as we have 
seen in (36) and (38) the former relation cannot be established across any CPs, whilst 
the latter can. Couched in terms of the current analysis of theta-roles, percolation of a 
complete theta-role is a more specific operation than percolation of B alone. A 
formulation of the Elsewhere Principle as below will ensure that priority is given to 
the narrower context, namely that of whole theta-role percolation:
(46) Given two competing rules, R1 and R2, which operate in two domains of 
application, D1 and D2, such that the D1 forms a sub-set of D2, then R1 will 
block R2 from applying in D1.
Rule 1 refers to percolation of a complete theta-role and Rule 2 refers to percolation 
of B alone. Domain1 refers to conditions that hold of predication and Domain2 to 
conditions that hold of obligatory control. Put in to practice, this means that when 
complete theta-role percolation is possible, as in predication, it will take precedence 
over the percolation of B alone and therefore prevent percolation of B from occurring. 
Copying of B in isolation will be possible, however, in circumstances in which 
complete theta-role percolation is barred, namely across infinitival CPs. In this way, 
copying of B in isolation (binding) is limited to occurring in exactly the environments 
we wish it to, namely obligatorily controlled CP complements.
With the workings of Elsewhere in place, we can return to the obligatory control 
sentence in (43)b) and see the rule in operation. The infinitive verb’s external 0-role 
percolates to CP. Here, by Elsewhere, as formulated in (46), B is allowed to separate 
from A and percolate to its antecedent in the matrix clause:6
6 What is not a syntactic decision is the choice between object- and subject-control with double-object 
verbs, such as persuade in the matrix clause. Examples with NPs (taken from Koster (1986), but
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TP [B]#
VP [BJ
CP [A,B]
arranged
TP [A, BJ
T  [A,BJ
Elsewhere allows separation, since the whole 
theta-role is barred from crossing CP.
VP [A,B] 
win
Up until this point, we have abstracted away from the fact that 2Ts separation from A 
leaves A unsatisfied, a situation which without regulation could lead to the generation 
of unattested structures, such as controlled objects:
(48) * John said that Marv, likes 0i
This is an important issue and one I return to in the last but one section of this 
chapter.
Thus far this section has used Elsewhere (Kiparksy 1973) to regulate percolation, 
making it unnecesary to introduce any new conditions specifically for this purpose. 
Appealing to Elsewhere has enabled us to restrict theta-role separation to CPs:
attributed to Postal 1969) show that a controller can either be inferred from an adjective (a), placed in a 
PP (b), or left implicit (c):
(a) the American attempt to attack Cuba at night
(b) the attempt by America to attack Cuba at night
(c) the attempt to attack Cuba at night (Koster’s 19b, 20a & 20b)
Attempts to derive the above from conditions on structure seem misplaced. Rather, a semantic
restriction on the control verb/noun identifying the controller is necessary. See Rooryck 2000 for a 
fully worked out proposal.
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Desideratum VII. The next section applies this PRO-less system of theta-role 
decomposition to the data introduced in chapter one, for which PRO was deemed 
necessary, namely those with reflexives, secondary predicates, and floating 
quantifiers in infinitival clauses.
2.3. Evidence for PRO  
2.3.1 The Use of PRO
In chapter one, we saw that reflexives, secondary predicates and floating quantifiers 
in tensed clauses all adhere strictly to Principle A, which requires them to be bound 
by an argument locally in their binding domain:
(49) a. *Billi said [that Betty likes himselfi]
b. *Beni said [that Bill died drunki]
c. *The boysi said [that Bill should alii learn the lines]
For locality to be a universal property of reflexives, secondary predicates and floating 
quantifiers, their felicity in infinitival clauses requires something extra to be said 
about them, since infinitivals do not house any argument that could act as a local 
antecedent:
(50) a. Bill persuaded Ben [to enjoy himself]
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b. Ben persuaded Bill [to dance naked]
c. The teachers urged the pupils [to all learn their lines]
Without recourse to an argument in the subject position of each infinitival, their 
locality property cannot be maintained as was, but a caveat must be introduced, such 
that locality only holds in finite clauses or that locality is defined differently in non- 
finite clauses to that in finite clauses. In (50)a), for example, one might hypothesise 
that the whole clause constitutes the binding domain of the reflexive. But aside from 
the conceptual messiness inherent to the introduction of such an exception, this will 
not achieve the desired end because it does not explain why the antecedent must be 
the matrix object, rather than the subject:
(51) [Bill persuaded Ben [to enjoy himself] ]
Enter PRO. With the introduction of a null-subject, Principle A can be held constant, 
since the binding domain is the infinitival clause and the accessible subject that binds 
the reflexive is PRO. And as we saw in chapter one, the semantic antecedent can be 
restricted to the matrix object, since whatever controls PRO is also interpretatively 
linked to the reflexive, it being bound by PRO:
(52) [Bill persuaded Ben [PRO to enjoy himself]]
The same solution generalises to secondary predicates and floating quantifiers in 
infinitivals. The depictive is predicated of whatever controls PRO, again in this case, 
the matrix object, as in (53), and the obligatory co-reference between all and the 
pupils in (54), falls out from PRO being controlled by the matrix object:
(53) Ben persuaded Billi [PROi to dance naked]
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(54) The teachers urged the pupilsi [PRO] to all learn their lines]
But what we gain in keeping locality conditions constant, we lose in our reliance on 
this ill-defined element. PRO is of course a GB-construct and one might argue, 
therefore, that the question of its existence is outdated, since the framework in which 
it was introduced has been superceded by minimalism. But interestingly one of the 
most recent theories of control, namely that of Landau (2000) retains PRO despite 
this theory being placed firmly in a minimalist setting. So the answer to the question 
of whether or not we can explain the data above without recourse to PRO remains 
significant.
In the next section, I turn to this task. I start by examining the properties of DPs, 
which have a requirement for case and for a theta-role. Making the distinction 
between these rather different requirements explicit aids towards a better 
understanding of what it is that makes a DP an antecedent. In short, it will be argued 
that it is the theta-role assigned to a DP that acts as an antecedent to dependent 
elements. This will be shown for secondary predication, following Higginbotham 
(1985), for the binding of reflexives, by leaning on Williams (1994) and for the 
binding of floating quantifiers, by using an analysis in Janke and Neeleman (2005). 
We will see that with theta-role decomposition granted, the PRO-free approach can 
cater for the examples in (52), (53) and (54), which given PRO’s ad hoc nature, 
seems a step in the right direction.
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2.3.2 Argument properties
Secondary predicates, reflexives and floating quantifiers are sensitive to the 
argument/adjunct distinction. DP-subjects can all act as antecedents for these 
elements, whereas adjuncts cannot. But the properties that characterise arguments are 
distributed between their position, which is one in which case is assigned, and the fact 
that they are associated with a theta-role. It will be claimed here, following arguments 
made in Higginbotham (1985), Williams (1994), Janke and Neeleman (2005), that it 
is the latter of these two argument properties, namely the theta-role, which these 
phenomena are sensitive to. More specifically, they are bound by another theta-role. 
All of these properties have to do with one type of relation, namely identification; that 
is identification of some selectional requirement with a theta-role or a theta-role 
component. Let us look at identification in isolation first, before setting it into the 
context of secondary predication.
Theta-roles have been defined here as purely syntactic objects; this means that they 
are visible to and engage in syntactic operations, but the syntax makes no distinction 
between them. All else being equal, therefore, two theta-roles that meet on a node 
through percolation will be indisinguisable and as such will collapse, that is identify, 
effectively becoming one composed role:
(55) d
e e
Higginbotham (1985) introduces this view of theta-roles, which has been applied to 
secondary predication by Neeleman and van de Koot (2002) The theta-role of a 
secondary predicate is identified with a theta-role of a matrix verb, before assignment 
to an argument. So in a sentence such as, the students attended the lecture drunk, the
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result is such that the same argument can be predicated of both the main verb and the 
secondary predicate, without tampering with the Theta-Criterion:
(56) TP 0tt
DP 
the students
T’ 0
VP 0
ed
V 0 
attend-
V ’ 00# A P0  
drunk 
DP
the lecture
- identification o f main verb's external role and 
secondary predicate ’s only role.
The external theta-role of the verb and that of the depictive identify on VP, becoming 
one. This composed theta-role is then applied to the subject, enabling it to act as an 
argument for both the verb and the secondary predicate. In effect, the theta-role of the 
main verb is the antecedent of the secondary predicate, rather than the DP to which 
the theta-role is ultimately applied. The very same argument is made in Williams 
(1994) with regard to reflexives, to which we turn next.
In Williams (1994), argument-hood is addressed in relation to binding. In this work 
the antecedent of a reflexive is deemed to be the theta-role itself as opposed to a DP 
and binding theory is conceived as the set of rules that regulates relations between 
theta-roles. It is the theta-roles that have reference, whereas as the DPs to which these 
theta-roles are assigned impose conditions on the reference of their theta-roles. An 
illustration is provided in the tree below, where it is the theta-role that is linked to the 
anaphor, indicated by the index for expository purposes only:
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DP T* 9i
Ben
T VP 0t d#
V 9i e  DP 
I I
blamed 6, 0 himself)
Given that this theta-role is usually assigned to the antecedent, the distinction is a 
subtle one and masked in most environments. But there is evidence that this is a more 
accurate account. For one example, see (58) below, which shows that Condition B
operates on unassigned theta-roles. The unassigned external theta-role of the noun
admiration cannot corefer with the internal role assigned to the pronoun him:
(58) Admiration of him
(admirer ^ admiree) (Williams’ (2), p208)
Floating quantifiers also have anaphoric properties (see Belletti 1982) in that they, 
like reflexives, depend on a c-commanding argument for their reference. Janke and 
Neeleman (2005) categorise floating quantifiers as anaphoric adverbials. In this 
analysis floating quantifiers are regulated by two conditions. The first is that they 
must left-attach to a verbal category and the second is that they be bound by an 
unassigned theta-role in a local c-commanding node:
(59) A floating quantifier must: (1) left-attach to a verbal category
and (2) be bound by an unassigned theta-role
in a c-commanding node
We can plug this straight in to an example, which will clarify: In the sentence the 
boys both read the same book the floating quantifier both is bound by the verb’s
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external theta-role as it percolates up to the T’-node, where it is applied to the subject. 
The floating quantifier is interpretively associated with the DP satisfying the theta- 
role that binds it as in (60). For advantages of this approach see Janke and Neeleman 
(2005).
(60)
DP
The analysis just sketched rules out the examples in (61). Despite being hierarchically 
identical to the structure depicted in (60), the construction (61)a) is ungrammatical 
because both follows the category to which it is attached, contra (1) in (59) and (61)b) 
is ruled out as interpretively, the floating quantifier can only be bound by the verb’s 
internal theta-role. But since this theta-role is assigned before the floating quantifier is 
merged, it does not percolate to a node that c-commands floating quantifier, contra 
(2) in (59):
(61) a. * [t p  The boys [vp  [vp  read the same book] both]].
b. * [ ip  I [vp both [vp  met the boys]]].
The analysis of theta-role identification based upon Higginbotham (1985) and applied 
to secondary predicates, as in Neeleman and van de Koot (2002), reflexives in 
Williams (1994) and floating quantifiers in Janke and Neeleman (2005) all share the 
fact that it is the theta-role applied to the argument that is the antecedent of the 
respective element, whatever else their differences.
TP 6m
T0i
T
FQj ^ V P 0 ^  
V00 DP
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0i
Depictive*
Reflexivei 
Floating Quantifier!
I now reanalyse the data in (51) to (54), incorporating the above works. In each 
instance it will be the theta-role assigned to the DP, as opposed to the case position 
that the DP occupies, which acts as the respective element’s licenser.
2.3.3 Secondary Predicates and PRO
To analyse secondary predication using the present framework, we will marry 
Higginbotham’s (1985) notion of identification with theta-role decomposition. 
Essentially this mean that identification will be able to target the component parts of a 
theta-role not just the whole theta-role complex. That is, the meeting on a node of 
isolated theta-roles (63)a), of their component parts, as in (b) and (c), or of a complete 
theta-role and a sub-component, as in (d), will result in identification of those 
elements, and their effectively collapsing into one:
(63) ( a ( b )  (c) ^ J A J ^  (d) J ^ S l^
[A,BJ [A,BJ [B] [B] [A] [A] [A,BJ [BJ
Let us now use identification possibilities that are an outcome of theta-role 
decomposition by turning to secondary predicates in infinitivals. At this stage, I 
remind the reader of the original example and its problem, namely that the example 
requires a PRO-subject in order to reconcile it with the locality of predication:
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(64) Ben persuaded Bill [PRO to dance PRO naked]
A PRO-free representation proceeds as follows. In the tree in (65), the embedded verb 
merges with the secondary predicate and their unassigned theta-roles are identified on 
VP, as permitted by (63)a). This composed theta-role continues till CP, where A’s 
barring from CP, permits B, under regulation from Elsewhere (see (46)), to continue 
in isolation. Note that despite not being represented in the tree, the actual 
representation is more complex. At the matrix V-bar, B identifies with the B- 
component of the 0-role of the matrix control verb, persuade (see (63)b), which is 
applied to the matrix object, with the result that this object is predicated of both the 
embedded verb and the depictive:
(65)
Ben
TP
T’
T’ VP
-d
persuade
VP [B],
Bill V ’ [B]
V
tperouade
CP [B] - * [Cp 0] therefore Elsewhere allows
B to detach from A.
TP [A, B]
T VP [A,B] - identification
V AP
dance [A,B] naked [A,B]
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With this representation complete, I turn straight to a PRO-free analysis of infinitivals 
with reflexives.
2.3.4 Reflexives and PRO
Representation of reflexives in infinitivals (66), does not depend on PRO either. As 
demonstrated in (31), repeated for convenience below, the reflexives are 
interpretively linked to their antecedents via their introduction of B.
(31)
DP
Ben
TP [ABB
T’ [A,BJ 
T ^ V P J A B ]  [A,B]# 
W[A,BJ [A,B] DP [B]
I I
likes himself
Binding between the reflexive and its antecedent is established when the B introduced 
by the reflexive identifies with the 5-component of the verb’s external theta-role in 
virtue of (63)d) and this composed role is discharged from the DP’s mother node. 
Exactly the same analysis is given to reflexives in infinitivals:
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VP [B]
persuade
CP [B] -Elsewhere: B detachesfrom A 
TP [A f i j
T  [A,B]
T VP [A,B] - identification
V DP
enjoy [A,B] himself [B]
In the tree above, the reflexive’s 5-component is bound by the external theta-role of 
the infinitive verb, enjoy. By (63)d) these two identify on VP, and this composed role 
percolates to CP. But at this boundary, the whole theta-role cannot continue and 
Elsewhere kicks in, allowing detachment of B from A. At V-bar B identifies with the 
internal theta-role of the matrix verb, persuade, (by (63)d) and subsequent assignment 
of this theta-role to the object ensures that it is construed as the semantic subject of 
the infinitival clause as well as being interpretively linked to the reflexive. Again for 
ease of exposition, only the identification within the embedded clause has been 
shown.
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2.3.5 Floating Quantifiers and PRO
Finally I return to the locality conditions of floating quantifiers in infinitivals:
(67) The teachers urged the pupilsi [PRA to alf learn their lines]
As in Janke and Neeleman (2005), floating quantifiers are analysed as anaphoric 
adverbials that must left-attach to a verbal category. For motivation that floating 
quantifiers must be left-attached in English, I refer the reader to the paper itself In 
any theory adverbs must be specified as to whether they must left- or right-attach to 
the host category (although, the technical implementation may take a different form, 
for example in LCA-based frameworks). In English there exists no single context in 
which the adverbial use of ‘both’ can right-attach to its host category. Their being 
anaphoric means that this must be represented by a selectional requirement that they 
introduce, as was the case for reflexives. The selectional requirement must be a B- 
component, which represents the floating quantifier’s need to be bound. This 22- 
component must be bound by an unassigned theta-role. More specifically, B will 
identify with the infinitive verb’s external theta-role on VP. At CP, with whole theta- 
role percolation being barred across this boundary, Elsewhere permits B to percolate 
on to the unassigned internal theta-role of the matrix verb, with which it is identified.7 
Assignment of this theta-role to the matrix object secures the interpretive linking of 
the floating quantifier with the matrix object DP:
7 Once again, for ease of exposition, this second step of identification is not represented in the tree.
rThe teachers T
VP [B],
the pupils V-/B7
V
turgc
CP [B] -  detachment o f B from A
TP [A,B]
T  [A,B]
to T’ [A,B] -  point o f  identification
FQ/B7
all
VP [A,B] 
learn their lines
Providing a representation of these constructions without a null-subject has 
demonstrated that we can adopt this mechanism without losing the generalisations for 
which PRO was introduced, Desideratum III, yet we can lose PRO, Desideratum VI.
I return in the final section to a potential problem raised in section 2.2.4, namely that 
of controlled objects.
2.4 Ruling out Controlled Objects
Up until this point, we have abstracted away from the fact that in virtue of B 's 
separation from A at CP, A is left unsatisfied in the infinitival, a situation which
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without with out regulation could lead to the generation of unattested structures, such 
as controlled objects:8
(69) *Bill said that Bettyi likes 0j
Theta-role identification and the possibility of A and 5  separation make the above 
construction potentially derivable in the following way. The embedded transitive verb 
introduces two theta-roles. The external theta-role percolates to TP, where it is 
discharged to the subject-DP. The circumstance that needs to be prevented concerns 
the internal theta-role. The 5-component of the internal theta-role might detach itself 
from A, identify with the 5-component of the external theta-role (by (63)d) above), 
with the result that Betty is interpreted as both subject and object:
(70)
DP 
Bill
But this problem is avoided from the formulation of Elsewhere in (46), repeated 
below:
8 The notation in this example indicates that what needs to be ruled out is a representation such that the 
verb introduces two theta-roles, but no object of any kind projects, leaving the internal theta-role 
unassigned.
TP
T’
T’ VP
CP
said
C
that
TP [A,B]n
DP VP [A,B] [A]
Bettyi
V[A,B] [A,B] 
likes
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(46) Given two competing rules, R1 and R2, which operate in two domains of 
application, D1 and D2, such that the D1 forms a sub-set of D2, then R1 will 
block R2 from applying in D1.
Elsewhere has a bias for keeping A and B together, since the process of copying A and 
B together is more specific, in that more information is copied, than one in which B is 
copied alone. Let us pin the rule that copies the complex [A,B] and the rule that 
copies the sub-component [B] straight to those rules of the Elsewhere principle to 
make this clear. Rule 1 of Elsewhere refers to the copying of the complex, [A,B], 
since carrying more information, it is the more specific rule, which means that Rule 2 
of Elsewhere refers to the copying of B alone. So we start with a bias for keeping the 
complex together, [A,B]', Rule 1 will only give way to Rule 2 if it is blocked from 
applying in its domain. But there is nothing to block Rule 1, since like being a 
transitive verb can assign accusative case. This availability of accusative case ensures 
that the [A,B] complex will be copied and assigned without separation:
(71) a. * John said that Maryi likes 0*
b. John said that Mary likes herself
Note that the availability of case that prevents controlled objects is not available for 
controlled subjects, hence the impossible:
(72) * Johni hoped hei/himi to win the game
This lack of case then, will mean that theta-role decomposition will always be
warranted for obligatory control structures. Deriving obligatory control’s distribution
via case-availability has become unpopular (see especially Landau (to appear)), 
chiefly because of data from morphologically rich languages such as Icelandic, which 
have provided evidence for a case-marked PRO (Sigurdsson 1991, 2003). But
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Icelandic can be accounted for without PRO, as we will see in chapter three, thereby 
removing it as an obstacle to a case-centred explanation.
But another reason for the unpopularity of deriving the distribution of PRO from 
case-availability is the existence of languages that allow overt subjects in infinitivals. 
Camie and Harley (1997), for example, show that the licensing of an overt subject in 
Irish in non-finite clauses depends on a clause-internal mechanism: they can stand 
alone, so are not limited to sub-categorial positions, are not dependent on an overt C, 
nor are they licensed via ECM. The authors argue that the distribution of PRO is 
governed by the EPP, thus making two predictions:
(73) (i) Languages demonstrating no EPP effects will allow overt nominals in
the subject position of infinitivals
(ii) PRO is case-marked
Prediction (i) is discredited by German and Dutch. German subject positions do not 
need to be obligatorily filled, showing no EPP effects:
(74) Gestem wurde getanzt 
Yesterday was danced 
‘There was dancing yesterday’
German should, therefore, allow overt nominals in subject positions of infinitivals, 
contrary to fact. Prediction (ii) is supported by Camie and Harley using Icelandic
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case-concord data. But chapter three is dedicated to answering for case-concord 
without PRO.9
A remaining issue, however, is Lasnik’s (1992) observation that we noted in chapter 
one? Recall that a case-based theory of PRO’s distribution was rejected because of 
examples in which despite case being unavailable, PRO remained impossible. I repeat 
the relevant examples below.
The contrast between the two examples in (75) has been attributed to case: the 
transitive verb assigns case obligatorily, but the argument runs (Chomsky and Lasnik 
(1993)) that PRO can only receive null case, hence the ungrammatical example in (b).
(75) a. John believes himself to be clever
b. *John believes PRO to be clever
The matrix verb exceptionally case marks the subject of its complement, which 
permits the reflexive in the subject position of the complement, not PRO. But the next 
set of examples proved this explanation fell short, since an intervening adverbial 
which prevents accusative case assignment and hence the possibility of the reflexive, 
does not save PRO:
(76) a. *John believes sincerely himself to be clever
9
Szabolcsi (2005) introduces a possible overt subject in Hungarian infinitivals. The title of this paper, however, is 
rather telling: Overt infinitival subjects (if that’s what they are).
(1) Nem szeretnek [en is elcsuszni]
Not would.like(lsg) [I(N) too slip(inf)
‘I wouldn’t like it to be the case that I, too, slip’. Szabolcsi’s (5)
Szabolcsi herself suggests that these pronouns are not subjects, hence not arguments. Given that the 
structure of this example remains unclear, it is not a strong counterargument to the claim that overt 
subjects in obligatorily controlled infinitivals are not possible.
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b. *John believes sincerely PRO to be clever
(Lasnik’s 11 & 12)
The explanation for the ungrammaticality of the example in (76)b) is different to that 
for the absence of a controlled object in (71)a) and has to do with the category of the 
verb in (76)b), which crucially is not a control verb. In chapter four, where I elaborate 
on the syntactic selection involved in obligatory control that is absent in non- 
obligatory control, I will return once more to this example and we will see that it does 
not threaten the case-centred explanation for the absence of controlled object
3.4 S um m ary
In this chapter, I have applied a system based on theta-percolation, with theta-roles 
understood as composites, to obligatory control. It has been extended to the binding 
of secondary predicates, reflexives and floating quantifiers in infinitivals, removing 
the need for PRO to act as protection for the locality condition that regulates them 
(Desideratum I and II) The fact that obligatory control is analysed as a syntactic 
dependency ensures that it will adhere to the properties of the configurational matrix, 
since these properties pervade all grammatical dependencies (Desideratum III). In 
each case the mechanism used has been the interpretative component B, which is 
copied beyond the infinitival to a theta-role introduced by the matrix verb. Theta-role 
decomposition has enabled us to distinguish obligatory control and binding on the 
one hand from both NP-raising and predication on the other; the former two relations 
are regulated by the component of a theta-role that is sent to the semantic interface 
only, namely B, the latter two by a complete theta-role (Desideratum V) The 
distribution of obligatory control has been derived using Elsewhere and an appeal to 
case. The Elsewhere Principle and case-availability has ruled out the unwanted
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generation of controlled objects (Desideratum VI). Lastly, Elsewhere has restricted 
theta-role separation, i.e. obligatory control to CPs (Desideratum VII):
(77) I © Our theory of control should not rely on an ad hoc category such 
as PRO
II © Our theory should account for the subject properties of the infinitival.
III © Our theory should provide an account for why obligatory control is
subject to four conditions, which non-obligatory control is not: its 
antecedent is obligatory, must be unique, local and must c-command 
its understood subject.
IV Our theory should account for why the understood subject in non- 
obligatory control must be human.
V © Our theory should explain why anaphoric binding shares a substantial
number of properties with obligatory control.
VI © Our theory should rule out controlled objects
VII © Our theory should explain why controlled clauses are CPs and not VPs
or TPs.
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Chapter 3
Case and Agreement in Icelandic
3.1 Introduction
The chief aim of this chapter is to use the PRO-less approach to obligatory control 
mapped out in the previous chapter on Icelandic, which on the surface suggests that 
ridding the grammar of PRO might be premature. Icelandic has a class of quirky 
verbs/predicates, which determine the case on their subjects, whilst manifesting 
themselves an obligatory default form:
(1) a. Strakunum er kalt a’. *Strakunum eru kalt
Boys.the(Dpl) isCdflt1) cold(dflt) Boys.the(Dpl) are(3pl) cold(dflt)
b. Henni var hjalpad b’ *Hun var hjalpad
She(Dsg) was helped She(Nsg) was helped
The predicate kalt, in its quirky guise as in (l)a) takes a dative subject, whereas the
predicate itself and the main verb show no agreement with this subject, manifesting
an obligatory default form. This is particularly clear in (a’), where despite the plural 
subject, the copular connecting the subject with the predicate cannot agree in number.
1 Default on main verbs in Icelandic is 3rd person singular.
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In (b), the passive participle help also takes a dative subject obligatorily, as is clear 
from (b’), in which a nominative subject rules the sentence out.2
When a quirky verb appears in an infinitival clause, (i.e. the passive participle help 
below, which takes a dative subject), in combination with a regular (non-quirky) 
secondary predicate, that secondary predicate strongly prefers to agree in case with 
the would-be subject of the quirky verb:3
(2) Ekki hafdi eg vonast til ad vera hjalpad drukkinni/??drukkin 
Not had I(N) hoped for to be helped(dflt) drunk<pfsgy??(Nfsg)
'I had definitely not hoped to be helped drunk'
Given the agreement that surfaces on the secondary predicate, an immediate question 
is whether a quirky case-marked PRO is necessary to explain these agreement 
restrictions. With a case-marked PRO, the origins of the dative agreement on the 
secondary predicate can obviously be accounted for (see esp. Sigurdsson 1991,2002). 
In an example like (2), the secondary predicate would simply agree with its null 
subject:
(3) Ekki hafdi eg vonast til ad PRO vera hjalpad drukkinni 
Not had I(N) hoped for to PRO(D)be helped^) drunk(DfSg)
The pattern of agreement in examples similar to (3) has been regarded as strong 
evidence for the existence of PRO, convincing even those who have denied its 
existence for many years (see especially Hudson 2003), that PRO must exist after all. 
But the Icelandic data receive a natural account under an approach based on theta-role
2 See Zaenen, Maling and Thrainnson (1985) for extensive evidence that the surface subjects of quirky 
verbs behave syntactically as subjects, as opposed to raised objects.
3 Example constructed with the help of Gunnar Hrafn Hrafnbjargarson (pc)
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decomposition. In fact, if adopted, some unwanted complications accompanying a 
PRO-based analysis are avoided.
In this chapter, I will examine Icelandic and its morphological evidence that is widely 
accepted as a motivation for PRO. The case and agreement system in this language is 
such that in finite clauses, adjectives, participles, secondary and semi-predicates and 
floating quantifiers inflect for case and phi-features, showing agreement with their 
antecedent. There has been some dispute as to what provides the source for 
agreement on these elements when in infinitivals, there being no overt subject with 
which they can agree. If the representation in (3) is correct and there is a case-marked 
PRO in this position, capable of bearing any case that an overt DP bears, the 
agreement on the elements in question loses its mysteriousness. But the fact that PRO 
does not block wanna contraction, patterning with non-case-marked elements such as 
NP-trace in this respect, rather than case-marked elements such as wh-trace (see 
Jaeggli 1980, Berendsen 1986, Homstein 1999, 2000) casts doubt on this analysis. 
Equally, it remains unexplained as to why this subject cannot be overt. Conversely, if 
there is no PRO in that position, contraction is expected to be unhindered, there being 
nothing to intervene, and a lack of case will account for the prohibition on overt DPs. 
But this brings us back to the agreement facts, the focus of this chapter.
A look at the case and agreement properties of Icelandic follows, which will force a 
divide between non-syntactic and syntactic agreement. The former, to which we turn 
in section 3.2, refers to phi-feature agreement. Justification for a non-syntactic 
treatment of this data comes chiefly from their presence when there is no syntactic 
source. An extra-syntactic rule is proposed to cover this agreement pattern, which 
bars elements that identify a subject from clashing with that subject. In section 3 .3 ,1 
turn to syntactic agreement, drawing a distinction between that exhibited by quirky 
and non-quirky verbs. Syntactic agreement refers to the licensing of arguments,
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which, it will be argued in section 3.4, (following an idea dating back to Jakobson 
1935/66) is achieved in one of two ways: case on the subject or agreement on the 
main verb. Quirky case phenomena fall out from this assumption in that when a 
subject has quirky case, its main verb lacks agreement, taking a default form instead. 
A specific syntactic rule regulates quirky case, tying quirky case to theta-role 
assignment. Giving precedence to this more specific syntactic rule and using the 
mechanism mapped out in the previous chapter, makes it possible an account of all 
Icelandic agreement in infinitivals without any recourse to PRO; a task taken on in 
section 3.5. The PRO-free mechanism is applied to the Icelandic data, illustrating that 
PRO is not necessary to accommodate them. In section 3.6, I take the Icelandic 
question a step further, by asking whether Icelandic in fact provides evidence against 
PRO. A comparison with the PRO-based approach adopted in Sigurdsson (2002) 
suggests that it is does. I conclude in section 3.7.
3.2 Non-syntactic Agreement
3.2.1 Phi-feature Agreement
In Icelandic a regular (non-quirky) adjective agrees with the argument it qualifies, in 
both case and phi-features. This is demonstrated in the examples below, where the 
adjective agrees with its neuter, feminine or masculine antecedent, in (4)a), (b) and 
(c) respectively:
(4) a. Eg tel bomin falleg
I consider the children(Anpl) beautiful(Anpl)
b. Eg tel stelpumar fallegar
116
I consider the girls(Afpl) beautiful(Afpl)
c. Eg tel strakana fallega
I consider the boys(Ampl) beautiful(Ampl)
Phi-agreement is not clause bounded in the way that case-agreement sometimes is:
(5) [Mig vantadi bara [a5 vera hjalpad drukkinni/*drukkna af foreldrum minum]] 
Me(Aisg) lacked only to be helped^) drunk(Dfsg/*Afsg) by parents mine
'All that I needed was to be helped drunk by my parents'
In the example above, the secondary predicate drunk has dative, feminine and 
singular morphology. There cannot be one syntactic source for these features, given 
the rather different restrictions that regulate them, as we will see. The number feature 
on drunk matches that of the matrix subject, both being in the singular. But the 
feminine feature on drunk cannot derive from the matrix subject too, given that the 
first person pronoun bears no gender feature. This is also true of the predicate’s case- 
agreement, given that accusative agreement, which would match the matrix quirky 
subject, is barred. On the basis of the example in (5) alone then, it seems as though 
number has a syntactic source, albeit a non-local one, whereas gender is regulated 
outside of syntax. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that both number and gender 
features are regulated extra-syntactically, as these next examples of non-obligatory 
control demonstrate:
(6) a. Ad vera fundinn drukkinn er hraedilegt, ad vera fundinn nakinn
er ekki svo slaemt.
To be found(N.m.sg) drunk(N.m.sg) is horrible, to be found(Ninsg) naked(Nmsg) 
is not so bad.
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b. Ad vera fimdin drukkin er hraedilegt, ad vera fundin nakin 
er ekki svo slaemt.
To be found(N.f.sg) drunk(N.f sg) is horrible, to be found(Nfsg) naked(Nfsg) 
is not so bad.
c. Ad vera fundnar drukknar er hraedilegt, ad vera fundnar naktar
er ekki svo slaemt.
To be foimd(N.fPi) drunk(N.fpi) is horrible, to be found(Nfpi) naked(Nfpi) 
is not so bad.
Spoken by a male, the sentence in (6), would require the agreement in (a), but with a 
female it must be as in (b). Lastly, if a group of females recite the same sentence the 
agreement alters to (c). In each instance then, number and gender agreement on the 
participle and secondary predicate depend upon the understood semantic subject, 
namely a discourse, rather than a syntactic, antecedent. A non-syntactic rule, which 
says no more than that the features of an element which help to identify a subject 
cannot clash with those of the subject, is sufficient to regulate this agreement:
(7) Properties of the semantic subject of a terminal node X, cannot clash with
features in X that index the subject
The referents of the semantic subjects of ((6)a, b and c) are identifiable from the 
morphological phi-agreement on the participles and secondary predicates. An 
interpretation at odds with the features present should not be possible according to the 
rule above, and this is indeed so. The number and gender of the speakers is 
unequivocal.
In the next section I turn to syntactic agreement, distinguishing those arguments 
licensed by case from those licensed in virtue of their agreement with the main verb.
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3.3 Syntactic Agreement
3.3.1 Regular versus quirky predicate agreement
Recall that regular (non-quirky) predicates always agree with the argument they 
qualify:
(8) a. Eg tel bomin falleg
I consider the children(Anpl) beautiful(Anpl)
b. Eg tel stelpurnar fallegar
I consider the girls(Afpl) beautiful(Afpl)
c. Eg tel strakana fallega
I consider the boys(Ampl) beautiful(Ampl)
The agreement pattern of regular predicates contrasts with that of quirky ones, 
recognised both by their non-nominative subjects and their lack of agreement with 
this subject. I deal with their subjects5 case first. The case on these quirky predicates5 
surface subjects cannot be predicted from syntactic structure, but is an idiosyncratic 
phenomenon, peculiar to each predicate. Examples are given below.
(9) a. Henni var kalt b. Hana vantadi vinnu c. Hennar var saknad
Her(D) was cold Her(A) lacked job(A) Her(G) was missed
‘She was freezing5 ‘She lacked/needed a job5 ‘She was missed5(by someone)
(Sigurdsson 2002 his (2),(3),(4))
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The rigidity they display, in terms of the case they require on their subjects, is 
explained if a quirky predicate, as often assumed (see Chomsky 1981), is stored in the 
lexicon with its case-specification linked to the theta-role it assigns:
(10) kalt: [ f ASE]
Assignment of quirky case then, is a syntactic relation which is theta-dependent, in 
that its locus of case-assignment is tied to that of the theta-role. The rule regulating 
this relation can be stated quite simply:
(11) Quirky case assignment is 0-bound
A quirky adjective cannot be combined with a subject whose case is at odds with the 
adjective’s theta-linked case-specification. We see this in example (12)b), where the 
quirky adjective, kalt, which requires a dative subject, has a nominative one.
(12) a. Henni var kalt b. *Hun var kalt
Unlike quirky adjectives, a regular adjective is stored in the lexicon linked to a bare 
theta-role. Morphological endings also have their own lexical entries, which in 
Icelandic amount to four case possibilities: nominative, accusative, dative and 
genitive. A rule of combination joins the adjective with a morphological ending, 
which ensures that case affixes, as functors in the sense of de Sciullo and Williams 
(1987), take an adjective with an external 0-role and deliver an adjective with an 
external theta-role linked to a specific case:
Her(D) was cold(dflt) 
‘She was freezing’
She(N) was cold(dflt) 
‘She was freezing’
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(13) Affix Input: Adjective 0
Output: Adjective Q c a se
Combining a regular adjective with a morphological ending gives the representation 
in (14).
(14)
A d  AFFIX (CASE)
The result is very similar to that of a quirky predicate. On the root node of the 
adjective the two predicates will look identical, but whereas the regular predicate’s
representation, as in (15)a), is derived, the quirky predicate, as in (b), has its case
specified inherently:
(15) a. A 6fASE b. ACF^
A 6  AFFIX (CASE)
Put into practice, the mechanism used for morphological case-agreement works as 
follows. Taking (8)c) as an example, the theta-role introduced by ‘fallega’ 
(beautiful.Ampl) combines with the accusative morphological case affix, and this 
theta-role percolates to T-bar, where it is applied to the accusative DP:
(16) TP (I consider the boys beautiful)
D
Eg
T >
VP
V
tel
TP
DP
strakana(A)
T [ 0 kc] ,
a p / # 4CC/
fallega (A)
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Quirky adjectives also lack morphological agreement. They invariably bear a default 
form, namely nominative, neuter, singular:
(17) a. Honumerkalt b. *Honum er kaldum
Hini(D3sg) is freezing(dfit) Him^sg) is freezings
Their default status follows if we accept Economy as given, which at its simplest, 
requires an output of a linguistic operation to differ from its input. Building a 
construction where a quirky adjective agrees in case with its subject would be at odds 
with this principle. The quirky adjective (18)a), stored lexically with its case- 
specified theta-role, might combine with a separately stored morphological case 
ending,(18)b):
(18) (a) kalt: (fMr (b) AFFIX {DAT)
Once combined, as in example (19), where only the adjective’s features have 
projected, the root node would consist of exactly the same information as was in its 
daughter, ruling such ineffectual projection out:
(19) * A  ePAT
A  0°AT AFFIX (DAT,
The agreement distinction between regular and quirky adjectives extends to main 
verb agreement. A regular adjective combined with a main verb requires subject-verb 
agreement, but use of quirky adjective results in that verb being default. I turn to 
these facts next.
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3.4 Main Verb Agreement
3.4.1 Agreeing forms versus Default forms
A copula verb connecting a regular adjective with its nominative subject, must agree 
in number and person with this subject:
(20) Bomin eru/*er falleg
Children.the(Nnpl) are/*is beautiful(Nnpl)
The opposite holds for copulas connecting quirky adjectives with their subjects, 
where a lack of agreement is imposed. We see this by taking a plural subject, and 
noting that the copula must be in the singular:
(21) a. Strakunum er kalt b. *Strakunum eru kalt
Boys.the(Dpl) is(dflt4) cold(dflt) Boys.the(Dpl) are(3pl) cold(dflt)
An account for this contrast comes from analyses that advocate a bi-modal approach 
to argument marking, initiated in Jakobson (1935/1966) and developed in Bittner and 
Hale (1997), Nichols (1986) and Neeleman and Weerman (1999). That is, that there 
are two ways of marking an argument as such: either through case assignment, or 
through subject-verb agreement, but crucially not both. In (21)a) then, the lack of 
subject-verb agreement comes about because the subject bears the inherent case 
bound up with the theta-role it has been assigned, ruling out the need, and so the 
possibility, of further identification from the verb. In contrast, the obligatory subject- 
verb agreement in (20) precludes structural case assignment to the subject. What then
4 Default on main verbs in Icelandic is 3rd person singular.
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of the nominative that appears on ‘Bomin’? The claim is that it is in fact no case at 
all. A more accurate representation of the example in (20) then, is as in (22) below.
(22) Bomin eru falleg
Children.the(npl) are beautiful(npl)
The empirical basis for this argument is not inconsistent with Sigurdsson (1993), 
where, building on work by Holmberg (1985) and Taraldsen (1994), it is noted that 
structural case correlates with the presence of agreement, and inherent case with its 
absence. All these approaches agree that there is a general tendency for languages to 
show dissociation between inherently case-marked subjects and subject-verb 
agreement, even if this is not absolute (see Anderson 1984 on Georgian). But the 
claim that nominative case is no case is controversial, and rejected in Sigurdsson 
(1991,1996), so the next sub-section provides some support for it.
3.4.2 Bi-Modal Argument-Marking
Neeleman and Weerman (1999) offer a number of arguments in support of 
nominative case being a misnomer; here I concentrate on two. Firstly, in an 
agglutinative language such as modem Turkish, in most instances, nominative case 
contrasts with all other cases in having no affix. The second is that verbs do not select 
for nominative DPs, which makes sense on the reasonable assumption that heads do 
not select for the absence of a feature.
I turn first to Turkish, where, as shown in the paradigm below, plural affixes exist 
separately from case affixes. In the singular, the nominative of the noun is the bare
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stem, but in the plural the ‘ler’ affix adjoins. Unlike the nominative form of the noun, 
all the other cases have their own peculiar case affix stacked on to the plural affix:
(23) Modem Turkish paradigm for ‘hand’
Nom el Plural: Nom eller
Gen elin Gen ellerin
Dat ele Dat ellere
Acc eli Acc elleri
Abl elden Abl ellerden
Loc elde Loc ellerde
(N & W’s (19))
An agglutinative language such as Turkish is a better indicator of where case exists 
than a fusional language like Icelandic, where it is difficult to separate case from phi 
features, since they are all contained within the same suffix.
Our second piece of motivation is based on the assumption that heads to do not select 
for absent features. If so, then a prediction made by the ‘nominative-is-no-case’ camp 
is that it should not be possible for a verb to select a nominative DP. Lexical case 
selection is not regulated by any structural mles of a language. For example, in the 
German, Ich vertraue ihm nicht (I don’t trust him) the verb lexically selects a dative 
object, a fact not predictable from the sentence’s structure. But such lexical selection 
of nominative objects appears to be absent, (see De Wit 1997 for Russian, Van 
Riemsdijk 1983 for German). Despite superficial appearances, Icelandic is not a 
counter example to this generalisation, even though in particular circumstances it 
allows nominative objects which control verb agreement:
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(24) Okkur J)6tti hann fyndinn
Us(Dfpl) thought(3sg) he(Nmsg) amusing(Nmsg)
‘We found him amusing’
(Hrafiibjargarson (2001)
Since the nominative case on the object is not determined by the property of a 
particular verb, but by the structure in which the verb appears, this does not refute the 
prediction made. Note that an example such as ‘Her(A) like they(N)’ (Icelandic) is 
not a counter example, since presence of nominative on a selected category does not 
mean that the verb selects for nominative, just as presence of plural on a category 
does not mean that the verb selects for plural. To ascertain whether case is lexically 
selected, one needs to look at the case-assignment rules of a language. If an argument 
has a case at odds with that predicted by these rules, then one can argue that it is 
lexically selected case. Crucially the appearance of nominative on non-subject 
arguments and subjects in finite clauses is predictable from the case-assignment rules 
of the language: if the subject bears a case other than nominative, then the lower 
argument gets nominative. A counter example would be a double-object verb, whose 
arguments have the pattern nominative, dative, nominative.
A further piece of corroboration for nominative case in Icelandic not being a proper 
case comes from the distribution of reflexives. It is well known that reflexives do not 
occur in the subject position of finite clauses in English:
(25) *Beni believed that himselfi was the fastest runner in the class
Rizzi (1990) has argued that it is not subject-hood but agreement that prevents 
occurrence of a reflexive in these positions. He formulates this as the Anaphor- 
Agreement Effect:
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(26) Anaphor-Agreement Effect
Anaphors do not occur in syntactic positions construed with agreement 
(Rizzi 1990, p 27)
If it is agreement that prevents the reflexive in (25) from occurring, this would 
account for the felicity of a reflexive in the subject of the ECM clause below:
(27) Ben believed himself to be the fastest runner in the class
The quirky verb phenomenon in Icelandic provides a good way of confirming 
whether or not it is agreement that prevents reflexives from occurring in particular 
positions (see Everaert 1990 and Shiraki 2006). Notably, the Icelandic paradigm for 
reflexives is incomplete, it having no nominative reflexives:
(28) Icelandic Reflexive
NOM
ACC sig
DAT ser
GEN sin
Now recall that quirky verbs, whilst determining the case on their subjects, never 
agree with their subjects, exhibiting an obligatory default form instead:
(29) Mig langar ad fara til Islands 
Me(Acc) wants(dflt) to go to Iceland(Gen)
‘I want to go to Iceland’
Reflexives can occur in subject position if the verb is quirky, but not if that verb is 
regular:
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(30) Hann sagdi ad sig vantadi haefileika.
He(N) said that REFL-SUBJ lacked-SUBJ ability 
“He said that he lacked ability.” (Maling 1984, p 232)
(31) * Jon segir ad sig/sin/ser elski Maria
Jon(N) says that REFL-SUBJ loves-SUBJ Maria 
“John says that he loves Maria.” (Everaert 1990, p 280)
Furthermore, despite Icelandic allowing ‘nominative’ DPs in what appear to be object 
positions, reflexives nre barred in this position:
(32) *Henni finnst sig/sin/ser veik.
The emerging generalisation is that reflexives cannot appear in positions construed 
with agreement, as Rizzi (1990) argues.
There are, of course, languages in which all arguments are licensed by case, 
nominative included, such as Japanese, which has a full morphological case 
paradigm:
(33) Japanese ‘book’
NOM hon-ga
GEN hon-no
DAT hon-ni
ACC hon-o
Her(D) finds REFL-SELF sick 
“She considers herself sick.” (Everaert 1990, p 281)
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But in such languages, verbal agreement is conspicuously absent, lending support to 
the bimodal analysis of argument marking:5
(34) Tokyo-ga zinkoo-ga ooi.
Tokyo-NOM population-NOM many 
‘Tokyo’s population is large’
Interesting for present purposes is that unlike Icelandic, whose non-quirky verbs 
agree with their subjects, Japanese, which has no subject-verb agreement, does have 
nominative anaphors:
(35) John-ga [zibun/zibun-zisin-ga Mary-o seme-ta to] it-ta
John-NOM self/self-self-NOM Mary-ACC blame-PAST COMP say-PAST 
‘John said that he blamed Mary’
(Shiraki (2006) (his 78))
The contrast between these two languages in this respect weighs quite heavily in 
favour of the bi-modal approach to argument-marking as adopted here.
A potential counter example to such an argument is given in Sigurdsson (1996), 
where adjectives which have nominative agreement in finite clauses, as demonstrated 
by (36)a) are shown to have accusative agreement in ECM clauses, as in (36)b). This 
may lead one to question whether the bi-modal approach to argument marking can be 
upheld, since accusative is case and it is present on the subject of the exceptionally 
case-marked clause and accusative agreement is present on the adjective:
(36) a. Strakamir voru gafadir
5 There are some who argue that the Japanese system of honorification is a form of agreement. But see 
Shiraki (2006) for evidence against this view.
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the boys(Nmpl) were(3pl) intelligent(Nmpl)
b. Eg taldi strakana (vera) gafada
I believed the boys(Ampl) be(inf) intelligentAmpl)
(Sigurdsson 1996 (27),(28))
But it is the main verb which provides the accurate test for whether or not the bi- 
modal approach to argument marking can be upheld, because it is through main-verb 
agreement, not adjectival agreement that an argument is said to be licensed. In (36)a) 
the main verb does agree with its subject, whereas in (b), although the verb is 
optional, when it does appear it is crucially without tense. If nominative and 
accusative do differ then, in that only the latter is a genuine case, the data above is 
expected, since the argument licensed through case, as in (b), shows no agreement 
with its verb.
With the agreement facts in place, the next section will turn to secondary predicate 
agreement in subject-controlled infinitivals. It will show that the copying mechanism 
mapped out in the first part of the paper allows for all case variations found with 
Icelandic, whilst precluding ungrammatical ones.
3.5 Agreement in Obligatory Control Infinitivals
3.5.1 Quirky Infinitivals
If the agreement of a quirky participle is regulated by its local subject in finite 
clauses, then one might argue that the same regulation obtains in infinitival clauses,
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only that in this latter instance the subject is phonetically null. Such has been the 
reasoning in Sigurdsson (1991), where it is argued that PRO can bear structural or 
quirky case, thereby answering for the consistent agreement of quirky verbs across 
both finite and non-finite clauses.6 Just as the dative subject in (37)a) is responsible 
for the default form of the participle, so is the null (dative)-subject in the infinitival 
clause in (37)b):
(37) a. Strakunum var hjalpad/*hjalpadir/*hjalpudum.
The boys(D) was helped(dflt)/(*Npl.m)/(*Dpl.m)
b. Strakamir vonast til [ad PRO vera a hjalpad/*hjalpadir/*hjalpudum]
The boys(N) hope for to (D) be helped(dflt)/( *Npl. m)/(*Dpl. m)
(Sigurdsson 1991 his 19b and 20b)
Problems with a PRO-based account are addressed in section 6, but for now I turn 
straight to the present alternative, based on theta-role decomposition. This would 
work as set out in the tree in (40). The theta-role introduced by the quirky participle 
consists of two components, by now familiar, A and B. But recall from (11), that a 
quirky theta-role is linked to its case inherently, raising the question of whether case 
is linked to A or B:
(38) a. [eAD,B] b. [oA,B°]
PRO is of course a GB-construct and one might argue that the question of its existence is outdated, 
since the framework in which it was introduced has been superceded by minimalism. But interestingly 
one of the most recent theories of control, namely that of Landau (2000) retains PRO despite this 
theory being placed firmly in a minimalist setting. Sigurdsson (2002) also continues to posit PRO. So 
the answer to the question of whether or not we can explain the data above without recourse to PRO 
remains significant.
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But given that B is concerned with semantic reference, whereas the task of A is to 
locate a licensed DP, it must be A with which the dative case feature is linked:
(39) Inherent case is tied to the formal component of a theta-role: [qAd, B]
With the locus of the dative feature clear, we can move on to the example of the 
copying mechanism at work:7
T P [eA,BJu
r  [e A, BJStrakamir
VP LA, BJ
CP [eBJvonast 
[&A, BJ
C [ eAD,B ]
til C* [eAD, B]
a5 TP [eAD, BJ
T [ eAD,B ]
T VP [eAD, B]
vera hjalpaS
The composite theta-role introduced by hjdlpad percolates till C \ Since AD can go no 
further, separation of A and B is permitted by Elsewhere, and B percolates until 
reaching the external theta-role of the matrix verb with which it collapses. Copying of 
this composed theta-role to the root node, where it immediately dominates the matrix 
subject establishes the link between it and hjdlpad. With this straightforward case 
illustrated, we turn now to secondary predicates, first illustrating their agreement 
possibilities, then answering for this pattern in the same way.
7 For clarity, the tree includes only those theta-roles that contribute to the relation to hand.
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3.5.2 Secondary Predicates in Infinitivals
Secondary predicates in finite clauses exhibit agreement in case, number and gender 
with their antecedent:
(41) a. Strakamir hittu kennarann drukkinn
boys.the(Nm.Pi) met teacher.t h e (AinSg) d ru n k (A m sg )
b. Strakamir hittu kennarann drukknir 
boys.the(Nmpi) met the teacher drunk(Nmpi)
(Sigurdsson 2002 (72),(73))
In subject-control environments, the case-agreement on secondary predicates varies 
according to the type of verb used in the infinitival, not the verb used in the matrix. 
This becomes clear in the next set of examples which show the agreement 
possibilities for the regular secondary predicate, drukkinn (drunk), in infinitivals. The 
secondary predicate follows a regular and a quirky participle in the infinitivals in (42) 
and (43) respectively, but both of these examples have the same regular control verb 
in the matrix, namely vona til (to hope for), which takes a nominative subject. To 
control for possible interference from the matrix clause, examples (44) and (45) use a 
quirky matrix control verb, vanta, (to lack/need) which takes an accusative subject, 
and so will check whether case on the matrix subject can impact on the case- 
agreement of the secondary predicate in the infinitival. To sum up, two predicate 
types - regular and quirky - varying across the matrix and infinitive clauses give four
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possibilities, and collectively these examples show that there is no case copying 
across a clause.8
(42) Ekki haf5i eg vonast til ad vera sott drukkin
Not had I(N) hoped for to be picked up(Nfsg) drunk(Nfsg)
'I had definitely not hoped to be picked up drunk'
(43) Ekki hafdi eg vonast til ad vera hjalpad drukkinni/??drukkin 
Not had I(N) hoped for to be helped(dflt) drunk(Dfsg/??Nfsg)
'I had definitely not hoped to be helped drunk’
(44) Mig vantadi bara ad vera hjalpad drukkinni/* drukkna af foreldrum minum 
Me(Acc) lacked only to be helped(dflt) drunk(D&g/*Afsg)by parents mine
'All that I needed was to be helped drunk by my parents'
(45) Mig vantadi bara ad vera sdtt drukkin/*drukkna af foreldrum minum 
Me(Acc> lacked only to be picked up(Nfsg) drunk(Nfsg/*Afsg)by parents mine 
'All that I needed was to be picked up drunk by my parents’
I turn to (42) first, pictured in (48), which is consistent (but no more) with the 
secondary predicate’s case-agreement being locally determined by the participle in 
the infinitival, as opposed to the control verb in the matrix. Recall that nominative is 
analysed here as the absence of case, so the theta-role complexes of the participle and 
the secondary predicate lack case-specification altogether. In accordance with the
8 These examples are not standard, in that they would be frowned upon by prescriptive grammarians, 
but they are heard frequently in the following context: ‘I had been through so many uncomfortable 
things this evening, all I had left to do was to be helped/picked up drunk: the ultimate embarrassment!’ 
(Gunnar Hrafn Hrafiibjargarson pc). But for even those informants who found some of the example 
pragmatically odd (but not ungrammatical), the agreement possibilities were unequivocal.
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theta-role identification possibilities introduced in chapter two, reproduced in (47), 
these theta-roles identify on the node immediately dominating them, and the resulting 
composite percolates to CP. As a means of regulating theta-role identification, I 
incorporate the following rule to prevent conflicting cases:
(46) ©-Identification Rule: 9-role-identification must respect linked cases.
The implementation of this rule will impact on theta-role identification by allowing 
((47)a,b,c) but ruling out (47)d), where two theta-roles are linked to different cases:9
(47) ( a ) ^ O ^  (b)
e e 6° e 0° 0°
Identification of the participle’s and predicate’s theta-roles in (48) satisfies the above 
rule vacuously, neither of them being specified for case, as in (47)a). Only B 
continues past CP and identifies with the 5-component of the matrix verb’s external 
0-role, again permitted in virtue of (47)a). Application of this composed 0-role to the 
matrix subject ensures that the matrix subject is interpretively linked with the matrix 
verb, as well as the participle and depictive in the infinitival clause:
9 Although only dative and accusative cases are illustrated in the examples, the rule applies to all cases.
(48) XP 
Ekki CP
haffii TP [eA ,B ]§
e8 (n >
vonaQist
[oA,BJ
T  [ eA ,B ]
NegPAeA ,B
VP [gA, BJ
CP [gB]
C’ [gA, BJ
C’ [eA, B]
TP [eA, BJ
T  [g A, B]
VP [gA,B]vera
V[gA,B] V [ 0A ,B ] 
s6tt (fig) drukkin^ fig)
Support for cross-clause case copying being barred comes from the example in (45), 
repeated here as (49), where the accusative case on the subject in the matrix cannot be 
reflected on the secondary predicate in the embedded clause, which cannot agree with 
it:
(49) Mig vantadi bara ad vera sott drukkin/* drukkna af foreldrum minum
Me(Acc> lacked only to be picked up drunk(NfSg/*Afsg) by parents^) mine^) 
‘All that I needed was to be picked up drunk by my parents
The representation of this telling example follows:
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(50) TP[eA '.B ],
Mi&» T  [eAA, BJ
V P  [e A ' .B ]
vantadi
[oAa,BJ
V P  [eB]
C P / *  5 /
C ’ [e A, B]
T P  [eA, B]
T  [e A, BJ
V P  [eA ,B ]vera
\ [ eA ,B ]  V  [0A, BJ 
sott(&g) drukkin^ ftg)
The two theta-roles, which bear no case-specification, of the regular participle and 
secondary predicate are identified on VP. At CP B has separated from A, and it 
continues until identifying with the 5-component of the matrix verb’s external theta- 
role, as permitted by (47)b). The external theta-role’s accusative linked ^ -component 
is applied to the matrix subject, which bears the accusative case that the quirky verb 
specifies. This component, having been introduced in the matrix clause, cannot effect 
the case-agreement possibilites in the infinitival, since there is never any connection 
between it and the ^ -components in the infinitival clause.
The example in (43), whose representation is set out in (51), has a regular secondary 
predicate combined with a quirky participle in the infinitival clause. Hjdlpad 
introduces a lexically determined dative theta-role, whilst drukkinni introduces a bare 
theta-role which has combined with a morphological dative affix. These two theta- 
roles, both having identical case specifications are free to identify on VP (see (47)c). 
Hjdlpad exhibits the default ending, marking it out as quirky, and drukkinni shows
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morphological case-agreement consonant with the dative-linked theta-role it has 
identified with. The composed theta-role separates and at CP only B continues to the 
matrix clause, where it identifies with the 5-component of the matrix verb’s external 
theta-role, permitted by (47)b). This theta-role is then applied to the matrix subject:
(51) XP
TJ>[eA,Bh
T  [eA ,B]  
thaf* K e t f U e A , B ]
W i  ^ V ? ^ [ e A ,  B] 
vonaSist [eA, B]  CP [eB]
^ C f e ^ . B ]  
til ^ C J e A D, BJ
ad T ? [0Ad,B ]
T [ eAD,B]  
vera VP [eAD,B ]
V[eAD,BJ  V [eA°, BJ 
hjalpad drukkinni(D6g)
The speakers that accept, albeit not completely, a ‘nominative’ ending on drunk in the 
example above, as indicated in the original sentence in (43) are accounted for, since 
one of the two identifying theta-roles is unspecified for case, a scenario covered by
(47)b):
(52) ^ V P [ e A D,BJ 
V[eAD, BJ V [eA, B]
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That the agreement of the secondary predicate, as demonstated on the tree in (51), is 
determined locally, as opposed to there being any transferal via the matrix subject, is 
corroborated by (44), represented in (53), where an accusative matrix subject cannot 
trigger accusative agreement on the secondary predicate in the embedded clause:
(53)
Mig(A) ^ J T J oAa, BJ
^ vp [*a?,bj
vantadi [eA  BJ ^V P ^JgB J
bara CP [e BJ
c; [eA°, B]
TP [sAd,B ]
T [ sAd,B ]
vera V ? [eAD,B ]
V[eAD,B ] V [eAD,B ] 
hjalpad drukkinn i^g)
*drukkna(Afig)
Accusative agreement on the secondary predicate is ruled out by the ©-Identification 
Rule in (47). Despite drunk being a regular predicate, and so not lexically specified 
for case, by (13), it combines with a morphological case affix before entering the 
syntax. This makes its case feature visible to the syntactic operation of theta-role 
identification, and to conditions on that operation, in this instance the rule in (46): 
Hjdlpad has a dative-marked theta-role and drukkna an accusative-marked one, 
prohibiting identification of their theta-roles:
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(54) * ^ V f J e A ' . B ]
V [sAd,B ]  V [sA*. B] 
hjdlpad *drukkna
3.6 With or Without PRO?
The present account has extended to all the examples, allowing the possible ones, 
whilst precluding their ungrammatical counterparts, removing Icelandic’s stature as a 
language that can provide conclusive evidence for PRO’s existence. In the next 
section, however, we encounter data that are problematic for both the present account 
and one that utilises PRO, namely long-distance case-agreement. But is an account 
based on PRO nevertheless preferable to one that isn’t? A comparison of the 
assumptions necessary for this account with those necessary for a PRO-based 
account, such as in Sigurdsson 2002, will demonstrate that there is little to distinguish 
them, both making very similar assumptions. What could tip the balance in favour of 
the present account is the last sub-section, which shows that PRO cannot actually do 
the task it needs to.
3.6.1 Long-Distance Case-Agreement
The previous section focussed on secondary predicates in controlled clauses, 
comparing the agreement options for predicates merged with quirky participles with 
those for predicates merged with regular participles. The resulting generalisation was 
that a secondary predicate merged with a quirky participle must agree in case with the 
would-be subject of that quirky participle, cross-clause case-agreement being entirely 
out. This is expected if quirky case is theta-linked and in this story regulated by 0-
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identification (see the stricture in (46) above). This case-agreement then, is a local, 
syntactically regulated relation based on copying:
(55) Local case-agreement is regulated by ©-identification
But a complication to this thus far neat picture is that in restricted circumstances, 
Icelandic exhibits long-distance case-agreement. Specifically, long-distance case- 
agreement is a universally accepted option on semi-10, primary and secondary 
predicates within object-controlled complements (see especially brainsson 1979 and 
Sigurdsson 1989,1991). In each instance, cross-clause agreement with the accusative 
matrix controller is the more widely accepted option:
(56) a. Jon bad Bjama ad koma einan
Jon(N) asked Bami(A) to come alone(A)
b. %Jon bad Bjama ad koma einn
Jon(N) asked Bami(A) to come alone(N)
Of the 6 Icelandic informants on which this data was tested, all accepted (56)a) as 
perfect, whereas there was a clear split for (56)b), with half accepting it and half 
rejecting it. A similar pattern of judgements obtains for secondary predicates in 
object-controlled complements:
(57) a) J6n bad hana ad dansa nakta
Jon(N) asked her(A) to dance naked(A)
b) %Jon bad hana ad dansa nakin
101 use this admittedly vague term to refer to elements such as ‘alone’.
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Jon(N) asked her(A) to dance naked(N)
5 out of 6 informants accepted (57)a) as perfect and 1 found it marginal. For (b), 
acceptance was again split, with 3 finding (b) perfect and 3 rejecting it completely11 
Primary predicates follow suit: again the accusative agreement in (58)a) was accepted 
by all, whereas 3 found the nominative in (b) perfect and on the same par as (a), 
whilst 3 speakers rejected it completely.
(58) a. Maria bad hana ad vera goda
Maria(N) asked her(A) to be good(A)
b. %Maria bad hana ad vera god
Maria(N) asked her(A) to be good(N)
So the descriptive generalisation is that in all instances the element in question, be it a 
semi-, a secondary or a primary predicate, prefers to agree in case with its semantic 
subject, although nominative remains a possible, if less widely acceptable 
alternative.12 The non-syntactic rule proposed for phi-agreement, repeated in (59) 
below, in a sense extends to both the cross-clause accusative and the nominative 
agreement:
(59) Properties of the semantic subject of a terminal node X, cannot clash with 
features in X that index the subject
In all of the examples in (56) - (58) the semantic subject is the accusative object in the 
matrix clause, and X is the semi-, secondary or primary predicate respectively and the
11 The same 3 that had rejected the nominative agreement in example (55b)
12 Of these 6 informants, there was a general trend for the younger informants (20 yrs -  30yrs) to reject 
the nominative. The 3 more ‘mature’ ones tended to rate them equally.
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possibility of the nominative is also not at odds with this rule, if nominative 
represents an absence of case, as argued above. The negative formulation of the rule 
above permits absence of case-agreement between X and X’s semantic subject, a 
circumstance represented by instances labelled conventionally as nominative.
But it is nonetheless strange that phi-feature agreement is obligatory, whereas case- 
agreement is optional. And another reason for being suspicious about a semantic- 
centred explanation of this optional agreement surfaces when we note what purpose 
these features serve. Gender and number agreement on a predicate identify 
interpretative properties of their antecedent, unlike case. It does not make intuitive 
sense then, that those features which have no role in interpretation be regulated by a 
semantic rule.
The question remains as to why there is an object- subject-asymmetry in case- 
agreement, in that availability of long-distance case-agreement is limited to when 
there is an object in the matrix clause. I will take an, at this point, stipulative measure 
in trying to address this question. The system operative for the subject-control cases 
in (42) to (45) extends to that of object-control in that if a quirky verb occurs in the 
infinitival clause, the long-distance case-agreement disappears. The telling example 
comes from an adaptation of (56), as in Boeckx and Homstein (2003), where the 
quirky predicate bored replaces come in the complement (their 17, but with my own 
reported judgements) and long-distance agreement is not possible:
(60) a. ?Jon bad Bjama ad leidist ekki einum
Jon(N) asked Bami(A) to be-bored not alone(D)
‘Jon asked Bami not to be bored alone’
b. *Jon bad Bjama ad leidist ekki einan
Jon(N) asked Bami(A) to be-bored not alone(A)
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‘Jon asked Bami not to be bored alone’
c. %?J6n bad Bjama ad leidist ekki einn
Jon(N) asked Bami(A) to be-bored not alone(N)
‘Jon asked Bami not to be bored alone’
Although not totally acceptable to all speakers, the agreement possiblities are quite 
clear. 4 out of 6 judged the example with dative agreement on the semi-predicate as 
slightly marked (but definitely not ungrammatical), whereas the remaining 2 judged it 
as perfect. The accusative was rejected absolutely by all 6 informants, whereas the 
nominative again gave a mixed bag of results: 2 found it slightly marked (but not 
worse than the dative), 2 judged it as bad (worse than the dative), and 2 rejected it 
absolutely.1314
So an assumption made here is that the syntactic rule that regulates quirky case 
overrides long-distance case-regulation. Repeated from (11) in section 3.3, local case- 
agreement obtains when the verb with which the semi, secondary or primary 
predicate is combined is quirky:
(11) Quirky case assignment is 0-bound
The less widely accepted nominative in (60)c) is not problematic, since the 0- 
Identification rule in (46) allows both possiblities. In both (60)a) and (60)c) the B- 
component introduced by ‘alone’ identifies with the 5-component of the dative- 
linked theta-role. Dative agreement is preferred, but absence of agreement is not 
barred. On this account, a theta-role unlinked to a case specification escapes
13 The judgements indicated above deviate from those reported in Boeckx and Homstein (2003), who 
put a star against the nominative option.
4 Again, it was the 3 older informants that accepted the nominative.
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regulation from (46), thereby leaving a gap in the system. The examples in (56) - (58) 
fall within this gap. The verb local to the semi, secondary and primary predicates is 
not a quirky one, so the case-specification of the theta-role in the controlled 
complement is undetermined. The predicates in question will prefer to agree with 
their semantic subject (i.e. the matrix object), but lack of case-agreement is also 
available. So when nothing in the infinitival determines the case-agreement on the 
predicate in question, that agreement can be determined by the controller. But to limit 
this option to object-control, we must further state a locality restriction such that such 
case-agreement cannot cross VP:
(61) Locality Restriction on Long-Distance Case-Agreement:
When case-agreement is not theta-linked, then case on a predicate 
may be determined by the controller iff the controller is within VP
The rule above at presence lacks explanatory force, although one way of motivating it 
would be to assume that only structural case can give rise to long-distance agreement, 
but note that a PRO-based account needs to adopt a very similar ordering of rules to 
the one assumed above, in order to account for the possibility of long-distance 
agreement when the verb in the controlled clause is regular, as in (62)a) against its 
absolute ban when that verb (participle) is quirky, as in (b).
(62) a. Jon bad Bjama ad koma einan
Jon(N) asked Bami(A) to PRO(A) come alone(A)
b. ?Jon bad Bjama ad leidist ekki einum/*einan
Jon(N) asked Bami(A) to PRO(D) be-bored not alone(D/* A)
PRO must be barred from inheriting case when its predicate is quirky (b), yet allowed 
to inherit case when the verb is regular (a). So it could be claimed that cross-clause
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case-feature transferral is blocked when PRO’s predicate is quirky, which is very 
similar to the assumptions made in the present account. But such an assumption is not 
sufficient, since there remains the question of why nominative case can be 
(optionally) assigned to PRO in quirky infinitivals. Recall that half the speakers used 
for the present study (n=6) accepted nominative in (60)c), repeated below:
(60) c. %?J6n bad Bjama ad PRO leidist ekki einn
Jon(N) asked Bami(A) to PRO(case?) be-bored not alone(N)
In an account in which nominative is a proper case it is difficult to explain why it is 
nominative that shows this special behaviour.
The pattern of judgements within this sample, where older speakers treated 
nominative case-agreement (i.e. absence of case-agreement) and cross-clause case- 
agreement as equally acceptable and younger speakers rejected the nominative, could
be explained if the age-difference observed in this small sample represents a
particular stage of language change, along the lines of Kroch (1989). We can imagine 
that a person’s grammar consists of one rule to start with, Rule X, which demands a 
lack of case-agreement, but at a later stage, a second mle, Rule Y enters that same 
person’s grammar, which demands case-agreement. These two rules will compete 
with each other, until eventually, at the last stage, one rule overrides the other:
(63) a. Rule X: Lack of case-agreement
Rule Y: Case-agreement
b. Stage I Rule X
Stage II Rule X and Rule Y 
Stage III RuleY
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Crucially, in an analysis such as Kroch (1989), the two grammars can be present 
within the same speaker. So to relate this back to the present sample, the older 
speakers, who allow presence or absence of case-agreement, would be at stage II in 
the above example, whereas the younger speakers, who reject the lack of agreement, 
would be at stage ID. Naturally, the suggestion above is only tentative, as a larger 
sample is necessary to see if the age-difference noted in this study represents a trend 
of the population in general.
3.6.2 Icelandic as Evidence Against PRO?
Icelandic hasn’t shown that we need PRO, but might it in fact offer an argument 
against PRO? I return briefly to how a PRO-account runs, using Sigurdsson 2002 as 
an example, to illustrate the problem it creates. In this account the agreement 
properties of secondary predicates such as in (64) and the like are transferred via 
PRO.
(64) Henni leid ilia drukkinni 
Her^fsg) felt(3sg) badly drunk(Dfsg)
‘She felt badly when drunk’ (Sigurdsson 2002 (76))
On this view PRO inherits case, number and gender features from its antecedent, 
before transmitting these values to the secondary predicate:
(65) Her(D3fsg) felt badly [PRO^fsg) drunk^fsg)]
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Using PRO as the means of transferral localises the long-distance agreement relation, 
but not entirely successfully. If an element inherits features subsequent to its 
introduction into the syntax, this is a problem for inclusiveness (Chomsky p225 
1995), which requires syntactic operations to have access to items in the numeration 
only. In the account above such inheritance is forced, since PRO is the source of the 
agreement on the secondary predicate, which, as we have seen from the examples we
began with in (6) varies according to the sex and number of the speakers). But this
problem aside, syntactic transferral only works in the 3rd person. The predicate 
dmkkinni, has dative, feminine, singular morphology. But from where does the 
feminine agreement originate?
(66) Mer leid ilia drukkinni 
Mepisg) feh(3sg) badly drunk^fsg)
‘I felt badly when drunk’
In order for drukkinni to inherit gender features from PRO, PRO must be in the 3rd 
person because 1st and 2nd person have no gender feature, yet if PRO is to be 
interpretively linked with the matrix controller, it must be in the 1st person:
(67) a. *Me(Disg) felt badly [PRO(D3fig)drunk(D3fSg)] 
b. *Me(Di sg) felt badly [PRO(Difcg) drunk(D3fsg>]
For PRO to work, one would need to attribute it with feature combinations that don’t 
exist on any overt counterpart.
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3.7 Summary
The empirical difference between the present account and one that utilises PRO is 
slight. In the former, a theta-role regulates the case on the predicate, in the latter PRO 
does. In fact, it is in the present account’s favour that it makes very similar 
predictions to a PRO-based story, accounting for the data that PRO was initially 
introduced for. But the present account makes a distinction between those features 
that are regulated syntactically (quirky case) and those that fall outside of this 
boundary (phi-agreement). Examples of arbitrary control and control by an 
antecedent that lacks the features necesssary for inheritance have shown this 
demarcation to be warranted. Whether or not it also preferable to a story that utilises 
PRO, depends not just on PRO’s felicity as a transferral mechanism, but also on the 
extent to which we are willing to rely on an element whose veiy definition remains ad 
hoc. By offering an account of the case-agreement properties of predicates in 
Icelandic infinitival clauses, the theta-role decomposition approach adopted here has 
not only shown that PRO is unnecessary but that it cannot actually fulfill the task for 
which it was proposed.
In the next chapter, I move away from obligatory control and on to non-obligatory 
control; the question raised is similar, in that it will be asked whether PRO is 
indispensable to this control relation, but in our analysis of this relation we move out 
of the syntactic realm.
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Chapter 4
Non-Obligatory Control
4.1  Introduction
The main tenet of this thesis has been that the control relation can be represented 
without recourse to a PROsubject acting as an intermediary between the matrix 
controller and the controlled infinitival complement. For obligatory control this was 
achieved by implementing a mechanism of theta-role assignment based on theta-role 
percolation. Through this copying procedure, a direct relation between the external 
theta-role in the infinitival and the antecedent in the super-ordinate clause was forged, 
thus enabling the apparent subject properties of controlled infinitives to be 
reinterpreted as properties associated with the external role. Specifically, the 
interpretative component of the infinitival’s external theta-role was copied to the 
matrix VP, where it immediately dominated the matrix verb’s external theta-role 
destined for the controller. Identification of this interpretative component with that 
same component of the control verb’s external theta-role secured the link between 
controller and controllee:1
1 For ease of exposition, the tree shows the path of the embedded verb’s theta-role only.
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V CP [B] - copying o f [BJ in isolation to matrix clause
hoped
C TP [A,B]
T  [A,B]
T V?[A,B]
to win
These two syntactic mechanisms of copying and identification make possible a PRO- 
free representation of obligatory control. But what of non-obligatory control? The 
evidence for PRO in this relation is just as strong as it was for obligatory control:
(2) PRO to introduce oneself at a party is the done thing
(3) PRO to turn up drunk was a bad idea
(4) PRO to all leave at the same time would look bad
In each of the examples above, positing a PRO-subject gives us a structurally 
represented, local antecedent for the reflexive, secondary predicate and floating 
quantifier respectively. But the syntactic mechanism used for the obligatory control 
examples cannot extend to cases of non-obligatory control, since, as we see in 
example (2), (3) and (4), in non-obligatoiy control there is (often) no structurally 
represented antecedent at all. The problem becomes apparent in the example below; it 
demonstrates how lack of an antecedent in the super-ordinate clause means that the 
copying procedure implemented for obligatory control is unworkable for non- 
obligatory control. The theta-role of the verb and secondary predicate identify on VP.
Further copying of the theta-role, however, is futile, there being nothing in the 
structure that could function as a semantic argument. As such the theta-role remains 
unassigned:
(5)
C’ [A.BJ
TP [A,B]
T[A,B] a bad idea
VP[A,B]
V’ [AJB] AP [A,B] 
drunk 
V [AM] Prt
turn up
So the motivation for a PRO-subject in non-obligatory control seems stronger than it 
was for its obligatory cousin, the direct relation between antecedent and dependent 
established for obligatory control being impossible. The rest of this chapter develops 
a non-syntactic solution for this problem.
The chapter is laid out as follows: section 4.2 gives a brief outline of the proposal; 
essentially it will anticipate that two different rules are operative in non-obligatory 
control. One rule operates when the understood subject is interpreted generically and 
another when the subject receives a specific interpretation. Section 4.3 will remind 
the reader of the constructions that fall within the non-obligatory control domain, but 
will focus particularly on interrogative complements. Despite their non-obligatory-
2 An argument will be developed later in this chapter to the effect that the external theta-role in an 
NOC-infinitival does not in fact percolate beyond TP, but this does not effect the point made here, 
namely that there is nothing in the structure to which the theta-role can be assigned.
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control classification being widely accepted, this classification has been rejected in 
Landau (2000), where they are realigned under obligatory control, more specifically 
as partial control. In this section, I show this realignment to be incorrect. Section 4.4 
is concerned with predicting the distributional differences that separate non- 
obligatory control from obligatory control. A structural restriction on copying will 
achieve this end. In section 4 .5 ,1 look at genericity in more detail and identify the 
control structures that have a generic reading. I end by introducing an LF- 
interpretative rule that operates on all non-obligatory control structures. Generically 
interpreted non-obligatory control structures require no more than this rule. Non- 
obligatory control structures whose understood subjects are interpreted specifically 
are regulated by a discourse rule, in addition to the LF-interpretative rule, the focus of 
section 4.6. In the same section I show that such a rule is necessary independently of 
the constructions to hand and give evidence for the extra-syntactic status of this rule. 
The final sections of this chapter investigate whether a combination of these two 
rules, LF- and discourse-governed respectively, can account for two other 
phenomena. The first is the so-called linked reading effect introduced in Lebeaux 
(1984), such that when two PROs appear in the same sentence, the one is dependent 
for its interpretation on the other; in fact, we will have good reason to suggest that 
this problem is orthogonal to control. Nonetheless, the LF-rule introduced for non- 
obligatory control can explain this data. The second phenomenon is that of the null 
generic object of Rizzi (1986) and we will see how the combination of the LF- and 
discourse-governed rule might account for this phenomenon. The conclusion can be 
anticipated: a representation of control does not require PRO.
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4. 2 Extra-Syntactic Regulation of Non-Obligatory Control
Just as was demonstrated for obligatory control in chapter 2, we will see that a 
representation of non-obligatory control is not aided by positing a PRO-subject and 
that, granting extra-syntactic regulation of non-obligatory, an analysis which gives 
theta-roles a syntactic status is preferable to one in which subject properties depend 
on the ambiguous category that PRO is. A non-syntactic response is motivated 
independently of the inability of the copying mechanism to cater for the examples in 
(2), (3) and (4), since, as we will reiterate in the next section, non-obligatory control 
is not syntactically constrained in the way that obligatory control is. Given its 
substantial divergence in this respect, it would be counter-intuitive to place the 
regulation of non-obligatory control within the syntactic realm. To sum up the 
proposal in brief, it will be argued that a theta-role not saturated syntactically is 
subject to an LF-interpretative rule, which attributes the theta-role with a [+human] 
specification.
(6) LF-Rule: Unassigned 0-role —► [+human]
The [+human] specification is the very minimum of interpretative specifications that 
a semantic argument can bear in order to qualify as such. Application of this rule 
must be restricted so as to avoid a circumstance in which obligatory control structures 
become instances of non-obligatory control through attributing the ‘controlled’ theta- 
role with a [+human] specification. For the moment, I will assume that this interface 
rule only occurs whenever obligatory control cannot, with a view to refining this 
restriction as we proceed. The LF-rule suffices to cater for non-obligatory control 
examples in which the interpretative subject is understood generically as in (7), but 
something more is needed for cases of non-obligatory control which have a specific
154
antecedent, either syntactically represented, but not locally as in (8), or simply 
inferred as in (9).
(7) John knows how to fix the head gasket
(8) Johni said that to PRO* to get there on time would be very difficult
(9) To finish off one sentence in peace would be nice
In long-distance cases, such as example (8) above, a [+human] specification isn’t 
sufficient, since the understood subject of the infinitival is a definite one, namely the 
non-local argument John in the super-ordinate clause. The sentence in (9) is different 
again, in that although there is no potential antecedent in the structure, a specific 
implicit argument is inferred. That is, the reader assumes that it would be nice for a 
certain person to be able to complete one sentence without being disturbed. For 
instances such as these, referential candidacy is decided by the degree of saliency of 
prospective antecedents. The notion of Accessibility, as developed in Ariel (1988), 
will determine how the [+human] theta-role’s reference is supplemented. Briefly, a 
separate discourse-governed rule will take the most accessible (where ‘accessible’ is 
defined later) antecedent in the discourse and match its reference to that of the 
[+human] theta-role:
(10) Discourse-Rule: An underspecified [+human] argument can only be linked to
a highly accessible antecedent
These two extra-syntactic rules will collectively cover all the non-obligatory control 
examples. This will be shown for infinitival subject clauses, controlled interrogative 
complements, verbal gerunds, control with implicit arguments and long-distance 
control. The criteria under which these constructions are placed within the non-
155
obligatory control-bracket were given in chapter 1, but I repeat them in 4.3 below. In 
the main, they adhere to Williams (1980), where non-obligatory control relations are 
essentially seen as left-over cases that do not conform to the syntactic restraints 
operative on obligatory control structures. The current delineation of non-obligatory 
control does not diverge substantially from this view, in that non-obligatory control is 
considered to be a heterogeneous group, so uniform rules to which this relation must 
comply are unexpected. But there is an additional entry here, which takes on board an 
observation in Manzini 1983. It runs in the opposite direction from the other criteria, 
in that it actually places a demand on non-obligatory control that is absent from 
obligatory control. This is that the understood subject be interpreted as human. Non- 
obligatory controlled infinitivals also appear to have independent tense, an 
observation I take on board from Landau (2000).
4 .3  T h eN O C C u t
Recall the conditions that regulated obligatory control structures. These included the 
need for an antecedent, as in (ll)(a), a requirement that said antecedent be theta- 
marked, as in (b), that this antecedent be local, as in (c) and that it c-command ‘PRO’ 
as in (d). Lastly, the understood subject cannot host split antecedents, as evidenced by 
the infelicitous example in (e).
(11) a) Billi tried [PROi to organise himself]
b) *Iti was tried [PROi to organise himself]
c) ♦Bill* thinks it was tried [PROi to organise himself]
d) ♦Bill’Si aunt tried [PROi to organise himself]
e) ♦Billi asked Benj [PROi&j to kiss Bobby behind the bike shed]
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As Williams (1980) originally demonstrated, these criteria operative in obligatory 
control, do not regulate non-obligatory control. Non-obligatory control relations may 
conform to some of them, but they do not exhibit all and in some instances lack them 
entirely. I repeat the revealing constructions below:
(12) [To go to the lecture drunk] wasn’t one of your best ideas
(13) [Peter knows [cp how [to fix the head gasket]]]
(14) [Walking back home yesterday], a brick fell on my head
(15) a) [It is fun [to dance]]
(It is fun for x, for x to dance)
b) [[To finish off one sentence in peace] would be nice] (for x)
(16) Peter said that to get there on time would be very difficult
Infinitival subjects, shown in (12), verbal gerunds, as in (14) and implicit control 
constructions, exemplified by (15), have no structurally represented antecedent at all. 
And although the interrogative complement in (13) does have a non-local argument in 
the super-ordinate clause, this is not the antecedent for the understood subject in the 
infinitival, which is interpreted generically. And lastly, the long-distance control case 
in (16) can ignore the locality condition that regulates obligatory control. The same 
example also tolerates split antecedents, separating it further from obligatory control, 
which does not:
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(17) Peter said to Paul that to get there on time would be very difficult for them
In contrast to this absence of restrictions, recall that non-obligatory control is subject 
to a semantic restriction which obligatory control is not, namely that the understood 
subject in non-obligatory control must be interpreted as human. I repeat the contrast 
between the two relations below:
(18) a. This booki promises PROi to be a great read (Obligatory Control)
b. This book is a great example of how PROarb to
entertain children. (Non-Obligatory Control)
The semantic criterion that non-obligatory controlled understood subjects must meet 
then, says simply the following:3
(19) Understood subjects of non-obligatory control must be +human
Note that controlled clauses headed by adjuncts, whose placing into the obligatory 
control-category might latterly be considered controversial, patterns with obligatory
3 The formulation of the semantic criterion above may seem too strong in light of the examples below:
a) Field mice are easy feed for the nocturnal owl. To go out at night therefore, is dangerous.
b) Trotting in the field yesterday, some barbed wire got entangled round my horse’s hoof.
But such sentences are more indicative of our tendency to refer to non-human entities as though they 
had peculiarly human characteristics (such as our reasoning capacity) and in light of this they do not 
constitute counter examples to the +human requirement. Another potential counter example is 
provided by (c) below. But there is reason to believe that this is a nominal gerund as opposed to a 
verbal gerund. Verbal gerunds, for example, do not take determiners, contra (d), and permit adverbs as 
modifiers, as opposed to APs, contra (e).
c) Melting at room temperature is typical of ice
d) The melting of ice is expected at room temperature
e) Unexpected/*unexpectedly melting of ice at room temperature...
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control, in not being subject to this semantic restriction, further supporting its 
placement in the obligatory control category:
(20) a) The bomb exploded whilst sitting in the hands of the detonator
b) The book was rejected despite entertaining the children for hours.
In addition to this semantic restriction on the understood subject in non-obligatory 
control, such clauses carry independent tense:
(21) a. [Going to the lecture drunk today] will upset your mother next week
b. [Walking home yesterday] will guarantee you a lift today
c. Peter said yesterday that [to get there on time today] will be very 
difficult for him
d. Johni knew already what [to buy himi in London tomorrow]
Independent tense will become important when we formulate the LF-rule operative 
on these clauses’ understood subjects.
Before moving on to how the distributional differences of obligatory- and non- 
obligatory control can be predicted in this system, I spend a little time justifying the 
classification of interrogative complements under non-obligatory control. My reason 
for doing so is that more recently, in Landau (2000), they have been reclassified 
under obligatory control.
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4.3.1 Interrogative complements: clarifying their non-obligatory 
control character
Interrogative verbs select a CP-complement, but the generic (+human) character of 
the understood subjects of these complements suggests they are not instances of 
obligatory control:
(22) Peter knows how to fix the head gasket
‘Peter knows how one could/should fix the head gasket’
Although the categorisation of interrogative complements under non-obligatory 
control is widespread (see Williams 1980, Chomsky 1981, Bresnan 1982, Manzini 
1983, Koster 1984 and Homstein 1999), latterly they have been placed in the 
obligatory control basket in Landau (2000). But it is worth noting why the present 
account sees an obligatory control label as erroneous. In Landau (2000), any 
infinitival complement whose empty subject is VP-intemal4 is categorised under 
obligatory control, rather than non-obligatory control, thereby placing interrogatives 
firmly within obligatory control. Recall from chapter 1, that within the category of 
obligatory control, Landau makes a further split between so called ‘exhaustive’ and 
‘partial’ control. In the former relation, the interpretation of the infinitival subject 
coincides absolutely with that of its antecedent, whereas in the latter, the 
interpretation of the infinitival subject need only include that of the antecedent, but 
can also refer to more individuals not present in the structure. To take Williams’ 
original example, where this phenomenon was first noted, a collective predicate in the 
infinitival can refer to the antecedent and other individuals:
4 Landau assumes a version of the VP-intemal subject hypothesis, wherein subjects start out in VP, 
before moving to Spec-TP.
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(23) Ii want PROi+ to meet at six Williams (1980)
Interrogative complements are placed within this ‘partial control’ category in Landau 
(2000), where the following examples are offered for corroboration:
(24) a) *Johni wondered [cpwho PRO to introduce himi to]
b) *Suei asked [what PRO to buy heri in Rome]
c) *Wei contemplated how to promote usi
d) * Johni wondered [cp how PRO to talk to himi about oneself]
(Landau’s 31a, c, d and 35)
The ungrammaticality of the above examples are given as evidence of a condition B 
effect, which should be absent if PRO in the infinitival were truly arbitrary. The fact 
that the pronoun in the infinitival cannot be co-referential with the matrix subject
supports an analysis in which the reference of PRO includes the matrix subject, hence
the condition B effect. When the pronouns in (24) (a and b) are substituted with 
anaphors the examples become grammatical, thereby confirming that it is condition B 
that is responsible:
(25) a) Marki wondered [cpwho PRO to introduce himselfi to]
b) Suei asked [what PRO to buy herselfi in Rome]
(Landau’s 32 (a and d))
There are two points worth clarifying here: firstly, whether or not the infelicitous 
examples in (24) are representative of all controlled interrogative complements and 
secondly, whether in order to qualify as non-obligatory control the empty subject in
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arbitrary control constructions is necessarily restricted to one interpretation, with the 
closest overt counterpart being ‘one’. I would like to argue that although the difficulty 
with the examples in (24) is indicative of Condition B being operative, the Condition 
B effect does not, rather crucially, hold of all interrogative complements. This leads 
on to my second point, which is that the indefinite pronoun, one, is only one of a 
number of possible interpretations that the understood empty subject in non- 
obligatory control constructions can have. Put more clearly, under the present 
analysis of non-obligatory control, the understood subject may well co-refer with a 
structurally represented argument, but syntactically speaking, as will be elaborated on 
in section 4.6, this is incidental. The relevance of this for immediate purposes is that 
on the present account the existence of the examples in (25) is expected; the 
understood subject gains its reference via a discourse rule that homes in on the most 
accessible antecedent (to be defined below), which can come via a number of sources, 
one of which is the phrase marker in which it sits. So the problem posed by Landau’s 
examples is limited to explaining the Condition B violation in (24), which I will 
return to, after first demonstrating that a partial control analysis of interrogative 
complements generally, falls short and then how such an analysis for (25) in 
particular is problematic.
First, recall that Landau’s realignment of interrogative complements under partial 
control means the infinitival subject’s interpretation must at least include the matrix 
argument. Actually, we have already seen that this is not so in example (22), but here 
is another one:
(26) I know how to stop your wife leaving. Make love to her every night.
The imperative in the second sentence makes clear that the interpretative subject of 
the infinitival in the first sentence is the addressee and this doesn’t include its matrix 
subject. Note that this does not mean that the understood subject of an infinitival can
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never take a matrix argument as its antecedent, only that it need not, which is 
sufficient to rule out a partial control analysis of such examples.
I now return to the Principle B violation
(27) * Johni wondered who PRO1/2 to introduce himi to
Although the unacceptability of the above example is not in doubt, note that condition 
B does not interfere with all interrogative complements:
(28) a) Johni knew what to buy himi hi London
= x knew what y or y+ could/should buy x in London
^ x knew what x or x and y could/should buy x in London
b) Johni explained how to ignore himi when he was feeling moody 
= x knew how y or y and z could/should ignore x
^ x knew how x or x and y could/should ignore x
But in these grammatical examples, where the pronoun can refer to the matrix 
argument, the understood subject of the interrogative complement does not include 
the controller. So amelioration comes when we clearly separate referentially the 
infinitival’s understood subject from the pronoun within, hence the absence of any 
Condition B violation.
The existence of examples in which interrogative complements can exclude the 
matrix argument as in (26) above, rule out a partial control classification of 
interrogatives as does the possibility of avoiding Condition B violations, by the same 
method, namely making sure that the understood subject does not co-refer with a 
matrix argument, as in (28)(a and b). On this basis, I consider the classification of 
interrogatives under non-obligatory control, rather than obligatory control, to be in
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the right direction. With the delineation between non-obligatory control and 
obligatory control firmly in place, I turn now to how their distributional differences 
might be predicted.
4. 4 The Structural Restriction on Copying
What non-obligatorily and obligatorily controlled infinitivals have in common is that 
they both introduce an external theta-role. The principle of Full Interpretation 
requires the interpretative component (5), of this theta-role to have the content of a 
semantic argument. But obligatory and non-obligatory control differ from each other 
in how this is achieved. In the former relation, saturation of B occurs syntactically via 
the copying mechanism, in which B separates from A and percolates to an antecedent 
in the matrix clause. In the latter relation, however, its saturation is achieved by 
semantic means; B is specified as [+human] at the LF-interface and this specification 
may or may not then be supplemented by a discourse rule directing it towards a 
highly accessible antecedent. So in principle, there are two ways of specifying how 
the external theta-role will be interpreted in the semantics:
(29) (1) Specify B as human
(2) Copy B to (an antecedent in) the super-ordinate clause
(2) in (29) is simply the mechanism of percolation at work, such that a selectional 
requirement copies until it reaches a node on which it immediately dominates the 
property it seeks, so it is option (1) that needs to be regulated. In order to do so, we 
will assume a choice point at which option (1) above becomes available. For the 
moment, we will assume that this choice point to be tensed TP:
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(30) At tensed TP: B  can be specified as + human
This will suffice for regulation of an external theta-role in an non-obligatory control 
infinitival clause, but we will see reason to modify this slightly in section 4.8, when 
we turn to internal theta-roles that are interpreted generically. The option in (30) is 
recursive, in that this option becomes available at every TP in the tree that is tensed.
The so-called ‘diary drop’ style in English may receive an account from the analysis 
developed here. Diary drop sentences carry their own tense (31) and their understood 
subjects seem to be restricted to being +human too (32):
(31) a. Got the complete set now
b. Went to the lecture on time but still couldn’t follow it
(32) a. #Got bashed in the car park whilst I was in the supermarket
b. #Got thrown away by the dustmen before I could stop them5
If the option in (30) is freely available in finite TPs, the sentences above can be 
analysed as a consequence of the verb’s external theta-role being a assigned +human 
specification at the interface:
(33) TP [A,B] -- +human interpretation at LF
T’ [A,B]
T VP [A,BJ [A,BJ#
V [A,B][A,B] DP 
Got the complete set
3 These sentences are not grammatical under the interpretation such that ‘the car’ got bashed in car 
park in (a) or your thesis was thrown away by the dustman in (b).
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Interestingly, such sentences only appear to be possible in root environments. If the 
current analysis is on the right track and the option in (30) is freely assigned in finite 
TP, this restriction to root environments requires an account:
(34) a. Think I’d better go now
b. *1 think better go now
c. * Think better go now
I return to this issue in the last section, because the account offered will also relate to 
the null-objects of Rizzi (1986).
4.4.1 Obligatory control and the copying of B
So much for the point at which option (1) in (29) becomes available, but it remains to 
refine the circumstances that determine when this option is chosen. Let us look at an 
obligatory control representation first.
In chapter 2, obligatory control materialised when an interpretative component of a 
theta-role, (B), separated from its formal-licensing component, (A), before CP. 
Separation of these components was regulated by the Elsewhere Principle:
(35) Given two competing rules, R1 and R2, which operate in two domains of 
application, D1 and D2, such that the D1 forms a sub-set of D2, then R1 will 
block R2 from applying in D1.
166
This principle, through its preference for whole theta-role percolation, ensures that 
copying of B in isolation only occurs when whole theta-role percolation is 
impossible, such as across infinitival CPs. (see chapter 2, section 2.2.4). B percolates 
to the super-ordinate clause, identifying with the theta-role of the matrix verb that is 
destined for the controlling DP:
(36) TP [B]
VP [B]
CP [B]
TP [A,B]
T  [A,B]
VP [A,B]
The Elsewhere Principle makes separation of B from A possible, because it is not 
possible to copy A across CP. But something extra needs to be said about how and 
why the theta-role goes beyond TP in the first place. In order for Elsewhere to 
become relevant in the structure above, it must be that the option in (30) is not chosen 
in obligatory control structures. But what determines this particular choice?
The reason lies with the obligatory control head’s syntactic selection for a CP with an 
unassigned B:
(37) Obligatory Control-type head selects for a CP with an unassigned B
The relevant structures for which such syntactic selection include subject-control 
structures, object-control structures and control structures headed by adjuncts:
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(38) Paul hoped to sleep well that night
(39) Peter persuaded Paul to get a good night’s sleep
(40) Peter crossed the road (in order) to speak to Paul
In examples (38) and (39), it is the matrix verb that selects for an unassigned B in its 
CP-complement, whereas in example (40), it is the head of the adjunct that selects for 
the unassigned B. It is this selection by the controlling head in the super-ordinate 
clause for a B in its sister node that provides the pull for the copying of the 
unassigned B out of the embedded clause. The tree below shows the full 
representation for obligatory control, including the point at which Elsewhere allows 
for the separation of B from A, the identification of B with the matrix verb’s theta- 
role and finally application of this theta-role to the controlling DP:
(41) ^ T P [Aji]*
DP T’ [A,B]
T VP [A,B]
V[A,B] [A.BJ# ^ J 3 T [ B ]
C TP[A,BJ
T  [A,B]
T VP [A,B]
Application of composed role to DP
Identification of [AJB] & [B] 
Elsewhere allows A & B to separate
If the option in (30) were available at TP and instead of being copied out of its 
clause, B were attributed with the +human specification in the embedded clause, the 
saturated theta-role would not percolate further and the selectional property of the 
controlling head, for a CP with an unassigned B (see (37)), would not be met:
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V
crossed
DP 
the road
in order CP - no unassigned B on CP
C TP [A,B] - +human specification
T
to
V[A,B]
speak
VP [A,B] [A,B]# 
PP
to Paul
The option in (30) allows for verbs that select complements without their being 
obligatory control structures. And such examples indeed exist; in the example below, 
the infinitival clause is a complement selected by suggest, but this is not an obligatory 
control structure, as the absence of any structurally represented antecedent attests:
(43) John suggested [to leave at once]
= John suggested to me that I should leave at once
or John suggested to me that you should leave at once
The same rule predicts that any clause not selected in the relevant sense of (37) is not 
going to be obligatory control. And this is also true; properties of a subject are not 
selected (see esp. Marantz 1981) and control found in subjects is never obligatory.
With the structural restriction on copying in place we can now return to example (72) 
of chapter two, repeated here as (44). This example was used in Lasnik (1992) as 
evidence against a case-centred explanation of the lack of controlled objects. Recall
that the adverbial that intervenes between the matrix verb and the understood subject 
of the infinitival blocks case-assignment, yet ‘PRO’ is still rule out:
(44) * John believes sincerely PRO to be clever
(Lasnik’s 11 & 12)
But we can now attribute the ungrammatically of this example to the category of the 
matrix verb with more confidence. Believe is not a control verb, which means it does 
not syntactically select for an unassigned B in its complement. Without the pull from 
a matrix control verb, the unassigned theta-role does not percolate beyond its clause.
In the next sub-section I turn to non-obligatory control, which in the main 
characterises those instances of control which are not selected by the matrix control 
verb. The only spanner in the works are interrogatives, whose complements are 
selected, but on closer inspection, we see that that copying in the sense of (37) above 
is absent. Essentially, we will see that the complement of a wh-expression must be an 
open proposition.
4.4.2 Non-Obligatory Control - no copying without selection of B
Recall that non-obligatory control structures, apart from interrogative clauses, are not 
complements, so their 5-components are not selected for by control heads. Deferring 
discussion of interrogatives until last, these structures included infinitival subject 
clauses (45), verbal gerunds (46), control by implicit arguments (47) and long­
distance control (48):
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(45) [To go to the lecture drunk] wasn’t one of your best ideas
(46) [Walking back home yesterday], a brick fell on my head
(47) It is fun [to dance]
(48) Paul said that [to get there on time] would be very difficult for him]]
In all these examples, the claim will be that the theta-role receives an interpretation 
within its clause. Recall the option in (30), repeated below. On economical grounds, 
this option, available in tensed TPs, should be taken. This is because copying derives 
a more complex structure, where what determines complexity includes the number of 
copies of theta-roles in a given structure. A structure with fewer theta-roles, therefore, 
is more economical, making (1) the preferred option:
(30) At TP +tense, B can be specified as + human
Examples (45) and (46) are of a clause-initial infinitival subject and gerundive subject 
respectively, so their non-obligatory control characteristics follow straightforwardly. 
In both cases there is no pull from a control verb that causes the 5-component to 
percolate beyond its clause, since the verb does not select for a clause with an 
unassigned B. In the absence of such selection then, the more economical option is 
preferred and the external theta-role of each clause is subject to the LF-interpretative 
rule that specifies the argument variable as [+human]. (We will return to this rule in 
more detail in section 4.5). Examples (47) and (48) also involve subject-clauses. The 
former is an example of extra-position, the latter that of an embedded subject within a 
complement, so again the fact that their external role is interpreted within the clause 
follows straightforwardly. In the next section, I turn to interrogatives and how to 
reconcile them with the rule in (30).
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4.4.3 Interrogatives: syntactic- versus semantic selection
Recall from (37), repeated below, that obligatory control verbs select for a CP with an 
unassigned 5-component:
(37) Obligatory Control-type head selects a CP with an unassigned B
It is in virtue of the unassigned B component copying to the super-ordinate clause that 
the complements of obligatory control-verbs are predicates. In contrast, the infinitival 
verb in non-obligatory control clauses introduces a theta-role that gains a +human 
specification. In the absence of copying, therefore, the non-obligatory control 
infinitival clause is a proposition. But what of interrogative complements? These are 
selected for by their matrix verbs, but the wh-feature introduced by interrogatives 
must have a proposition with only one open position in its scope, namely that of the 
bound variable:
(49) +wh scopes over a proposition that contains a variable bound by the wh
The necessity that the interrogative complement be a proposition, as opposed to a 
predicate, comes from the fact that questions are only formed from propositions. A 
good precedent for this assumption comes from Karttunen (1977) for example. In this 
work, a question is formed in two steps. Briefly, the first step is that of constructing a 
"proto-question", which has an operator attached to the front of a proposition; in the 
second step, this proto-question is manipulated to make a real question. But crucial 
for present purposes, is that one can only make a proto-question out of a proposition, 
so everything which ends up as a question starts life as a proposition, (see especially 
Hamblin (1973) and Karttunen (1977)). Even in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1989) for
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whom interrogatives do not always denote propositions (that is, they're not always of 
type t), interrogatives are always of a type made from s and t, i.e. nothing that 
indicates any missing arguments.
So there are potentially contradictory requirements at work here, in that there is a 
conflict of interest between what a control verb syntactically selects for, namely a CP 
with an unassigned 5, which makes the complement a predicate, and what die wh of 
the interrogative requires semantically, namely that its complement be a proposition. 
To attribute C’/TP with both would result in a contradiction, since the infinitival 
cannot be simultaneously a predicate and a proposition:
(50) * [ unassigned B, +wh] —► [predicate and proposition]
The alternative would be to say that verbs with interrogative complements, such as 
know in (22) select a CP, but not with an unassigned B. Without the pull from the 
matrix verb, the 5-component of the external role introduced in the infinitival is not 
copied beyond TP, therefore, but specified as +human, which fits in well with their 
generic character and also falls in place with their non-obligatory control 
classification, as argued earlier.
In this section we have seen that one of the crucial respects in which obligatory and 
non-obligatory control differ is that obligatory comprises two components: the first is 
the controlling predicate’s syntactic selection for a CP-complement with an 
unassigned B and the second is the copying of this unassigned B to the controlling 
argument in the super-ordinate clause, thereby binding the infinitival to the 
designated controller. It is the absence of this first component in non-obligatory 
control that is responsible for its different distribution: Infinitival subjects and 
gerunds have no higher predicate that could select for a 5-component and
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interrogative complements do not make a syntactic selection for a CP with an 
unassigned B.
I turn next to the LF-interpretative rule, introduced in (6), which applies in all non- 
obligatory control environments, including those that have a generic interpretation, 
those whose interpretation comes from an antecedent in the structure and also those 
whose reference is determined by a specific inferred argument. I begin with 
infinitivals that are understood generically, as these constructions need no more than 
this rule for their interpretation.
4. 5 Generically Interpreted Infinitivals
We observed in section 4.3 a semantic restriction that held of non-obligatory control, 
but was suspended for obligatory control cases. This restriction was such that 
understood subjects of non-obligatory control clauses must as a bare minimum be 
+human. If in the syntax, there is an unassigned theta-role, then there is a semantic 
requirement on that theta-role to be interpreted as +human. The LF-rule that connects 
the semantic representation (where the argument is specified as +human) to the 
syntactic representation (the unassigned theta-role) can be formulated as follows:
(51) LF-Rule: Unassigned 0-role is interpreted as +human
Application of this rule does supply the unassigned role with some referential 
content, albeit a rather sparse one. But for what non-obligatorily controlled 
environments does this specification suffice? It cannot be sufficient for cases of long­
distance control:
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(52) Peter said that [[to get there on time] would be very difficult for him]]
Here the external role of the infinitival is referentially dependent on the fully 
specified antecedent in the matrix clause. So although there is no contradiction 
between an external theta-role with a +human specification and Peter, the rule that 
specifies the restriction on the variable is not sufficient for the theta-role’s 
interpretation to be fully equated with the argument with which it shares its reference 
and all the features this argument bears. A +human interpretation also falls short for 
instances of implicit control in which the inferred argument refers to a specific 
discourse referent, in this case the speaker:
(53) To finish off one sentence in peace would be nice
I return to both of these examples in section 4.7, where I argue that a discourse- 
governed rule supplements the +human interpretation. But for now, I return to where 
the sparse content provided by a +human specification is exactly what is required, 
namely generic contexts, one of whose very hallmarks is an omission of any referral 
to specifics. There is then, an accord between an external role that has a +human 
specification and a generically interpreted clause. It is the coincidence of these two 
factors, namely a +human interpretation and genericity, which occur with 
interrogative complements. What we will motivate in the next section is that although 
these complements’ genericity is licensed by the presence of a generic operator at the 
semantic level, the +human specification is exactly the right amount of information 
for their interpretation. But a short introduction to genericity that will ground the 
claim precedes.
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4.5.1 Genericity
Generic infinitival sentences do not express properties of any specific events or 
individuals; rather they refer to generalisations over events, referring to custom-like 
regularities:
(54) To dance is fun
(55) Dancing the tango is fun
In both the extra-posed sentence in (54) and the verbal gerund in (55), the
interpretation is such that ‘dancing is fun for people in general’. Adding a specific
time reference guides away from the generic interpretation, leaving us with an 
expectation for a conversational cue to guide us to towards a referent for the 
individual(s) dancing:
(56) a) It was fun to dance yesterday
b) Dancing the tango on Saturday night was fun
The present account will focus on two types of clauses in which the understood 
subject can receive a generic interpretation: interrogative complements, as in (57) and 
so called ‘implicit’ control structures, as in (58).
(57) Peter knew how to fix the head gasket
=Peter knew how one could/should fix the head gasket
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(58) To dance is fun
For both of these types of examples, there are two interpretative possibilities in need 
of attention, namely their generic interpretation, as evidenced in (57) and (58) above, 
and their specific interpretation, as in the examples below:
(59) a. John wondered whether to talk to himself in public
b. To finish off one sentence in peace would be nice
The reflexive in (a) forces an interpretation in which the understood subject is 
equated with the matrix subject, where as the circumstances surrounding the sentence 
in (b) strongly encourage an interpretation such that the wish expressed relates to the 
speakers own heart. I defer an account of these ‘specifically’ interpreted examples 
until section 4.6, focussing on their generic guises now.
The possibility of a generic interpretation comes about from the interplay of two 
factors; the unassigned +human theta-role is neutral in regard to a generic 
interpretation, whereas a modal operator at the semantic level fixes generic scope. In 
this respect, the present account gains much from Bhatt and Izvorski (1998), who link 
genericity to modality, although the account of control developed here differs from 
theirs in important respects (see chapter 1, section 1.2.4 and section 4.5.3 below). I 
look at interrogative complements first.
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4.5.2 Interrogative complem ents
The understood subjects of interrogative complements do not take the overt argument 
in their super-ordinate clause as their antecedent. In the main, these subjects receive a 
generic interpretation, their nearest overt counterpart being one. But in addition to 
this understood subject having a reference distinct from the overt argument in the 
matrix, interrogatives have a modal feel to them, as demonstrated in Bhatt and 
Izvorski (1998), where they are matched to their nearest paraphrases: (Bhatt and 
Izvorski’s 36 and 37):
(60) a) Matt knows how to solve the problem
a’) Matt knows how one could/should solve the problem
b) Daniel knows what to do with one’s life6
b’) Daniel knows what one should/could do with one’s life
Falling under the non-obligatory control category, the representation of interrogative 
complements proceeds as shown in (61): their external theta-role is copied up to TP, 
and in virtue of (51), it is attributed with a +human interpretation, repeated for 
convenience below:
(51) LF-Rule: Unassigned 0-role is interpreted as +human
6 This sentence is not available in my grammar, but another, attributed to Chomsky in Lebeaux (1984) 
which makes the same point is:
John asked Bill how PRO,* to behave oneself under such circumstances
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(61)
DP
Peter
TP [A,BJ§
r  [A,B]
T VP [A,B] [A,BJ#
knows [A,B] [A,B]
C
how
CP
TP [A,B] -  f+human specification]
T’ [A,B]
T VP [A,B] [A,B]§
to
V DP
fix [A,B][A,B] the head gasket
Through this +human specification, a generic interpretation becomes possible. That is 
in the absence of any other rules, the result is a generic interpretation of that sentence. 
Having been specified, no further copying of the theta-role is motivated; it does not 
leave the infinitival complement in which it was introduced. Crucially, failure to copy 
the theta-role further, makes this complement a proposition, as is required by the wh- 
feature (see section 4.4.3.1). The generic operator, introduced by the hidden deontic 
modal, is of semantic consequence:
(62) Peter knows [how to fix the head-gasket]
—► scope of genericity
Recall from section 4.4.2, despite the infinitival being a complement of the 
interrogative verb, the selection is not of the obligatory control-type. That is these 
verbs do select for a CP, but not a CP with an unassigned B. Such syntactic selection 
would render the complement a predicate, which would contravene the semantic 
requirement for the complement of the wh to be proposition.
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4.5.3 Implicit Control
I return now to the example of ‘implicit’ control, in which an inferred generic 
argument is felt:
(63) To dance is fun
i
Bhatt and Izvorski (1998) develop an account for examples such as these. Essentially, 
their claim is that fun has an implicit argument, itself generic and it is this that 
controls, and hence determines the interpretation of, the understood subject in the 
infinitival. In fact, they make the stronger claim that an arbitrarily interpreted PRO is 
always dependent on a generic implicit argument. So two factors in unison predict 
whether PRO can be interpreted generically: an implicit antecedent and that 
antecedent’s genericity; neither on its own being sufficient. It is not completely clear 
whether the implicit argument on which PRO is dependent for its interpretation in 
their proposal is posited as a structurally represented one. The statement introduced 
about its whereabouts is open to a syntactic or a semantic construal:
(64) PROait Generic implicit argument in the immediately higher predicate
(Bhatt and Izvorski’s (19)
But the descriptive statement as formulated in (64) does not stand up empirically 
whether or not it refers to an implicit generic argument at the syntactic or the 
semantic level, as the following examples show:
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(65) Bill: The headmaster just phoned
Ben: What did he say?
Bill: He said to introduce yourself to the class before he arrives.
(‘He said to me that you should introduce yourself to the class before 
he arrives’)
If in the above example, the matrix verb said has an implicit argument, the reference 
of this argument is the speaker, Bill, which is not the antecedent of the interpretative 
subject of the infinitival clause, which is understood as the addressee, namely Ben. 
So the claim that arbitrary PRO is always referentially dependent on an implicit 
controller in the immediately higher predicate is too strong.
A weaker claim that takes away the bi-conditional in (64) and replaces it with a 
conditional can perhaps be upheld:
(66) If there is an implicit argument then PRO co-refers with that argument
Thus amended, the above statement is sufficient to account for the interpretation of 
the infinitival’s understood subject in (67). We will return to the generalisation in
(66) in section 4.7, when we turn to the so-called ‘linked-reading effect’ observed in 
Lebeaux (1984).
(67) To dance is fun
Note that, contrary to Bhatt and Izvorski (1998), examples such as (68) below, set 
against the indexical predicate in (67), do not prove that PROarb always has an 
implicit controller:
(68) *To dance is certain/likely/sure
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Certain and such predicates express the extent to which something is true or false, 
whereas dance expresses an activity. Since activities don’t have truth values it is 
expected that the latter cannot be predicated of the former, making the example 
orthogonal to the issue of implicit arguments. If we were to pick an adjective which 
says nothing about truth, that predicate’s combination with to dance improves:
(69) To dance in tap shoes is noisy
The adjective noisy also has no implicit argument, yet the sentence still carries a 
generic reading. So an account of generically understood subjects in infinitivals does 
not necessarily depend on the presence of a generic implicit argument. The claim 
made here is that what contributes to the availability of a generic interpretation is the 
+human specification on the theta-role. And this is indeed true. Both of the 
constructions examined so far allow for a generic interpretation:
(70) a) It is fun to dance
[For people in general] [it is in general fun to dance]7
b) Paul knew how to fix the head gasket
Paul knew how one should fix the head gasket.
So the generic interpretation is not necessarily due to another generic implicit 
argument, but does it depend on anything else? If we look again at the example in
(70), we can see that this sentence has a double layer of genericity. That is, there are 
two sources of genericity in this sentence, indicated by the brackets. We can prove 
that these two different sources exist by looking at the possible interpretations that the
71 return to the double genericity of this structure below.
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sentence in (70) can have. First, note that generics differ from universals in that the 
former allow exceptions, where as the latter do not:
(71) a. It is fun to dance
b. It is always fun to dance
In (a) above, It is fun to dance is a true statement even if we can think of an occasion 
when it isn’t fun tQ dance (when a less than sober parent forces one onto the dance 
floor at a wedding, for example). The universal added in example (b) however, would 
not be a true statement if we could think of an occasion on which dancing would be 
less than pleasant. To test, therefore, whether the example in (70), repeated here as
(72)a), has two sources of genericity, we can see if insertion of a universal before 
people, as in (b), or fun, as in (c), is tolerated. These examples indicate that 
exceptions are indeed possible in two places, since the interpretation of the sentence 
in (a) does not entail either (b), (c) or (d) below:
(72) a. For people in general it is in general fun to dance
b. For all people it is in general fun to dance
c. For people in general it is always fun to dance
d. For all people it is always fun to dance
What these examples show is that there are two independent sources of genericity in 
such an infinitival: the unassigned theta-role that is attributed with a +human 
specification and a generic operator, operating at sentence level. But although we 
have proved that the generic reading of the +human theta-role exists independently, 
there is reason to believe that this interpretation is still in need of licensing by a 
generic operator. There are no examples of a generic subject, for example, when the 
sentence in which it sits is not generic as a whole. Recall that insertion of an episodic 
marker makes a generic reading of the sentence impossible:
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(73) It was fun to dance yesterday
4- ‘It was fun for people in general to dance yesterday’
What this effectively does is remove the matrix generic operator and with that the 
availability of a generically understood subject.
So it seems that when the whole structure is within the scope of a generic operator, 
the structure licenses the genericity of the understood subject, if that subject’s 
specification is minimal. The +human specification that follows from the LF-rule, 
repeated below, qualifies as such:
(51) LF-Rule: An unassigned 0-role is interpreted as +human
The external role of the infinitival verb percolates to TP, the point at which the 
+human specification option becomes available (see (30)). With this minimal 
specification, the generic interpretation is made available, but through the generic 
operator at sentence level, the interpretation is licensed.
(74)
TP [A,BJ
T’ [A,B]
V [A,BJ
I
dance [A,B]
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The sparse nature of its specification makes it compatible with a generic reading, but 
will allow it to be enriched when a particular antecedent suggests itself, for example 
when an episodic marker is added:
(75) To dance was fun yesterday
Notice that addition of an episodic marker, such as in the example above, which 
makes the event referred to specific, removes the possibility of a generic reading of 
the understood subject.
If  the theta-role’s specification were any more detailed, this specification might clash 
with those of the particular antecedent with which it might be subsequently linked. 
This argument is developed further in the next section, where we look more closely at 
the discourse metric that fleshes out the interpretation of +human theta-roles in non­
generic contexts.
4. 6 Discourse-regulated antecedents
The inter-face rule introduced in section 4.4 supplies referential content to unassigned 
theta-roles in NOC-clauses via the +human specification. We saw that this rendered 
the theta-role compatible with generic readings, where minimal specification is 
required, but something more is needed for those instances in which the reference of 
the inferred subject is concrete. These include examples in which the inferred 
subject’s antecedent is present in the structure (76), where its referent is mentioned in 
the discourse (77) and also when the referent is simply inferred (78).
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(76) John said that to get there on time would be difficult
(77) Bill: That’s what we should be doing
Ben: What is?
Bill: Sailing the seas without a care in the world
(78) To finish off one sentence in peace would be nice
For such examples then, the +human attribution is not sufficient, but a pragmatically 
governed rule, which directs an underspecified argument towards a highly salient 
conversational cue for interpretation, is:
(79) Discourse-Rule: An underspecified [+human] argument can only be co-
referential with a highly accessible antecedent
The decision as to what makes an antecedent highly accessible will be determined 
using a metric along the lines of that developed in Ariel (1988), in which it is shown 
that the weaker a referential dependent, the more salient its antecedent must be. I 
begin by motivating an extra-syntactic mechanism, before introducing Ariel’s metric, 
which is then put to use on the data in question. I go on to provide evidence for this 
rule’s extra-syntactic status before explaining how copying of B beyond non- 
obligatorily controlled infinitivals is barred. Section 4.7 demonstrates how the 
combination of these two inter-face rules can cater for what is often referred to in the 
literature as the linked-reading effect. The chapter concludes with section 4.8, by 
drawing a parallel between understood non-obligatory control subjects in English and 
the Italian null-objects of Rizzi (1986), suggesting that the latter are interpreted via 
the same rule. If correct, then this discourse-rule is not peculiar to non-obligatory 
control-4subjects’, but has a broader relevance, moving it in the direction of a 
general grammatical principle.
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4.6.1 Accessibility Theory and Antecedent Choice
Before leading on to an explanation of how a theory of Accessibility might work, it is 
worth noting why such a theory is needed in the first place. Syntactically speaking, 
non-anaphoric expressions are free, but in practice something in the discourse 
restricts them:
(80) As for Ben’s girlfriend, her mother can’t stand h’r
The syntax allows us to construe the reduced pronoun h 'r as distinct from the DP 
Ben's girlfriend, but the fact that they are understood as being co-referential means 
something extra-syntactic is regulating our use of referential expressions during 
discourse. That something is Accessibility, as developed in Ariel (1988), in which it 
is argued that the form/content of a (pro)noun instructs us as to how to link it to an 
antecedent. The basic idea is that the more information a (pro)noun encodes, the less 
obvious its antecedent needs to be and using this criteria (pro)nouns are ordered on a 
hierarchical scale. At one end are low accessibility markers, such as proper nouns; 
these would be used by a speaker who is unable assume that their addressee has any 
prior knowledge about who the speaker is referring to. So in the example below, 
where both (a) and (b) signify an initial communicative attempt, (b), which uses a 
proper noun, would be the most sensible choice of expression for a speaker that 
wishes to be understood:
(81) a) #He just left the room
b) Bill just left the room
187
Proper nouns then, are low accessibility markers, as are definite descriptions. The 
more lexical material an accessibility marker comprises, the lower on the scale it is, 
which makes sense given that each addition contributes more information for the 
addressee:
(82) a) The man just came into the room
b) The man with the heavy moustache just came into the room
c) The man with the heavy moustache that we bumped into yesterday
just came into the room.
At the opposite end of the scale, lie high accessibility markers, which are those 
expressions used when a speaker can assume their addressee has immediate or easy 
access to their referent. In terms of saliency, 1st and 2nd person should make more 
accessible antecedents than 3rd person, since 1st and 2nd refer to the speaker and the 
addressee, both of whom are involved in the discourse to hand. And this is so. In the 
absence of any additional conversational cue, (83)c), in which a 3rd person is taken to 
be the person to whom the directions are addressed is decidedly odd:
(83) a. One tablet should be taken every four hours
b. ‘You should take one tablet every four hours’
c. #‘They should take one table every four hours’
Being less obvious, or salient, in terms of Ariel’s criteria, a 3rd person requires an 
additional pointer if it is to act as the referential source for an implicit argument, 
whose paucity of features make it a high accessibility marker (see (87)). A topic 
marker can act as such a pointer, for example, the overt marker, as for, which guides 
unambiguously to the referential source, as its ameliorative effect on (83)c) shows:
(84) As for children under 12, V* a tablet should be taken every four hours
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Zero pronouns are the highest accessibility markers, always requiring highly 
accessible antecedents. The omitted subject of the diary-drop style of speech, as in 
(85) is strongly biased towards an interpretation in which it is understood to be the 
speaker of the discourse, namely the 1st person. Since the speaker of the discourse is 
the most accessible antecedent, any other interpretations, although compatible with 
the form of the verb, would be at odds with the contextual cues available and 
communication would fail. The sentences in (85) cannot be uttered, if the intended 
interpretations are as in (86).
(85) Went to the lecture yesterday, but fell asleep before the end. Got a D for the 
essay.
(86) #Jason went to the lecture yesterday. Susan fell asleep before the end. You 
got a D for your essay.
Given their absence of lexical material, the understood subjects of non-obligatory 
control-infinitivals must be at the top of the accessibility hierarchy, too. But where as 
those of obligatorily controlled clauses pattern with overt anaphors in that their 
referential sources are sought syntactically, the inferred subjects of non-obligatorily 
controlled clauses tally better with the restrictions on pronouns: there may or may not 
be a linguistic antecedent, but if present it need not be local or in any particular 
configuration. With these distinctions in mind, the following Ariel-based hierarchy of 
accessibility can be constructed, where (1) indicates markers of high accessibility 
and (5) low:
(87) 1) null pronouns
2) clitics/weak pronouns
3) strong pronouns
4) definite descriptions
5) proper nouns
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The factors which grade the referential forms above according to how accessible their 
antecedents must be include saliency, for example if their antecedent is marked as a 
topic, competition between referential candidates and distance between a (pro)noun 
and its referential source:
4.6.2 Application of the Discourse Rule
Application of the principles behind Accessibility would guide interpretation of non- 
obligatorily controlled clauses in the following way. Recall first that the discourse 
rule, repeated below, restricts their interpretation to an antecedent that is highly 
accessible:
(89) Discourse-Rule: An underspecified [+human] argument can only be
co-referential with a highly accessible antecedent
Non-obligatorily controlled understood subjects are at the top end of the Accessibility 
scale in terms of their need for referential sources, lacking in lexical features as they 
do. They should then demand their referential sources to be highly salient, free from 
competitors and if present in the structure, closer than other potential candidates (88). 
The residual structures for which we must still account are long-distance control, 
verbal gerunds and non-generic implicit control cases:
(88) a) Saliency
b) Competition
c) Distance
topicality
presence/absence
local/inter-sentential/intra-
paragraph
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(90) Peter said that [to get there on time] would be very difficult.
(91) Walking back home yesterday, a brick fell on my head
(92) To finish off one sentence in peace would be nice
Taking the long-distance control example in (90) first; the infinitival subject of the 
embedded clause does have one potential antecedent in the super-ordinate clause, 
marking it as the most accessible antecedent vacuously. There are no other 
competitors and Peter is the topic of the conversation, so a construal under which the 
understood subject is interpreted as a third unmentioned party, say Paul, is barred. If, 
however, Paul is mentioned in the discourse, then distance and salience regain 
significance:
(93) Paul was confident that he could attend the concert and still make it to the 
viva on time. Peter said that to get there on time would be very difficult.
Despite there being two competitors for the understood subject, and Peter being 
closer, the most salient, and therefore most obvious antecedent choice, is Paul, the 
topic of the conversation. But the sparse information provided in (93) does not 
absolutely rule out an interpretation in which both Peter and Paul for example, are 
the antecedents of the understood subject and this is exactly what is required from a 
pragmatically driven rule, which should guide, rather than direct absolutely. Paul 
remains the preferred, but both Peter and Paul together are a possible, option.
The verbal gerund repeated below can be accounted for in similar fashion. 
Again, there is a null-subject, making 1st or 2nd person, both of whom are present in 
the discourse to hand, most accessible and hence preferred antecedents. Addition of 
the first 1st person possessive pronoun in the following clause, however, provides the
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crucial cue and we interpret the understood subject as 1st person (94)a) rather than 2nd 
(94)b).
(91) Walking back home yesterday, a brick fell on my head
(94) a) Whilst I was walking back home yesterday, a brick fell on my head
b) #Whilst you were walking back home yesterday, a brick fell on my
head
Lastly, the case of implicit control, where the implicit argument refers to someone 
specific, also follows from Accessibility Theory without complications:
(95) To finish off one sentence in peace would be nice
The indexical predicate nice has an inferred argument which may or may not be 
represented structurally, but for present purposes it is enough that it is the only 
conceivable antecedent for the infinitival’s null-subject, there being no other 
competitors.
4.6.3 Support for the Extra-Syntactic Nature of the Discourse Rule
Having illustrated how the combination of the discourse rule in (89) and Ariel’s 
notion of Accessibility can regulate the interpretation of the unassigned external 
theta-role, this section ends with evidence for the extra-syntactic nature of this rule. 
Firstly, recall that the obligatory control relation comprises two key parts: the control 
verb’s specification that determines which of its arguments act as controller and the
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copying mechanism, which essentially carries out this direction, by linking the 
interpretative component of the infinitival’s external 0-role to that of the antecedent 
in the super-ordinate clause. I have argued that non-obligatory control lacks this first 
component entirely, in that there is never a higher predicate that selects an NOC- 
clause in the way that obligatory control-clauses are selected. It is in the absence of 
such selection, that the discourse rule comes into play, by filling the reference of the 
underspecified external 0-role. This discourse-rule, however, should not be able to 
interfere with the interpretation of obligatorily controlled understood subjects, whose 
reference is regulated syntactically. The example in (99) suggests that is so. First, 
observe how the topic marker, as for, works. In example (96), as for marks Peter as 
the sentence’s topic. Topic-hood makes Peter a highly salient prospective antecedent 
and so the external 0-role of the infinitival is directed towards it for its referential 
source:
(96) As for Peter, the boss suggested to align himself with the union.
If demoted from topic position, however, Peter can no longer be the antecedent of the 
infinitival’s understood subject, requiring a highly salient antecedent as it does:
(97) * As for Peter’s sister, she suggested to align himself with the union.
Note that demoting Peter from topic position does not have any effect on an overt 
pronoun, which is expected; overt pronouns do not require an equally high accessible 
antecedent, so they do not need to link back to a topic:
(98) As for Peter’s sister, she suggested he align himself with the union.
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Topic-hood also has no impact on obligatory control examples, showing that this 
extra-syntactic referential aid cannot interfere with a relation that is regulated 
syntactically:
(99) * As for Johni, Mary promised him 0* to leave
Here, despite John being marked as the topic, it cannot be the antecedent of the 
infinitival. The control verb’s specification that its complement is predicated of its 
external argument cannot be overridden: Mary must be the infinitival’s interpreted 
subject.
This section and the one preceding it has offered two rules, which have collectively 
covered the interpretations in all the non-obligatory control structures documented. In 
all these structures, the external role of the infinitival clause is subject to the LF- 
interpretative rule through which the theta-role receives a +human specification. 
Generically interpreted clauses, among which are those with implicit arguments not 
modified by an episodic marker and interrogative complements whose subjects can be 
paraphrased as one, are subject to this rule alone. Long-distance control cases and 
implicit control cases that are interpreted specifically, are subject to the additional 
discourse rule, which supplements the +human specification. The rule, guided by 
Accessibility, as introduced in Ariel (1988), guides interpretation to a highly 
accessible referential source.
In the next two sections, we will show these rules in operation on two different 
phenomena. The first is the so-called linked reading effect, which describes the 
circumstance in which two infinitival clauses co-occur in the same sentence and the 
interpretation of the understood subject in the most embedded clause co-refers with 
that of the matrix clause. The second is the generic null-object in Italian, as described 
in Rizzi (1986). This null-object is of potential significance to the LF-rule introduced
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for understood subjects, since it implies that this rule operates on objects, too. The 
widening of this rule’s applicability beyond that of understood subjects, takes the rule 
in the direction of a general grammatical principle.
4.7 The Linked-Reading Effect
When two non-obligatorily controlled clauses are combined in the same sentence, 
their understood subject must usually co-refer. Lebeaux (1984) provides some 
examples that demonstrate this linked-reading effect:8
(100) a) ©i making a large profit as a slum landlord requires @i/»2
exploiting the tenants
b) @i becoming a movie star involves ©i/*2 being recognised by
everyone
c) ©i to know him is ©i/*2 to love him
In each of the examples above, the understood subject of embedded verb must be 
interpreted as identical to the understood subject of the uppermost verb. Despite there 
being a strong preference for such two subjects in the same sentence to co-refer, Rizzi 
(1986) contains the following example in which two arbitrary subjects may refer to 
different entities:
g
With the current PRO-free analysis of control in mind, I use the theta-role notation (©) to indicate 
that it is the external theta-role that is relevant in this relation.
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(101) It is difficult ©i to hope that @1/2 winning the race will be easy
(Rizzi 1986 his 24d)
But it is not easy to produce such examples, in fact, once we factor out those verbs 
that centre around competitions, such as win, lose etc, the preference for a linked 
reading is very strong:
(102) a. #It’s difficult © 1  to expect that @ 2 reading the book will be easy
b. #It’s unwise © 1  to hope that © 2  bringing the train in on
time will be easy
It could be that the example in (101) is more akin to that provided in Williams 
(1980), where for some speakers there need not be strict identity between the 
understood subject and its antecedent; it is sufficient that the antecedent include it:
(103) Ii want ©1+ to meet at 6. (Adapted from Williams’ 68)
Such constructions have more recently been labelled as partial control in Landau
(1999). If one thinks of the way in which spectators of sport often include themselves 
when expressing how their team fared, the absence of an obligatorily linked reading 
in (101) might only be an apparent one:
104) Bill: How did Man-U do on Saturday?
Ben: Ah, we was robbed. The referee had it in for us from the start...
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Partial control constructions are looked at more fully in chapter five. For the moment, 
the above examples serve only to put a question mark over Rizzi’s exception to the 
linked-reading effect.
What is noteworthy of the three original examples given in Lebeaux (1984), is the 
generic character of the examples; in the paraphrases below, the nearest overt 
counterpart to the null-subjects in each of the examples is the indefinite pronoun one:
(105) a) For one to make a large profit as a slum landlord requires one to
exploit the tenants
b) For one to become a movie star involves one being recognised by 
everyone
c) ?For one to know him is for one to love him
Note also the interpretations that these generic pronouns have. They are also unable 
to refer to different entities, which must question whether the linked-reading effect is 
actually a ‘control problem’. That said, the LF-rule introduced in section 4.5, repeated 
below, if applied to the unassigned external role of each infinitival in Lebeaux’s 
original examples in (100), will serve to restrict the interpretation of the argument 
variable represented by each theta-role to +human:
(51) LF-Rule: Unassigned 0-role is interpreted as +human
At this point, with two minimally specified theta-roles, we need only recall the 
descriptive generalisation that held of implicit control, which was essentially a 
weaker version of Bhatt and Izvorski’s, repeated below:
(106) If there is an implicit argument than PRO co-refers with that argument
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Translated into current terms, this would mean that the unassigned theta-role, which 
has been attributed with the +human specification, will share its reference with 
another unassigned theta-role if present:
(107) TP
CP
[+ h u m a n ]  ~  TPfAJBJ T 
is
T[AJBJ
T
CP
T
to
VP [A,BJ [A,B]#
V [A,B] [A,BJ D 
know him
TP [AJBJ ~ [+ h u m a n ]
T  [A,BJ
VP [A,B]T
to
V[A,BJ [A,B]H D 
love him
Note that if we provide a reference for the understood subject in the embedded clause 
in the examples in (102), the generalisation in (106) is no longer relevant
(108) a. It’s difficult ©i to expect that © 2  reading the book will be easy for 
Billy.
b. #It’s unwise © 1  to hope that © 2  bringing the train in on 
time will be easy for British Rail
The reference of the understood subject is supplemented, as guided by Accessibility, 
with the result that it is no longer dependent on the interpretative subject in the matrix 
clause for its reference.
But does this leave Rizzi’s exception to the linked reading effect without an account? 
Aside from the English example in (102), the exact identity relation being as yet
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inconclusive, Rizzi (1986) shows that in Italian it is also possible to have two 
instances of arbitrary interpretations, whose references are distinct from each other. 
The example in (109)(a) has the possible interpretation given in (b)9
(109) a. E difficile [ PROarb’ sperare [che il govemo possa autorizzare  arb”
a PRO vivere cosi
‘It is difficult[ PRO to hope [that the government can authorise___
[PRO to live like that]]]’
b. ‘It is difficult for x to hope that the government can authorise y to live 
like that’.
(Rizzi 1986 his 25b)
But again, note that a paraphrase of (109), which uses the overt counterpart of the null 
generic pronoun, la gente, may also have an interpretation such that the two pronouns 
are understood as being distinct from one another. The sentence in (110)a) can take 
(b) as one of its possible interpretations:
(110) a. E difficile per la gente sperare che il govemo possa autorizzare
is difficult for the people to-hope that the government could authorize
la gente a vivere cosi* 
the people at live like-that.
’It is difficult for people to hope that the government could 
authorise people to live like that’
b. ‘It is difficult for x to hope that the government could authorise y to
live like that’.
9 For evidence that this interpretation is one of real ambiguity, I refer the reader to the paper itself, in 
which Rizzi induces a Principle B violation when die two null-categories share governing categories.
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Marco Tamburelli (pc) provides the following context in which such an interpretation 
becomes available: we are discussing how birds, unlike humans, are free because they 
can fly from one country to another without having to carry a passport. When I 
suggest that voters should only elect a government that includes this as part of their 
manifesto, you utter the sentence in (a) above, which could mean: It is difficult for 
people (i.e. voters in general) to hope that the government could authorise people (i.e. 
human beings) to live like that".
The availability of this referential dissociation is important because it again points to 
the linked reference between the understood subject and object being a problem that 
is orthogonal to control.
Syntactically speaking, the linked-reading effect is accidental and given that the rules 
of discourse guide us as to their interpretation, the existence of a minority of counter 
examples is exactly what is expected and desired from a such a rule, which should be 
set to prefer the norm, yet be sufficiently pliable not to bar the limited amount of 
deviance from this norm.
4.8 NuQ-Objects
So far, the interface rules that have been proposed for unassigned theta-roles have 
only been applied to external theta-roles. But there is no subject/object asymmetry 
intrinsic to the rules themselves, so they should be applicable to internal theta-roles 
that remain unassigned. Rizzi (1986) documents a series of constructions in Italian 
that look very much like unassigned internal theta-roles. These null-objects exhibit 
syntactic effects, making it clear that their theta-roles are projected. The LF-rule that
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attributes external unassigned theta-roles with a +human specification can cater for 
the Italian null generic pronoun documented in Rizzi (1986). In fact, in certain 
circumstances, these null generic pronouns can become specific; this possibility is in 
line with guidance from the discourse rule, as determined by Accessibility. The 
broadened applicability of these rules, beyond that of understood subjects, transforms 
them from rules introduced for a particular construction to rules of general import to 
the grammar.
4.8.1 The Data
Implicit objects occur both in Italian and English:
(111) a) This leads (people) to the following conclusion
b) Questo conduce (la gente) all seguente conclusione
(112) a) This sign cautions (people) against avalanches
b) Questo cartello mette in guardia (la gente) contro le valanghe
(Rizzi 1986 his 1 & 2)
On the basis of these examples alone, it is not clear whether these implicit arguments 
should have a syntactic representation or not. But Rizzi (1986) provides 5 counts of 
evidence that the generic null pronoun of Italian is syntactically active, unlike its 
English counter part. Here I concentrate on two. In (113)a), we see that contrary to 
English b), Italian null objects can control:
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(113) a) Questo conduce all seguente conclusione
a’) Questo conduce a [PRO concludere quanto segue]
‘This leads to conclude what follows’
b) This leads to the following conclusion
b’) *This leads [PRO to conclude what follows]
(Rizzi’s 6b &d and 8b & d)
And the example in (114) shows that the null objects in Italian can also bind, whereas 
again, there is no English equivalent:
(114) a) La buona musica riconcilia con se stessi
b) Good music reconciles with oneself
(Rizzi’s 11)
The aim of Rizzi’s work was to show that whereas the null pronoun in Italian is 
structurally represented and assigned a theta-role, the null pronoun of English is not 
projected and the relevant theta-role is saturated lexically. The relevance of this 
analysis for the present work is the status of the Italian pronoun. I argued in chapter 2 
that purported evidence for the presence of a null-subject (PRO) in infinitivals can be 
reinterpreted as evidence for an external theta-role in that infinitival, even if that 
theta-role remains unassigned. I would now like to suggest that same argument be 
applied to the Italian null-object construction: the object properties evident in these 
constructions can reinterpreted in terms of the internal theta-role of the matrix verb.
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This theta-role is what controls the reference of the understood generic subject in
(113)a) in (114), it is the theta-role that is the antecedent of the generic reflexive:
Under this analysis, the internal theta-role remains unassigned and there is simply no 
null-object projected to which it is applied. Without a direct object to which it can be 
assigned, the theta-role percolates to VP, its maximal extension. In order for this 
theta-role to be the antecedent of the understood generic subject in (113)a) and the 
generic reflexive in (114), it must be minimally specified. I would like to suggest that 
the same LF-interpretative rule that was introduced for the external theta-role of 
infintival clauses might apply to the internal theta-roles too:
(116) LF-Rule: Unassigned 0-role is interpreted as +human
This would require a reformulation of the choice point at which the rule above 
becomes available. In section 4.4, this point was assumed to be TP:
(117) At tensed TP: B can be specified as + human
Since CPs block theta-role percolation (see chapter two), it follows that the maximal 
extension of the external theta-role is TP. The maximal extension of an internal theta- 
role, however, is VP. If we posit the maximal extension of a theta-role as the point at 
which the LF-interpretative rule becomes available, we can reformulate the rule in
(115)
understood subject* 
reflexive*
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(117), so that it generalises to external and internal theta-roles; for both ‘null-subject’ 
and ‘null-object’ cases, the option to interpret the theta-role as +human becomes 
available when that theta-role reaches its maximal extension:
(118) When a theta-role, [A, B], reaches its maximal extension, B can be specified 
as + human
In the tree below, the internal theta-role percolates to VP, at which point it is the 
subject to the interface rule, which attributes it with a +human specfication at LF:10
(119) TP
DP
Questo cartello
T’
VP
+human specification ~ [A,B] VP PP
[A,B] V 
mette in guardia
P
contro
DP
le valanghe
The proposal for internal theta-roles is only speculative so far, but it would be 
interesting to find out whether this +human internal theta-role can become specific, in 
the same way that it could for the +human external theta-role of non-obligatory 
control infinitivals in, as we saw in (110). If so, then the same discourse rule that 
applies to the understood subject of infinitivals generalises to that of understood 
objects; and if it extends to constructions beyond that of non-obligatory control 
infinitivals, it moves in the direction of the status of a general grammatical principle.
10 The tree shows only the thematic path of the verb’s internal theta-role.
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Note that there is no obligatory control of objects, since this relation is licensed 
through copying, made possible by Elsewhere. If a theta-role can be assigned, 
separation of B from A will not be permitted by this principle. For the same reason, 
’null-subjects5 in finite clauses are ruled out:
(120) *Johni promised Mary ®i would leave
There is in fact an independent reason for assuming that a null-object is not projected. 
This evidence comes from a theory of pro-drop developed in Neeleman and Szendroi 
(to appear in Linguistic Inquiry). In this paper, languages are shown to follow one of 
two patterns: either they show verb-object agreement, in which case pro-drop of 
objects is licensed, or they have overt objects that have a specific form. Aside from 
Italian, there have been no exceptions to this pattern. Italian does not exhibit verb- 
object agreement and it is also not an agglutinative language, meaning its arguments 
do not have specific forms in the relevant sense. Either Italian is a real counter 
example then, or its null-object is more accurately described as an unassigned internal 
role that receives its +human, and hence generic specification by the LF-rule as 
argued here.
4.9 Sum m ary
This chapter has demonstrated the non-syntactic properties that pervade non- 
obligatory control structures, interrogative complements included. On the basis of its 
distinction from obligatory control in this respect, an extra-syntactic analysis was 
developed, such that all external theta-roles of non-obligatory control infinitivals 
were subject to an LF-rule that would ensure they be interpreted as arguments in the
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semantics. But this specification was minimal, namely +human, which catered for all 
non-obligatory control structures whose interpretation was generic. A further 
discourse rule was implemented on top of the LF-rule, for those structures whose 
understood subjects had a fully fleshed out interpretation. The distributional 
differences between obligatory- and non-obligatory control were explained by the 
additional component operative in obligatory control structures, namely that they 
contain a control verb that s-selects a CP with an unassigned B. Their predicate status 
fell out from the copying of the unassigned B out of the embedded clause. In section 
4.7 and 4.8, I asked whether the two rules introduced in this chapter for non- 
obligatory constructions was limited to these constructions or if they might be at 
work elsewhere; in section 4.7, they were set to work successfully on examples that 
exhibited the linked-reading effect. It was noted, however, that this effect is not 
peculiar to control, since the same phenomenon existed with overt generic pronouns 
in English. In the final section, I introduced a possible alternative analysis for the 
null-objects of Rizzi (1986). The properties of these null-objects were also 
reinterpreted in terms of the internal theta-role, as opposed to a structurally 
represented, yet null, argument.
In the next chapter, I turn to Partial Control, a phenomenon analysed fully in Landau 
(2000). The chapter sketches a way in which partial control might be tackled using 
the system developed so far.
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Chapter 5
Partial Control
5.1 Introduction
Partial control has received its first detailed analysis in Landau (2000). In this work, 
such constructions are shown to conform to the properties of obligatory control in all 
relevant respects. But they differ in one crucial way, namely that although the 
understood subject in the infinitival clause must include the matrix controller within 
its reference, it can refer to additional individuals not necessarily represented in the 
structure. Thus the understood subject in the infinitival below is said to be plural and 
therefore to exceed that of its controller in the matrix clause:
(1) The chairi decided ©i+ to gather at six
It has been quite difficult to get a real feel for these constructions, since all but the 
original example first noted in Williams (1980), are not part of my grammar:
(2) Ii want 0i+ to meet at six
And even in this case, I’m not sure that its acceptability hasn’t more to do with the 
missing object implied by a verb such as meet. But Landau (2000) provides detailed 
evidence that partial control is a cross-linguistic phenomenon, available in German, 
Spanish, Italian and French and Hebrew. If so, then partial control needs to be 
incorporated into a framework for control in a principled manner. Part of this chapter 
will focus on ascertaining how productive this construction is. Section 5.2 will begin 
by looking at the type of matrix verbs that allow partial control, as well as the class
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of verb that must be in the embedded clause for such a reading to surface. 
Interrogatives will be omitted from the partial control category, contra Landau 
(2000). These were shown in chapter four to fit more accurately within the non- 
obligatory control category. With the classes of verbs that license partial control in 
place, I turn in section 5.2.2 to the tense properties of the complements of partial 
control verbs. They will be shown to carry independent tense, in contrast to their 
non-partial control counterparts. As in Landau (2000), their independent tense will 
be used later to predict the availability of partial control, although the 
implementation to be developed here differs considerably from that of Landau’s 
own. Section 5.2.3 sets out some examples of partial control in American English, 
with a view to showing that these constructions conform to the criteria necessary for 
them to be placed in the obligatory control basket. I will then illustrate properties 
that set them apart from obligatory control as traditionally understood, namely that 
the understood subjects in these infinitivals must be +human and that they can 
include in their reference individuals not structurally represented. The former 
property, as we saw in chapter one, is a condition that holds of non-obligatory- 
rather than obligatory- control constructions and the latter aligns them with 
pronominal relations, where such semantic up-stepping occurs. In section 5.2.4, 
we will focus on some of Landau’s own examples, first in English and then in 
German. The results of a small pilot study of these test sentences will indicate that 
partial control seems to be quite a restricted phenomenon, unavailable to a large 
proportion of the speakers asked. On the basis of these results, the present account 
will seek to incorporate two grammars into the mechanism adopted for a 
representation of partial control, one for the speakers who accept the construction 
and one for those speakers who reject it. In section 5.3 I sketch out a proposal 
based on the method of theta-role percolation adopted here. It will take on board 
both the ambiguous properties that pervade these constructions and their restricted 
acceptability. More specifically, partial control will be argued to be both obligatory- 
and non-obligatory-control. As must now be expected the approach will not utilise 
PRO.
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5.2 The Data
5.2.1 Verbs that allow Partial Control
Partial control seems to be a marked phenomenon for many speakers of English and 
for the small sample of native German speakers with whom I conferred (n = 5). In 
what follows, I will stick in the main to Landau’s original examples as I am unable 
to construct my own and have not found sufficient speakers of standard English, 
who consistently accepts these examples either.1 Landau identifies four classes of 
verbs that allow partial control. In (3) below, I illustrate each class, followed by an 
example sentence for each:
(3) Factive: John hated to solve the problem
Propositional: John claimed to have solved the problem
Desiderative: John hoped to solve the problem
Interrogative: John wondered how to solve the problem
(Landau’s (28))
In chapter four, it was shown that a partial control analysis for interrogatives was 
incorrect. To disprove this cut it was only necessary to show that interrogatives need 
not include the matrix controller. I repeat one of the telling counter examples below:
(4) I know how to stop your wife leaving. Make love to her every night
For the imperative that follows the first sentence to make any sense, the understood 
subject of the interrogative clause cannot include the matrix subject, since the 
imperative places some kind of order on its addressee, the 2nd person, and certainly
1 ‘Standard’ English represents the English spoken in England to avoid the misnomer, ‘British 
English’, which does not represent any identifiable class of speakers.
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not the 1st. So the unassigned theta-role must be referentially distinct from the matrix 
subject, as indicated by the indices below:
5) I] know how ©2/arb to stop your wife leaving. 02 make love to her every night
A further reason for assuming a non-obligatory control analysis was the absence of 
Condition B effects in some (but not all) interrogative clauses:
6) Johni knew what to buy himi in London
Apart from the irrelevant reading that the example above can have, where him refers 
to a third party, there is also the reading such that John knew what one could buy 
him, namely John, in London. Condition B does not, therefore, block this 
construction, because the pronoun is not locally bound. A +human specified theta- 
role intervenes between it and the subject in the matrix clause with which it shares 
its reference.
Thus we will amend the list in example (3), by removing the class of interrogatives, 
thereby restricting ourselves to the first three classes of verb:
(7) Factive: John hated to solve the problem
Propositional: John claimed to have solved the problem 
Desiderative: John hoped to solve the problem
So far, the example sentences given look very much like ordinary cases of obligatory 
control. It is not until we modify the class of predicate in the infinitival that the 
partial control reading surfaces. The relevant reading materialises when this 
predicate is of the collective type, primary examples being correspond, meet and 
convene. Let us then insert these predicates into the infinitivals of the examples 
sentences in (7) to illustrate the possibility of a partial control reading:
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8) Factive: Johni told Mary he hated ©1+ to correspond regularly
Prepositional: Mary said that Johni claimed @1+ to have met at one 
Desiderative: Johni told Mary that he hoped ©1+ to convene later
In these sentences, the reference of the understood subject in the infinitival clause, 
here represented by the external theta-role, is said to be able to exceed that of the 
subject with which it is indexed. That is, it can refer back to John in addition to other 
individual(s), which may or may not be structurally represented. The extent to which 
these examples are grammatical is unclear to me, not having found speakers of 
standard English that readily accept them. Their level of acceptability is of 
relevance, since it will bear directly on how we wish to represent partial control in 
our framework of control; we not only need to incorporate its availability, but also 
its unavailability to many speakers. I turn to this issue in the next sub-section.
5.2.2 Availability of Partial Control in English and German
As a first step toward ascertaining how productive the partial control construction is, 
I have taken a sample from Landau’s own examples from speakers of American 
English and conducted a pilot study on a small sample of native speakers of standard 
English. The relevant sentences follow:
(9) The chairi decided ©1+ to convene during the strike
(10) Johni told Mary that he intended ©1+ to separate before it’s too late
(11) Mary said that Johni wished ©1+ to correspond more often
(12) Mary learned that Johni was ready @i+ to fight together
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(Landau 2000 his 45b, 46b, 47b & 49b)
These examples were checked with seven native speakers of standard English. Each
speaker was asked to indicate the status of the sentence using the following criteria:
13) * = ungrammatical
?? = very marginal, but not absolutely out
? = marked
OK = grammatical
Below is a table which represents the frequencies for each judgement:
(14) Table 1 The judgements of seven native sneakers of English on four 
partial control sentences from Landau (2000V2
(n=7) Level of Acceptability
* 9? •  • ? OK
Judgements for sentence (9) 5 2
Judgements for sentence (10) 5 2
Judgements for sentence (11) 4 2 1
Judgements for sentence (12) 6 1
As the table indicates, the results are such that most speakers in the sample found all 
four sentences ungrammatical. One sentence was judged to be completely 
grammatical and this by a minority of two speakers.3 Let us suspend comment until 
we have looked at German, a second language which is documented to license
2 The judgements displayed come from the following native speakers of standard English: Nick 
Allott, Annabel Cormack, Vikki Janke, Mary Pearce, Neil Smith, Rob Truswell and Reiko 
Vermeulen.
3 One of these speakers added that the reason they found this sentence ok, had more to with an 
inferred object that they felt rather than there being a plural PRO.
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partial control. Again, I have taken four of Landau’s own examples from Landau
(2000) and received judgements from a small sample of native speakers (this time 
five) to get a feel for the general felicity of this construction. The sentences follow 
below, after which I display the results in Table 2. The infinitivals of the first two 
sentences are complements to factive verbs, whereas those in the latter two are 
complements to propositional verbs. Where possible, I have indicated their nearest 
translations in addition to the glosses that accompany Landau’s original examples:
15) Hans sagte der Maria dass er es bedauerte letzte Nacht gemeinsam 
Hans told Maria that he it regretted last night together
gearbeitet zu haben 
worked to have
‘Hans told Maria that he regretted their having worked together last night’
16) Der Verteidigungsminister vergass sich schon zweimal im Schloss 
The defence minister forgot self already twice in the castle
versamelt zu haben 
gathered to have
‘??The defence minister has forgotten twice already to gather in the 
castle’
17) Maria hat gehOrt dass Hans uberall herumerzahlte die letzte Nacht
Maria has heard that Hans everywhere around-told the last night
gemeinsam verbracht zu haben
together spent to have
‘Maria has heard that Hans is spreading it all around that they spent last 
night together’
18) Maria hat gehdrt dass Hans behauptet hat die Losung gemeinsam 
Maria has heard that Hans claimed has the solution together
gefundenzu haben 
found to have
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‘Maria has heard that Hans has claimed that they found the solution together’
(Landau 2000 his 53a,b,56a &b)
(19) Table 5.2 The judgements of five native sneakers of German on 
four partial control sentences from Landau (2000V4
(n = 5) Level of Accentabilitv
* 99 •  • 9 OK
Judgements for sentence (15) - - - 5
Judgements for sentence (16) 5 - - -
Judgements for sentence (17) 1 4 - -
Judgements for sentence (18) - - 55
As Table 2 shows, the first sentence was judged to be grammatical by all speakers, 
the last was considered marked by all five, where as the middle two were either 
completely ungrammatical or highly marginal for all speakers concerned.
Now given the paucity of the samples and informants for both the English examples 
(n = 7) and the German (n = 5), we cannot draw any strong conclusions from this 
pilot study, although the results do suggest that these sentences should be given to a 
larger test population to see if the direction in which these results point are 
significant. On its own, the pilot study leaves us with a question as to how 
productive partial control is in standard English, since only the first of the four 
examples was judged grammatical and this by only two of the seven speakers asked. 
Of the judgements in the German examples, two of the four sentences given were
4 My thanks to the following speakers for their judgements: Dirk Bury, Nicole Dehd, Imogen and 
Tilman Janke and Robert Pfeudler.
3 For one of these speakers there was a strong preference for gemeinsam (together) to refer to Hans 
and an unmentioned third party, rather than Hans and Maria.
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judged to be either grammatical or marked, (?), by all five speakers, whereas the 
remaining two were ungrammatical or highly marginal for all speakers, perhaps 
indicating that partial control is more readily available in this language.
One possibility that comes to mind regarding this data is that the plural reading 
available in partial control constructions is in fact an issue orthogonal to control. To 
what extent, for example, do the verbs used in the sentences in (9) to (12), repeated 
here as (20) to (23), license plural readings in non-control environments? The 
examples in (24) illustrate:6
(20) The chairi decided ®i+ to convene during the strike
(21) Johni told Mary that he intended ®i+ to separate before it’s too late
(22) Mary said that Johni wished ®i+ to correspond more often
(23) Mary learned that Johni was ready ©i+ to fight together
(24) a. The chair convened during the strike
b. John separated before his marriage became unbearable
c. John corresponded regularly
It is not without consequence to check the status of these constructions, since its 
productivity will help determine how we should account for its availability in our 
grammar. In Landau (2000), a singular subject with such a collective verb is ruled 
out:
(25) *John met at six (his (la, p27))
At this point, the status of partial control constructions in English and German 
remains unclear. But Landau (2000) provides many judgements from very diverse 
languages, including Hebrew and Catalan, all of which point to partial control being
6 The example in (23) has been omitted because of the plural reflexive in the infinitival clause. 
Similarly, I have not included the German examples because three of the four examples also have a 
plural reflexive, (gemeinsam) and the remaining example was rejected by all informants.
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a real phenomenon. For this reason, theories of control that omit partial control 
cannot be considered complete and in section 5 .3 ,1 sketch out a way in which the 
grammar of those speakers who reject partial control and those who accept the 
construction can be incorporated into the system of theta-percolation developed 
here. But before that I turn to a property peculiar to partial control complements, 
namely the independent tense that they bear, an observation due to Landau (2000).
5.2.3 Linking Partial Control to Tensed TP
One of the crucial respects that partial control constructions differ from their non- 
partial counterparts is in the tense properties of their complements. The former 
constructions can have complements whose tense differs from that of the matrix 
clause, as the contrasting time adverbials in each clause demonstrate:
(26) a. Yesterday, John hoped to solve the problem tomorrow (desiderative)
b. Today, John regretted having kissed his aunt last week (factive)
c. Today, John claimed to have lost his car keys last week (propositional)
(Landau’s 91 & 94)
Non-partial control verbs do not display this option. A time adverbial in the 
complement that conflicts with that in the matrix clause renders the sentence 
ungrammatical:
(27) a. * Yesterday, John began to solve the problem tomorrow (implicative)
b.* Yesterday, John had to solve the problem tomorrow (modal)
c. *Today, John managed to have finished his duties (aspectual) 
yesterday.
216
(Landau’s 90 & 98)
With this evidence we can assume that partial control complements have their own 
tense, whereas non-partial control complements do not:
(28) Partial control complements: TP = + tense
Non-partial control complements TP= - tense
This will become important in section 5.3, where availability of partial control is 
linked to this presence of tense. But first, I return to the properties of partial control, 
noting two that are at odds with the core diagnostics for obligatory control 
introduced in chapter one.
5.2.4 Properties of Partial Control
The conditions to which obligatory control must adhere will by now be familiar. 
These include: c-command, the need for a theta-supporting antecedent, locality and a 
ban on split antecedents. Given the thin line between split antecedents and partial 
control, I suspend this property for now, concentrating only on the first three. In
(29), I have used the desiderative verb refuse, which falls within the partial control 
class (see (8) above), to show that these constraints do regulate partial control. In 
29)a), we see that an expletive, which receives no theta-role, cannot be a controller. 
In (b), locality is contravened, where as example (c) breaks c-command:7
(29) a. *It was refused to meet at six
b. *Bill thinks it was refused to meet at six
c. *Biir s aunt refused to meet at six
7 A reader may wonder how these properties can be ascertained by a speaker for whom die 
construction is unavailable, but such constructions can be understood, yet deemed ungrammatical.
See Landau (2000) for further proof that partial control fells on the side of the OC-boundary.
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Although partial control conforms to the above conditions, which we expect if the 
relation is a sub-species of obligatory control, as argued in Landau (2000), it also 
exhibits properties at odds with this classification. Firstly, the ability of the 
understood subject in partial control complements to include more than the 
controller in its reference is absent in non-partial obligatory control constructions, as 
the contrast between the sentences in (30)a) and (b) shows. Such semantic up- 
stepping is a property it shares with non-obligatory control and pronominal relations. 
In the former relation, semantic up-stepping can be seen by using a non-obligatory 
control example that houses an antecedent, as in (30)(c). In the latter, such semantic 
up-stepping is the norm:
(30) a. *Beni managed 0  1+ to solve the problem (Non-Partial Control)
b. Beni decided 0 1+ to solve the problem together (Partial Control)
c. 0  to have gone to the party together would have made John more
confident. (Non-Obligatory Control)
d. Beni said that theyi+ would return later (Pronoun Relation)
But in pronominal relations semantic down-stepping is also possible, as in (31)a), an 
option unavailable to partial control and non-obligatory control.
(31) a. We decided that I should solve the problem alone
b. *The committeei+ decided ©i to meet tomorrow
c. *©i to have gone to the party alone would have made [John and 
Mary]i+ angry
As can been seen from (31)b), the understood subject of a partial control 
complement cannot refer to only a sub-part of its antecedent. And in (c), we see that 
when an understood subject in non-obligatory control clause does have an
218
antecedent, albeit not in any restricted configuration, the reference of the antecedent 
cannot exceed that of the understood subject. So although partial control shares the 
property of semantic up-stepping with pronominal and non-obligatory control 
relations, both partial control and non-obligatory control cannot engage in the 
semantic down-stepping that is characteristic of pronominal relations, suggesting 
that the parallel between pronouns and partial control is not extensive.
Partial control does, however, exhibit a further property that sets it apart from core 
obligatory control cases, but in line with non-obligatory control. This is that the 
understood subject of partial control complements must be + human. We saw in 
chapter one that this semantic requirement is not operative in obligatory control. I 
repeat two of the relevant examples below. For both the subject-control example (as 
in (32)a)) and the object-control example, as in (b), the understood subject in the 
infinitivals complement happily takes a non-human antecedent:
(32) a. The documentary] tries ®i to convey a humane side to Pol Pot.
b. The farm needed the cropi ®i to exceed last year’s quota
Since partial control verbs overlap with the obligatory control category, we expect to 
be able to construct examples using such verbs with non-human subjects. And this is 
indeed possible:
(33) a. The book] promises ©i to be a great read (desiderative)
b. The documentary] claimed © 1  to have been impartial (propositional)
But note that as soon as we choose non-human subjects, the semantic up-stepping of 
the understood subject that characterises such constructions, becomes unavailable:
(34) a. *The book] promises ©]+to be a great read
b. *The documentary] claimed ©i+ to have been impartial
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The generalisation emerging is that in order for partial control to be an option, the 
understood subject must be +human:
(35) Partial control available iff understood subject is human
To sum up what this section has shown, the properties of partial control do include 
the set of those that regulate obligatory control, but there are two additional aspects 
to partial control that set it apart from its obligatory cousin and syntactic 
dependencies generally: the reference of the understood subject can exceed that of 
the controller and the understood subject must be +human. These latter two 
properties tally with those evident in pronominal and non-obligatory control 
relations respectively. In the next section, we will try and integrate these ambiguous 
properties that partial control exhibits into the framework of control developed here. 
In short, partial control will be analysed as Obligatory + Non-Obligatory Control.
5.3 Partial Control as Obligatory AN D  Non-Obligatory 
Control
In the previous chapter, I introduced a rule that operated in both obligatory and non- 
obligatory control constructions. This rule pertained to the external theta-role of 
infinitivals and specified a particular stage at the theta-role could be sent for 
interpretation at LF. If sent for interpretation, the theta-role was specified as +human 
and non-obligatory control was a result. If this option were not chosen, the theta- 
role’s B component was copied out of the embedded clause and the theta-role’s 
reference was dependent on the antecedent in the super-ordinate clause to which it 
was ultimately applied:
(36) (1) Specify B as human
(2) Copy B to (an antecedent in) the super-ordinate clause
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Recall that option (2) is simply the mechanism of percolation at work, such that a 
selectional requirement copies until it reaches a node on which it immediately 
dominates the property it seeks. In order to regulate option (1) we assumed tensed 
TP to the choice point at which this option becomes available.
(37) At TP +tense B can be specified as +human
The LF-rule that operated in accordance with the option made available above was 
stated thus:
(38) LF-Rule: Unassigned 0-role is interpreted as +human
Although the copying mechanism and LF-rule covered obligatory and non- 
obligatory control relations respectively, the partial control phenomenon raises the 
question as to which of these options should regulate this relation, which exhibits 
properties from both of these relations. In fact, neither copying nor the LF- 
interpretative rule is sufficient on its own. Let us see why, using one of Landau’s 
partial control examples:
(39) The chairi decided 0i+ to convene during the strike
(Landau’s (45a))
If the interpretative component of the theta-role introduced by the infinitival verb 
were copied out of the embedded clause, it would collapse with interpretative 
component of the matrix verb’s external theta-role and ultimately be applied to the 
subject in the super-ordinate clause:8
8 As before, for ease of exposition I show only the path of the embedded theta-role complex
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DP 
The chair
(40) IP [B]#
T’[B]
T
V CP [B]
TP [A,B]
T VP [A,B]
- Application of B to antecedent
decided
Copying of B to matrix clause
to
VP [A 3] PP
convene during the strike
But on application to this controller, the reference of the theta-role would be limited 
to that of the controller. So the only relation that this copying procedure could 
achieve is one of identity. Yet the reference of the understood subject in a partial 
control construction exceeds that of its controller, as the index on the external theta- 
role in (39) indicates, leaving the extra referential component that the understood 
subject has without a source.
Application of the option in (37) fares no better. If the external theta-role is sent for 
interpretation at TP, it is specified minimally, namely as +human:
(41) TP
DP 
The chair
T’
decided
VP
V CP
TP [A,B] - +human interpretation at LF
T VP {A 3}
to
VP[A3] PP 
convene during the strike
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But this specification isn’t sufficient either since the reference of the understood 
subject in (39) is much richer; it refers to the antecedent in the matrix clause and 
additional unrepresented individuals(s). In addition, since the theta-role does not 
leave the infinitival clause, no syntactic link can be established between the theta- 
role and the controller.
What would provide an adequate representation of partial control is a combination of 
the option in (37) in addition to the copying mechanism. The implementation of this 
option can be seen in the tree in (42), which puts it to work on the partial control 
sentence in (39):
- Application of ‘B+H’ to antecedent
- Elsewhere allows B to separate
- Copy & + human at LF
[A3]
PP
during the strike
The external theta-role introduced by the verb in the embedded clause percolates to 
TP, the point at which the option in (37) becomes available and is chosen. This 
+human theta-role percolates beyond TP. At TP, B detaches from A (a circumstance 
permitted by Elsewhere -  see chapter two) and is copied to its antecedent in the 
super-ordinate clause to which it is applied.
Application of the theta-role to the antecedent secures their referential link, where as 
the +human specification it bears corresponds to the extra information it carries, 
namely that of unspecified extra individual(s). In this way, we account for its 
obligatory dependence on the matrix controller and the obligatory control properties
(42) TP [B]#
DP T’[B]
The chair
T VP [B]
decided
to
CP [B]
TP [A,B]
T VP
VP[A3] 
gather
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the construction exhibits, but do not restrict ourselves to identity between these two 
elements. This is because the +human specification the theta-role bears represents 
the extra information encoded, namely that of additional individuals. And the two 
non-obligatory control properties that characterise these constructions, namely the 
semantic up-stepping of the understood subject relative to its controller and its 
requirement to refer to a human, fall out from this +human specification on the 
theta-role. Copying of a theta-role with a +human specification will be limited to 
partial control constructions since the option (37) is only available at tensed TPs, 
which as we have seen in (26) and (27) characterises partial but not non-partial 
obligatory control constructions.
The application of two operations, namely that of copying and that of specifying a 
theta-role, is less economical than application of one alone, suggesting that this 
possibility is limited. Recall that we began this chapter by noting a variation between 
speakers: the speakers of standard English in the pilot survey carried out here did not 
on the whole (see Table 1), accept partial control. Yet the American speakers of 
English from whom Landau collected his data did, which gives us two grammars: 
one that tolerates9 partial control and one that does not. In German, the judgements 
of the speakers tended to group more reliably together, where a construction was 
accepted/reject by all (see Table 2). So in this case, we also have two grammars, 
namely one with and one without partial control. Taking on board the fact that 
application of both operations (copy and interpret) is a more expensive option than 
application of one these operations, together with the marginal nature of much of the 
data, I would propose the following: the partial control phenomenon is as restricted 
as it is because the operations needed for this construction are expensive and so 
economy renders non-partial control the preferred option. This leaves us with two 
possible grammars; the first conforms to economy and is operative in those speakers 
who reject partial control, and the second violates economy and is operative in those 
speakers who reject partial control:
91 use this word since even those speakers that accept partial control indicate that the construction is 
often quite marked.
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(43) Grammar A: Copy only
Grammar B: Copy + Interpret
The interpretative option and the copying operation will now cover the distribution 
of all control constructions:
(44) (1) Specify B as human = Non-Obligatory Control
(2) Copy B to antecedent = Obligatory Control
(3) Do both of the above = Partial Control
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Chapter 6
Summary
This study has sought a representation of both obligatory- and non-obligatory control 
without recourse to a null-subject in the infinitival clause. In chapter one I set out the 
properties of both of these relations, beginning with obligatory control, which exhibited 
four syntactic properties consistently. In sum, these amounted to the need for the 
understood subject of a controlled infinitival clause to be c-commanded by a unique and 
local antecedent obligatorily. In contrast, non-obligatory control did not conform 
consistently to these syntactic restrictions, but it did exhibit a semantic requirement, 
namely that its understood subject be interpreted as human. On the basis of these 
properties, I offered a syntactic analysis of obligatory control, whereas non-obligatory 
control was place into the extra-syntactic realm. The properties of obligatory control 
could not argue for a particular direction within the syntax, since the very same properties 
had in the past provided impetus for reductions of control to Move, to Agree and to 
Binding. It was the last of the aforementioned relations, in particular the implementation 
provided in Borer (1989), that the present study took as its precedent. A reduction of 
control to Move, as in Homstein (2000), introduced a raising operation that differed from 
raising as commonly conceived, relying on an NP-trace with ad hoc properties. A 
reduction of control to Agree, as in Landau (2001), obscured the anaphoric relation 
between ‘PRO’ in the infinitival and the matrix antecedent, by securing the control 
relation indirectly, through an Agree relation mediated by a functional head in the super­
ordinate clause. Binding-based analyses, such as in Manzini (1983) and Borer (1989) 
avoided such complications, but retained PRO/pro as well as having their feet firmly in 
the government and binding tradition, notions which a contemporary proposal needed to
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leave behind. A newly conceived binding theory, which did without a null subject 
altogether, was adopted. PRO-less analyses existed already, as in Bresnan (1978, 1980), 
but in such a theory, the controlled infinitival was analysed as a bare VP, as opposed to a 
CP, a conclusion which the present account wished to avoid. A CP-based and PRO-less 
syntactic theory of obligatory control, which might complement the PRO-ffee semantic 
account of control in Chierchia (1986), was determined as the way forward. Looking at 
previous reductions of control enabled me to form a list of desiderata for the present 
enterprise:
(1) I Our theory of control should not rely on an ad hoc category such as 
PRO
II Our theory should account for the subject properties of the infinitival.
III Our theory should provide an account for why obligatory control is 
subject to four conditions, which non-obligatory control is not: its 
antecedent is obligatory, must be unique, local and must c-command 
its understood subject.
IV Our theory should account for why the understood subject in non- 
obligatory control must be human.
V Our theory should explain why anaphoric binding shares a substantial 
number of properties with obligatory control.
VI Our theory should rule out controlled objects
VII Our theory should explain why controlled clauses are CPs and not VPs 
or TPs.
In chapter two, I turned to a PRO-free syntactic representation of obligatory control. The 
system proposed would rest on a notion of theta-theory in which theta-roles existed as 
complex syntactic objects. Syntactic dependencies, such as that between a verb and a 
subject, for example, was represented by a mechanism of percolation, such that the verb’s 
theta-role percolated to a node on which it immediately dominated and from here was 
applied to, its subject. This mechanism of percolation was based upon Neeleman and van 
de Koot (2002), who adopt insights from the framework of GPSG, as in Gazdar et al
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(1985) and also the HPSG model of Pollard and Sag (1994). With the notion of theta- 
roles as syntactic objects established, I looked at the composition of a theta-role more 
closely and argued that a theta-role is a complex comprising two key components. The 
contribution of these components to argument-hood was clearly dissociated, namely the 
component that formally licensed an argument and the component concerned with the 
argument’s interpretation. I labelled these theta-role components as A and B respectively. 
Independent motivation for this hypothesis came from Samek-Lodovici (2002), which, in 
its examination of Italian light-verb constructions, illustrated that the formal and the 
semantic properties of a verb could originate from different heads. Obligatory control 
was then explained using this pre-existing demarcation between theta-role components. 
Given that it is the interpretation of the infinitival’s subject that is relevant to the control 
relation, as opposed to its case, the current proposal used the interpretative component, 
(B), to regulate this relation. B was copied in isolation to the antecedent in the matrix 
clause, thereby securing the referential dependency between the infinitival’s understood 
subject and matrix argument. The path of the external theta-role complex in the infinitival 
ensured that subject properties of the infinitival were not lost and derived the control 
relation without PRO (Desideratum I & II). As Obligatory Control was analysed as a 
syntactic relation, the properties it shared with movement, predication and binding 
followed, since all grammatical dependencies exhibit these same properties (Desideratum 
III). The fact that the same component which regulated binding also regulated obligatory 
control, namely (B), accounted for the stark similarities that these two relations shared 
(Desideratum V). The absence of controlled objects received a case-related explanation 
and problems with such an explanation were shown to pertain to the difference between 
PRO and lexical anaphors, rather than the relation between these elements.(Desideratum 
VI). That controlled clauses were CPs, as opposed to VPs, also fell out from the system 
developed, since CPs blocked complete theta-role percolation and it was only then that 
obligatory control (i.e. theta-role separation) was licensed (Desideratum VII). Its 
advantages were that it avoided the need to depend on an empty category with dubious 
properties, whilst at the same time largely making the same predictions as those theories 
which rely on PRO. In addition, the mechanism could be set to work on Icelandic, the 
task of the following chapter.
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Chapter three turned to the case-agreement properties of predicates in Icelandic, which 
bore directly on the question of whether or not we could do without PRO in a post GB 
era, given the frequent citing in the literature of Icelandic data that presupposes a case- 
marked PRO (see Sigurdsson 2002, Landau 2003). If this data could be explained without 
leaning on PRO, then a rather large obstacle to its being dispensed with is removed, 
lending credence to the PRO-less mechanism set out in chapter two. The main problem to 
be solved was to account for the case-agreement found on quirky predicates in infinitival 
clauses, without relying on PRO as this source. The reason for assuming PRO as the 
source for this agreement was that the case on the subjects of these same predicates in 
finite clauses did seem to be determined by the quirky predicate, thereby inviting a 
generalisation from finite to non-finite clauses, where PRO would be bear this case, 
despite its lack of a phonetic matrix.
After setting out the basis of the case system of Icelandic, I made a distinction between 
non-syntactic and syntactic agreement. The former referred to phi-feature agreement, the 
latter to case-agreement on adjectives and subject-verb agreement. A mechanism that 
linked quirky case to theta-role assignment (along the lines of Chomsky 1981) could 
account for the case on the subjects of quirky predicates and the lack of agreement 
characteristic of the quirky predicate itself. An idea introduced in this section was the 
assumption that nominative case represented the absence of case. I looked at cross- 
linguistic evidence for a bifurcation between languages in the way in which they licensed 
their arguments. On this basis of this evidence, it was suggested, following an idea dating 
back to Jacobsen (1935/66), that argument licensing was achieved either through subject- 
verb agreement or case on the subject, but not both. With the agreement data in place, I 
implemented the copying mechanism set out in chapter two on to Icelandic infinitival 
constructions. The PRO-free mechanism was applied successfully to the Icelandic data, 
allowing the possible agreements, whilst precluding the ungrammatical variations, 
illustrating that PRO was not necessary to accommodate the data. Long-distance case- 
agreement proved problematic for PRO-based and PRO-free analyses alike. The chapter 
concluded by taking the Icelandic question a step further, namely asking whether
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Icelandic actually provided evidence against PRO. A comparison with the PRO-based 
approach adopted in Sigurdsson (2002) suggested that it did.
Chapter four, with its focus on non-obligatory control, shifted away from the syntactic 
realm, seeking to regulate this heterogeneous relation semantically. I set out a basis for 
predicting the distributional differences between obligatory and non-obligatory control; 
obligatory control involved syntactic selection by the controlling head. The following 
section looked at genericity, identifying those control structures that carried a generic 
reading. I ended by introducing an LF-interpretative rule that operated on all non- 
obligatory control structures; specifically this ensured that these clauses’ understood 
subjects were interpreted as +human (Desideratum IV). Non-obligatory control structures 
whose understood subjects could be interpreted specifically, required something more to 
supplement the minimal specification provided by +human. A discourse rule, as guided 
by Accessibility (Ariel 1990) achieved this end. I demonstrated that such a rule was 
necessary independently of the constructions to hand and gave evidence for its extra­
syntactic status. Finally, I showed how these two rules, LF- and discourse-governed 
respectively, could work in unison to account for other phenomena, namely the so-called 
linked reading effect introduced in Lebeaux (1984), the problem of which was in fact 
independent of control, and also the null generic objects of Rizzi (1986). The properties 
of these null-objects were also reinterpreted in terms of the internal theta-role, as opposed 
to a structurally represented null-argument.
In chapter five, I turned to partial control, a phenomenon first discussed in detail in 
Landau (2000). The core characteristic of this control construction was that the reference 
of the understood subject in the infinitival clause could exceed that of its matrix 
antecedent. Having looked first at verbs that made partial control manifest, I tested some 
partial control sentences of Landau (2000) on a small sample of standard English and 
German speakers. The results of this pilot study suggested that partial control was quite a 
marked phenomenon. These results gave an indication of the productivity of these 
constructions and an attempt was made to incorporate their restricted nature into the 
account to be developed. The properties of partial control were ambiguous, in that it
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shared both obligatory- and non-obligatory control properties. On the basis of these 
ambiguous properties, I sketched out an analysis of partial control, within the system of 
theta-role percolation developed here, which essentially viewed partial control as 
obligatory control + non-obligatory control. Specifically, partial control materialised 
when the infinitival’s external theta-role was subject to the LF-interpretative rule that 
attributed it with a human specification in addition to its interpretative component being 
copied to the super-ordinate clause. The violation of economy that resulted from 
simultaneous adoption of two operations was reflected in the restricted nature of the 
partial control construction: speakers who do not like partial control constructions are 
reluctant to violate economy, whereas those that can accommodate partial control are not. 
Throughout this study, PRO was shown to be unnecessary, unhelpful, or both.
231
Bibliography
Alexiadou, Artemis and Elena Anagnostopoulou (1998) Parametrising Agr: word order, 
verb movement and EPP checking. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 16: 
491 -  539.
Anderson, S (1984) On representations in morphology, case agreement and inversion in 
Georgian Natural Language and Linguistic Theory vol 2, No 2,157 - 218.
Andrews, Avery (1982) Case in Modem Icelandic. In Bresnan, Joan (ed) (1982) The 
Mental Representation of Grammatical Relations, pp 427-503. MIT Press: 
Cambridge, Mass.
Ariel, Mira (1988) Referring and Accessibility Journal of Linguistics 24: 65 -  87.
Babby, Leonard. (1998) Subject Control as direct predication: evidence from Russian. In 
BoSkoviC, S. Franks and W. Snyder (eds) Annual Workshop on Formal 
Approaches to Slavic Linguistics: The Connecticut Meeting 1997, p 17- 37. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan.
Bach, Emmon (1979) Control in Montague Grammar Linguistic Inquiry 10, 515 -  531.
Baker, Carl (1970). Notes on the Description of English Questions: The Role of an 
Abstract Question Morpheme. Foundations of Language 6:197-217.
232
Belletti, Adriana (1982) On the Anaphoric Status of the Reciprocal Construction in
Italian. The Linguistic Review  2: 199 -  248.
Berendsen, E (1986) ‘Tracing case in Phonology’ Natural Language and Linguistic 
Theory 3: 95-106.
Bhatt Rajesh and Roumyana Izvorski (1998) Genericity, Implicit Arguments and Control 
In Proceedings of Student Conference in Linguistics 7.
Bhatt, Rajesh and Roumyana Pancheva (2006) Implicit Arguments in Synergy ch 34: 
558 -588.
Bittner, M and K. L Hale (1996) The Structural Determination of Case and Agreement 
Linguistic Inquiry 27: 1 -  68.
Boeckx, Cedric and Norbert Homstein (2004) Movement Under Control Linguistic 
Inquiry 35:431 -  452.
Boeckx, Cedric, and Norbert Homstein (2003) Control in Icelandic. Ms., Harvard 
University and University of Maryland.
Borer, Hagit (1986) I-Subjects Linguistic Inquiry 17: 375 416.
Borer, Hagit (1989) Anaporic Agr in OJaeggli and K.J. Safir (eds) The Null-Subject 
Parameter, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Bouchard, Denis (1984) On the Content of Empty Categories. Foris: Dordrecht.
Bouchard, Denis (1985) PRO, Pronominal or Anaphor. Linguistic Inquiry 16: 471-477.
233
BoSkovic, Zeljko (2004) Be careful where you float your floating quantifiers Natural 
Language and Linguistic Theory 22: 681-742.
Borjars, K and N. Vincent (2000) Multiple Case and the ’Wimpiness' of Morphology. In 
Butt, M and T. King, Argument Realisation CSLI Publications: US
Brame, M.K. (1977) ‘Alternatives to the Tensed S and Specified Subject Conditions’ in 
Sturm, E and Fred Weerman (eds) 1983 Generatieve Syntaxis pl37- 411 Martinus 
Nijhof: Leiden
Bresnan, Joan (1978) A Realistic Transformational Grammar’ in M. Halle, J. Bresnan & 
G. Miller (eds) Linguistic Theory and Psychological Reality MIT Press: 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 1-59.
Bresnan, Joan (1982) Control and Complementation Linguistic Inquiry 13: 343 - 434.
Brody, Misi (1995) Lexico-Logical Form. MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass.
Brody, Misi (1999) Relating syntactic elements: Remarks on Norbert Homstein’s 
“Movement and Chains” Syntax 2 :210-216
Brody, Misi (2000) One more time. Ms., University College London.
Brunner, Karl (1959) Abrip der Mittelenglischen Grammatik. Max Niemeyer Verlag: 
Tubingen.
Camie, Andrew and Heidi Harley (1997) PRO, the EPP and Nominative Case:
Evidence from Irish Infinitivals
(dingo, sbs .arizona.edu/~camie/publications/PDF/UpennWP 1 paper.pdf)
234
Chierchia, Gennaro (1984) Topics in the Syntax and Semantics of Infinitives and Gerunds 
(PhD dissertation University of Massachusetts)
Chomsky, Noam (1981) Lectures on Government and Binding. Dordrecht: Foris
Chomsky, Noam (1986) Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin and Use. Praeger: 
New York
Chomsky, Noam (1995) The Minimalist Program. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Chomsky, Noam (1998) Minimalist Inquiries: The Framework. MIT Occasional Papers 
in Linguistics 15.
Corbett, G. (1991) Gender. CUP: Cambridge.
Cormack, Annabel and Neil Smith (1999) Compositionality, Copy Theory and 
Control UCLWPL.
Culicover, Peter and Ray Jackendoff (2001) Remarks and Replies: Control is Not 
Movement Linguistic Inquiry 32: 493 -  512.
Dahl, Osten (1975) On generics. In Formal Semantics of Natural Language 
Edward Keenan (ed) 99 -111. Cambridge University Press.
Davies, William D and Stanley Dubinsky (2004) The Grammar of Raising and 
Control. Blackwell Publishing: Oxford.
De Wit, Petra (1997) Genitive Case and Genitive Constructions PhD dissertation, Utrecht 
University.
235
Di Sciullo, Anna-Maria and Edwin Williams (1987) On the Definition of Word 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Epstein, Samuel (1984) Quantifier-Pro and the LF Representation of PROarb. Linguistic 
Inquiry 15: 499 -  505.
Everaert, Martin (1990) Nominative Anaphors in Icelandic: Morphology or Syntax? In 
Werner Abraham, Win Kosmeijer, and Eric J. Reuland. Issues in Germanic 
syntax. Mouton de Gruyter: Berlin.
Gazdar Gerald, Ewan Klein, Geoffrey Pullum & Ivan Sag (1985) Generalised Phrase 
Structure Grammar Harvard: CUP.
Grimshaw, Jane (1979) Complement Selection and the Lexicon Linguistic Inquiry 10: 
279 -  326.
Grimshaw, Jane (1990) Argument Structure. Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.
Groenendijk, Jeroen and Martin Stokhof (1989). Type-Shifting Rules and the Semantics 
of Interrogatives. In Gennaro Chierchia, Barbara Partee and Raymond Turner 
(eds) Properties, Types and Meanings, Semantic Issues, vol 2pp.21-68.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Hale, Kenneth and Samuel Jay Keyser (1993) On Argument Structure and the Lexical 
Expression of Syntactic Relations. In K. Hale and S.J Keyser (eds) The View from 
Building 20. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hamblin, C. (1973). Questions in Montague English. Foundations of Language 10: 41 - 
53.
236
Higginbotham, James (1985) On Semantics Linguistic Inquiry 16: 547 -  593.
Holmberg, Anders (1986) Word Order and Syntactic Features in the Scandinavian 
Languages and English. Doctoral dissertation: University of Stockholm.
Holmberg, Anders (1994) The Pros and Cons of Agreement in Scandinavian 
Impersonals. In G. Cinque et al (eds) Paths Towards Universal Grammar, Studies 
in Honour of Richard S. Kayne. Georgetown University Press. Washington DC, 
pp 217-236.
Homstein, Norbert (1999) Movement and Control. Linguistic Inquiry 30: 69-96.
Homstein, Norbert (2001) Move! A minimalist theory of construal. Blackwell Publishers 
Oxford:
Hrafnbjargarson, Gunnar Hrafh (2001) An Optimality Theory Analysis of Agreement in 
Icelandic DAT-NOM constructions, in Working Papers in Scandinavian Syntax 
68: 5-47.
Hudson, Richard (2003) Case Agreement, PRO and Structure Sharing. Research in 
Language 1.
Huang, James (1984) On the distribution and reference of empty pronouns Linguistic 
Inquiry 15, 531 -  574.
Huang, James (1989) Pro-drop in Chinese: A Generalised Theory of Control. In Jaeggli, 
Osvaldo, and Kenneth J. Safir (eds) The Null-Subject Parameter p i85 -214. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers: The Netherlands.
Jackendoff, Ray and Peter W Culicover (2003) The Semantic Basis of Control in English. 
Language 79: 517 -  556.
237
JackendofF, Ray (1997) The Architecture of the Language Faculty. MIT Press: 
Cambridge, Mass.
Jaeggli, Osvaldo (1980) Remarks on fo-contraction. Linguistic Inquiry 11: 239-245.
Jaeggli, Osvaldo, and Kenneth J. Safir (1989) The Null-Subject Parameter and Parametric 
Theory in Jaeggli, Osvaldo, and Kenneth J. Safir (eds) The Null-Subject 
Parameter pi -  44. Kluwer Academic Publishers: The Netherlands.
Jakobson, Roman (1935/1966) Beitrag zur Allgemeinen Kasuslehre: Gesamtbedeutungen 
der Russischen Kasus. In E.P Hamp et al (eds) Readings in Linguistic II. 
University of Chicago Press: Chicago/London.
Janke, Vikki (2003) A PRO-less Theory of Control UCLWPL 15:213 -242.
Janke, Vikki and Ad Neeleman (2005) Floating Quantifiers and English VP-structure 
Ms. UCL.
Karttunen, Lauri (1977). Syntax and Semantics of Questions. Linguistics and Philosophy 
1 :3-44.
Kiparsky, Paul (1973) ‘Elsewhere’ in phonology. In S. Anderson and P. Kiparsky (eds) A 
Festshrift for Morris Halle. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston p 93-106.
Koster, Jan (1984) On Binding and Control. Linguistic Inquiry 15: 417 -  459.
Koster, Jan (1987) Domains and Dynasties. Dordrecht: Foris
Kratzer, Angelika (1999) In A. von Stechow and D. Wunderlich International Handbook 
of Contemporary Research 639 -  650. de Gruyter: Berlin.
238
Kroch, Anthony (1989) Reflexives of grammar in patterns of language change. Language 
Variation and Change 1: 199 -  244.
Larson, Richard (1991) Promise and the Theory of Control. Linguistic Inquiry 22: 103 - 
139.
Larson, Richard. S.Iatridou, U. Lahiri and J. Higginbotham (1992) Control and Grammar. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers: Amsterdam
Lasnik, Howard (1992) Two notes on control and binding in R.K Larson and S Iatriadou, 
U. Lahiri and J. Higginbotham (eds) Control and Grammar 235 -  251.
Landau, Idan (2000) Elements of Control: Structure and Meaning in Infinitival 
Constructions. Studies in Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers: Dordrecht. (Doctoral Thesis)
Landau, Idan (2003) Movement Out of Control. Linguistic Inquiry 34:471 -  498.
Landau, Idan (to appear in Syntax) Severing the distribution of PRO from Case
Lebeaux, David (1984) Anaphoric Binding and the Definition of PRO. In Jones, Charles 
and Peter Sells (eds) NELS 14 GLSA Publications, UMASS: Amherst, MA 253 -  
274.
Lebeaux, David (1985) Locality and Anaphoric Binding The Linguistic Review 4: 343 -  
363.
Lekakou, Marika (2005) In the Middle; Somewhat Elevated: The semantics of 
middles and its cross-linguistic realisation. Doctoral Thesis: University College 
London.
239
Maling, Joan (1984) Non-Clause-Bounded Reflexives in Modem Icelandic. Linguistics 
and Philosophy 7: 221-241.
Manzini, Rita (1983) On control and control theory. Linguistic Inquiry 14:421-46
Manzini Rita and Anna Roussou (2000) A Minimalist Theory of A-Movement and 
Control Lingua, 110: 409 -  447.
Marantz, Alec (1984) On the Nature of Grammatical Relations Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press
Martin, Roger A. (2001) Null Case and the Distribution of PRO. Linguistic Inquiry 32: 
141 -166.
Mohanan, K (1983) Functional and Anaphoric Control Linguistic Inquiry 14: 641 -  674.
Neeleman, Ad and Hans van de Koot (2002) The Configurational Matrix. Linguistic 
Inquiry 33: 529-574.
Neeleman, Ad and Fred Weerman (1999) Flexible Syntax: A Theory of Case and 
Arguments. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press
Neeleman, Ad and Kriszta Szendroi (2006). Radical Pro-Drop and the Morphology of 
Pronouns. Ms. UCL/Utrecht University. To appear in Linguistic Inquiry.
Nichols, Johanna (1986) Head-Marking and Dependent-Marking Grammar. Language 
62: 56-119.
Pesetsky, David (1987). Wh-in-situ: Movement and Unselective Binding. In Eric 
Reuland and Alice ter Meulen (eds) The Representation of (In)definiteness, 
pp.98-129. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
240
Petter, Margo (1998) Getting PRO Under Control. LOT International Series, 8, HIL, 
Holland Academic Graphics: The Hague
Pollard, Carl and Ivan A. Sag (1994) Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar. 
University of Chicago Press: Chicago
Postal, Paul (1969) Anaphoric Islands in R. Binnick, A. Davison, G. Green & J. Morgan 
(eds) Papers from the Fifth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. 
University of Chicago: Illinois.
Postal, Paul (1974) On Raising: One Rule of English Grammar and its Theoretical 
Implications. MIT Press: Cambridge MA.
Reinhart, Tanya and Eric Reuland (1993) Reflexivity. Linguistic Inquiry 24: 657 -  720.
Reuland, Eric and Tanya Reinhart (1995) Pronouns, Anaphors and Case. In Haider, 
Hubert, Susan Olsen and Sten Vikner (eds) Studies in Comparative Germanic 
Syntax, 241 -  268. Kluwer Academic Publishers: The Netherlands.
Rizzi, Luigi (1986) Null Objects in Italian and the Theory of pro Linguistic Inquiry, 17: 
501 -557.
Rizzi, Luigi (1990) Relativised Minimality Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press
Rizzi Luigi (1990) On the Anaphor-Agreement Effect Rivista di Linguistica 2: 27-42.
Roeper, Thomas (1987) Implicit Arguments and the Head-Complement Relation. 
Linguistic Inquiry 18: 267 -  310.
241
Rooryck, Johan (2000) Configurations of Sentential Complementation. Routledge: 
London.
Rosenbaum, P (1967) The Grammar of English Predicate Complement Constructions. 
MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass.
Ross, John Robert (1969a) Auxiliaries as Main Verbs. In Studies in Philosophical 
Linguistics 1. William Todd (ed), 77 -  102. Evanston: Great Expectations Press.
Ross, John Robert (1969c) On the Cyclic Nature of English Pronominalisation. In 
Modem Studies in English. David Reibel and Sanford Schane (eds), 187 -  200. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Samek-Lodovici, Vieri (2003) The internal structure of arguments and its role in complex 
predicate formation. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 21: 835-881.
San Martin, Itziar (2004) On Subordination and the Distribution of PRO. PhD 
Dissertation, University of Maryland.
Sag, Ivan and Carl Pollard (1991) An Integrated Theory of Complement Control. 
Language 67: 63 -  113.
Sells, Peter (1987) Aspects of Logophoricity Linguistic Inquiry 18: 445 -  480.
Shiraki, Hitoshi. (2004a) Anaphors, Agreement and Case. In Mary Pearce and Ad 
Neeleman (eds.) UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 16: 109-147.
Shiraki, Hitoshi. (2006) Economy and the Distribution of reflexives. Doctoral Thesis: 
University College London.
Sigurdsson, Halldor Armann (1991) Icelandic case-marked PRO and the licensing of
242
lexical arguments. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 9: 327-363.
Sigurdsson, Halldor Armann (1993) Agreement as head visible feature government 
Studia Linguistica 47: 32 -  56.
Sigurdsson, Halldor Armann (1996) Icelandic Finite Verb Agreement. Working Papers in 
Scandinavian Syntax 57: 1 - 46.
Sigurdsson, Hallddr Armann (2002) To be an oblique subject: Russian vs. Icelandic. 
Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 20: 691 -724.
Smith, H. (1996) Restrictiveness in Case Theory. CUP: Cambridge.
Sportiche, Dominique (1988) A theory of floating quantifiers and its corollaries of 
constituent structure. Linguistic Inquiry 19: 425 -  449.
Szabolcsi, Anna (2005) Overt infinitival subjects (if that's what they are) 
(homepages.nyu.edu/~asl09/infinitival_subjects.pdf)
Taraldsen, Knut Tarald (1994) Reflexives, Pronouns and Subject/Verb Agreement in 
Icelandic and Faroese. Working Papers in Scandinavian Syntax 54: 43-58.
Thrainsson, HOskuldor (1979) On complementation in Icelandic (Doctoral Thesis) 
London: Garland Publishing
van Riemsdijk, Henk (1983) The case of German adjectives. In Frank Heny and Barry 
Richards (eds) Linguistic Categories: Auxiliaries and Related Puzzles p223-252. 
Dordrecht: D.Reidel.
Williams, Edwin (1980) Predication Linguistic Inquiry 11: 203 -  238.
243
Williams, Edwin (1985) PRO and the subject of NP Natural Language and Linguistic
Theory 3: 297-315.
Williams, Edwin (1987) Implicit Arguments, the Binding Theory, and Control' Natural 
Language and Linguistic Theory 5 : 151-180.
Williams, Edwin (1989) The Anaphoric Nature of Theta-Roles Linguistic Inquiry 20: 425 
-456.
Williams, Edwin (1994) Thematic Structure in Syntax. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press
Wurmbrand, Susi (2002) Syntactic versus Semantic Control. To appear in Zwart and 
Abraham (eds) Studies in Comparative Germanic Syntax: Proceedings of the 15th 
Workshop on Comparative Germanic Syntax. John Benjamins (Linguistics 
Today): Amsterdam.
Zaenen, Annie, Joan Maling and Hoskuldur brainnson (1985) Case and Grammatical 
Functions: The Icelandic Passive Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 3:
441- 484.
244
